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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is substantial empirical evidence and increasing recognition that not
only outcomes, but also the procedures leading to them, can affect people’s
utility from, and their reactions to, those decisions. Indeed, procedures have
been shown to matter in a broad range of areas and settings. For instance,
in organizational contexts, it has been shown that procedures influence neg-
ative employee behavior, e.g. theft (Greenberg, 1990), as well as employ-
ees’ job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Lowe and Vodanovich,
1995), organizational change (Tyler and De Cremer, 2005), turnover inten-
tions (Olkkonen and Lipponen, 2006) or mentoring relationships (Richard et
al., 2002).
Procedural aspects within polity and society have also been shown to be
important. For example, government policies which aim at overcoming indi-
viduals’ resistance to controversial projects (e.g., the construction of power
plants) tend to be most successful if people feel that the process honors their
concerns and therefore perceive the procedure as fair (Oberholzer-Gee et al.,
1995). Research on tax compliance and tax evasion has also shown that
the way taxpayers are treated, e.g. with respect and dignity, significantly in-
fluences their willingness to pay taxes (Feld and Frey, 2002, 2007). Besides,
people’s willingness to engage in cooperative actions within groups, organiza-
tions and societies has also been shown to significantly depend on procedural
judgments (Tyler and Blader, 2000).
Another important area where procedures are of prime importance is law.
Various studies found that people react adversely to unfair legal procedures,
irrespective of the objective judgment made by the court. People rather
obey a decision if they regard the authority that made that decision as le-
gitimate and entitled to be obeyed, irrespective of their own judgment about
the decision (Tyler and Lind, 2000; Tyler and Mitchell, 1994). Thus, the
effectiveness of legal authorities seems to depend upon citizens’ procedural
1
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fairness judgments.
However, there is still a large gap between numerous studies by non-
economists (e.g., psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, and legal
scholars) and the fact that economists began to investigate the role of proce-
dures only recently. Some rare attempts to account for individuals’ procedu-
ral concerns include recent work on procedural utility, notably done by Frey
and colleagues (see, e.g., Frey et al., 2004; Frey and Stutzer, 2001).
Besides, procedural aspects have not only been demonstrated to matter
in various settings but also in a wide range of methodologies, including panel
surveys, questionnaire studies, and psychometric work. However, research on
procedures rarely made use of economic experiments. Only a few procedural
aspects have been studied so far, the most notable ones are the roles of
appointment procedures (e.g., Brandts et al., 2006; Grimalda et al., 2008a),
intentions (e.g., Charness, 2004; Offerman, 2002; Falk et al., 2008), and
procedural fairness (e.g., Bolton et al., 2005; Grimalda et al., 2008b).
I would argue that, due to clear evidence for procedures influencing hu-
man decision-making, economists can not remain silent about procedural
aspects of strategic interactions any longer: not only outcomes shape human
behavior, the way in which decisions are taken do as well. There is an im-
portant research agenda to be developed. Behavioral economics may serve as
an important link. Its aim is to integrate the insights of cognitive and social
psychologists, as well as those of experimental economists, with neoclassical
economic theory. This dissertation intends to contribute to it by using an
experimental approach. My objective is to analyze possible effects of (a)
procedural fairness judgements, (b) procedural satisfaction, and (c) partic-
ipation opportunities. These three topics are closely related to each other.
Most of the previous research about procedural effects is concerned with pro-
cedural fairness to which I intend to contribute. In addition, I introduce the
notion of procedural satisfaction, as it not only implies procedural fairness,
but also goes beyond it: individuals may be satisfied with the use of a partic-
ular procedure because they judge it to be fair for example. This concept is
inspired by Dietrich’s (2005) claim for ‘Procedural Autonomy’. Rather than
looking for the ‘right’ procedure from a procedural, epistemic, or different
perspective, he suggests that a group should decide how to aggregate judg-
ments. In short, if the group wants a monarchy it will get a monarchy, if
it wants a particular type of democracy it will get this type of democracy,
etc. When asking individuals which procedure is right to use, I aim at elic-
iting procedural preferences without being interested in identifying people’s
underlying motivation. The third topic of interest is concerned with par-
ticipation which is also closely related to procedural fairness. According to
the vast body of literature about procedural fairness, a fair decision-making
3procedure requires one or more criteria to be met. Among other rules of fair
processes, Leventhal (1980) mentions representativeness, i.e., representation
of the affected parties in the decision making process where representation
rights may vary from voice to participation. A minimum requirement of pro-
cedural fairness seems to be that, if possible and feasible, the affected parties
should be given a voice: they are to be heard before the decision is made.
In many cases, people want more than just a voice, they want the possibility
of participation through, for instance, voting or vetoing. Tyler et al. (1997)
consider a process to be fair if people can participate in the process and are
heard.
In particular, I conducted (or took part in conducting) three economic
experiments to test whether:
1. individuals rather accept an outcome resulting from a fair procedure
than from an unfair one;
2. individuals rather accept an outcome resulting from a preferred proce-
dure than from a non-preferred one;
3. individuals rather claim a smaller share of a group endowment if they
have been appointed by the group to be proposers than if the group
has dismissed the procedure used to lead to the appointment;
4. individuals rather accept an outcome if they have the opportunity to
participate in the decision-making process concerning the distribution
of a group endowment.
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows: it is divided
into two parts (theoretical foundations and experimental evidence), and con-
sists of five main chapters (chapters 2 to 6) and a conclusion (chapter 7).
Each main chapter is based on a separate work, being composed of an intro-
duction, a main body, and a conclusion. Chapters 1 to 4, as well as chapter
7, were written by myself; chapters 5 and 6 are based on co-authored work.
Chapter 2 contains a literature survey on procedural preferences. I review
findings from the social sciences that have a potential application for human
decision-making, present a classification, and discuss the most prominent
theories in the field. As the predestined method to study these procedural
effects in the realm of economics seems to be the experimental method, I
discuss these previous findings in detail. Finally, I present recent efforts
to integrate individuals’ procedural concerns into economic models. This
chapter is based on Mertins (2008b).
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Chapter 3 discusses two methodological issues related to the conducted
experiments. In the first part, I survey methods of inducing players to reveal
their preferences and review experimental findings that shed light on the
question whether individuals’ decisions depend on the elicitation method.
In the second part, I discuss various methods to classify people according
to player types and consider whether this approach may assist to a better
understanding of behavior in experimental games.
Then, the three experiments are presented with a separate chapter being
dedicated to each of them. Chapter 4 builds upon Mertins (2008a), whereas
chapter 5 is based on Albert et al. (2008). Both studies should be seen in
connection with each other as they are part of a greater research program.1
In chapter 4, I present an experimental game with one proposer who has
distributive power over a pie and four responders who can invest in resisting
the proposer’s demand. I allowed each group of five participants to express
their individual preferences concerning two feasible appointment procedures
for choosing a proposer among them. I then told them the procedure pre-
ferred by the group’s majority and the procedure actually used, which either
was the procedure preferred by the majority or not. Besides, I elicited partic-
ipants’ fairness evaluations regarding both procedures and studied whether
responders’ resistance to various demands were affected by their procedural
fairness judgments and their procedural satisfaction. Thus, the experiment
is dedicated to answer research questions one and two.
A similar experimental design is used in chapter 5 which is based on Albert
et al. (2008). We used the same threshold public good game with one pro-
poser and four responders and elicited individuals’ procedural preferences.
Then, we studied whether participants’ behavior differs with respect to pro-
cedural satisfaction. The experimental design and procedures differ in two
main aspects. First, in the modified design, procedural preference elicitation
and treatment allocation takes place before roles are allocated and pay-off
relevant decisions are made.2 Thus, the original design has the ability to an-
1Before conducting both experiments, I conducted a pilot, the results of which can be
found in Mertins (2005). Mertins (2005) and Mertins (2008a) differ mainly in the applied
payment scheme: The first study applies the rather seldom used binary lottery mechanism
with high and low prizes being gifts, whereas the second one uses a standard payoff scheme.
With this modification, we intended to comply with the common publication requirements
(see, e.g., Guala, 2005). Besides, there are two follow-up papers which are to be finished in
the near future: Albert et al. (2009b) analyze exactly the same experimental game as Albert
et al. (2008) within a culturally different subject pool consisting of German students. Albert
et al. (2009a) discuss the significantly different findings between Bulgarian and German
students’ behavior alongside a cross-cultural line of reasoning.
2Consult figures 4.1 and 5.1 to realize the differences between the sequences of events
in both experiments.
5alyze responders’ behavior depending on procedural judgments, whereas the
modified design is additionally able to capture proposers’ behavior. Thus,
by using the modified design, we can also analyze responders’ behavior and
compare it with previous findings (e.g. by Brandts et al., 2006). Moreover,
the responders’ decision situation differs in the information given. In both
settings, responders can be responsive to proposers’ claims. However, in the
original design, proposers decide on a claim without knowing whether the
group has supported their appointment or not. This information may af-
fect proposers’ decisions. In turn, responders may evaluate proposers’ claims
differently, depending on the information available to proposers. Second,
the subject pool does not consist of (mostly) German students and visitors
of an University’s Open Day, but of students from a Bulgarian University.
People from transitional countries are expected to show stronger reactions
to procedural dissatisfaction (see e.g., Tontrup and Gaissmaier, 2008). The
experimental results shed light on question two and three. Note that due
to the modifications in the experimental design and procedures, it is rather
difficult to compare findings from both studies.
Chapter 6 aims at providing answers to research question four, i.e., does
participatory decision making increase acceptance of (unfavorable) decisions?
The experimental game consists of a three-person power-to-take game. Two
takers decide which fraction of the responder’s endowment to transfer to
themselves; the responder decides which part of the endowment to destroy.
Thus, responders can punish greedy takers, but only at a cost to themselves.
Participation is implemented by letting the responder participate in takers’
transfer decision. The study considers the effect of participation on the
destruction rate. Chapter 7 summarizes the main results and concludes.
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Part I
Theoretical foundations
7

Chapter 2
Procedural preferences: A
survey
2.1 Introduction
Experimental economics is among the fastest growing areas of economic re-
search. The field has evolved over the past decades both in terms of the meth-
ods it employs and the increasing range of economic phenomena it addresses.
A topic currently attracting growing attention is the issue of procedures, i.e.
the way that results in a certain outcome. Indeed, any decision in human
interactions is inherently associated with a procedure. It is impossible to
take a decision without deciding first on how to take it (Sebald, 2007a).
Judgments about a procedure might entail questions such as the follow-
ing (Deutsch, 1975): Who gets to divide the money? Why? How were these
things decided? To what degree did each party take part in the decision-
making? Various procedural aspects that affect human decision-making have
been identified. All of them show that people seem to care not only about
outcomes themselves but also about how they emerged in the first place.
With their pioneering research, Thibaut and Walker (1975) established the
procedural fairness hypothesis1: Disputants are more satisfied with and will-
ing to voluntarily accept decisions that are the result of a fair procedure. A
large literature found procedural fairness judgments having a distinct influ-
ence upon the acceptance of decisions and obedience toward rules, policies,
and laws, as well as upon people’s willingness to engage in cooperative actions
1Following Greenberg (1990), procedural fairness is concerned with the perceived fair-
ness of the process or system by which distribution decisions are made and implemented.
Economists mostly speak of procedural fairness, while psychologists and lawyers seem to
prefer the term procedural justice. We consider these expressions to be synonyms (see also
Van den Bos and Lind, 2002).
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within groups, organizations and societies.
While experimental economists only recently started to address procedu-
ral questions, this literature has grown enormously in other social sciences.
Indeed, procedures have been shown to matter in a broad range of areas
and settings (for an overview, see Frey and Stutzer (2001) and Frey et al.
(2004)).2
In the realm of economics, procedures are of particular importance for
analyzing the behavior of consumers and workers. In the case of consumers
it has been shown in a survey-based study by Maxwell (2002) that the knowl-
edge of how a price is determined has a significant effect on how the price is
being perceived. In organizational contexts, there exists a large literature on
distinct concerns for procedural fairness (see Cohen-Charash and Spector
(2001) and Konovsky (2000) for reviews). For example, procedural fair-
ness evaluations influence negative employee behavior, e.g. theft (Greenberg,
1990), as well as employees’ job satisfaction and organizational commitment
(Lowe and Vodanovich, 1995), organizational change (Tyler and De Cremer,
2005), turnover intentions (Olkkonen and Lipponen, 2006), mentoring rela-
tionships (Richard et al., 2002), and may serve as indicator for trust (Lengfeld
and Krause, 2006). Whereas fair procedures generally trigger positive re-
sponses, the opposite may be true as well. The implementation of participa-
tion in the decision-making process (usually assumed to increase procedural
fairness) has been shown to result in negative effects: when decision makers
fail to respond to inputs, perceptions of unfairness may be higher than if
inputs had not been solicited at all (Greenberg and Folger, 1983).
Procedural aspects within polity and society have also been shown to
be important. It is, for example, a well-known fact that people expect a
fair political process (like having the right to participate) within democratic
institutions. For example, government policies which aim on overcoming in-
dividuals’ resistance to controversial projects (e.g. the construction of power
plants) tend to be most successful if people feel that the process honors their
concerns and is therefore perceived as fair (Oberholzer-Gee et al., 1995).
Research on tax compliance and tax evasion has also shown that the way
taxpayers are treated, e.g. with respect and dignity, significantly influences
their willingness to pay taxes (Feld and Frey, 2002, 2007). Last but not least,
people’s willingness to engage in cooperative actions within groups, organi-
zations and societies has been shown to significantly depend on procedural
fairness judgments (Tyler and Blader, 2000).
2Procedural aspects have not only been demonstrated to matter in various settings,
but also in a wide range of methodologies (including panel surveys, questionnaire studies,
and psychometric work) and cultures (see MacCoun (2005) for a survey).
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Another important area where procedures are of prime importance is law.
Various studies found that people react adversely to unfair legal procedures,
irrespective of the objective judgment made by the court. People rather obey
a decision if they regard the authority that made the decision as legitimate
and entitled to be obeyed, irrespective of their own judgment about the
decision (Tyler and Lind, 2000; Tyler and Mitchell, 1994). Indeed, people
seem to link their fairness evaluation of a procedure with the legitimacy of
authorities and to make their subsequent compliance behavior dependent
thereon (see Tyler et al. (1997) for an overview). Thus, the effectiveness of
legal authorities depends upon citizens’ procedural fairness judgments.
We review some of these aspects in more detail below. This survey article
is intended to give the reader an idea of the large gap between the existing
evidence on procedural concerns provided mostly by psychologists and the ne-
glect thereof by standard economic theory. Behavioral economics may serve
as an important link. It aims on integrating insights derived by cognitive
and social psychologists as well as experimental economists with neoclassi-
cal economic theory. We argue that experimental economics, a method of
empirical investigation in a highly controlled environment, should increase
its efforts to identify procedural effects and thus help enrich the standard
economic model. In order to highlight the need for rethinking the standard
economic consequentialist approach we review findings from the social sci-
ences that have a potential application for human decision-making, present
a classification, and discuss the most prominent theories in the field (sec-
tion 2.2). As the predestined method to study these procedural effects in
the realm of economics seems to be the experimental method, we discuss
previous findings in section 2.3. Section 2.4 briefly presents recent efforts to
integrate individuals’ procedural concerns into economic models, and section
2.5 offers a conclusion.
2.2 Procedures in social sciences
There is substantial empirical evidence and increasing recognition that not
only outcomes but also procedures leading to them can affect people’s utility
from and their reactions to those decisions. However, there is still a large gap
between a vast number of empirical, experimental, and theoretical studies by
non-economists and the fact that economists begun to investigate the role
of procedures only recently. Whereas many social scientists, from psycholo-
gists and sociologists to political scientists and legal scholars, early started
to raise procedural issues, economists have remained silent for a long time.
Today, there is increasing recognition that rethinking the standard economic
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consequentialist approach is necessary. Sen (1995, 1997), for example, has
repeatedly argued that economic models should combine preferences for out-
comes with those for processes.
In this chapter, we focus on the basic findings in the social sciences,
thereby paying special attention to fundamental psychological research on
procedural effects. Among any procedural aspects, procedural fairness judg-
ments are especially emphasized, and thus we focus on them, as well. This
chapter has three aims. The first is to identify and classify potentially rel-
evant procedural characteristics. The second aim is to consider the reasons
why procedures matter. The third is to review the effects of procedural
considerations on people’s utility and on their behavior.
2.2.1 Relevant procedural characteristics: What mat-
ters?
Procedural fairness can be seen to be the most thoroughly researched aspect
among procedural effects. A large literature provides answers to what consti-
tutes a fair procedure.3 Leventhal (1980) distinguishes between six different
procedural characteristics of fair processes: representativeness, consistency,
correctability, bias suppression, accuracy, and ethicality. Each characteristic
may be of a higher or lower value. Representation rights, for example, may
vary from voice to participation, i.e. from the opportunity to be heard before
the decision is made to direct involvement in bringing about a decision.4
In their seminal paper, Bies and Moag (1986) emphasize the decision
maker’s role and add the concept of interactional fairness.5 They state that
while obviously people are clearly concerned about the fairness of outcomes
and formal procedures, they are also concerned about the interpersonal treat-
ment they receive during the process. The authors identify four criteria
for interactional fairness: respect, propriety, truthfulness and justification.
These criteria have also been shown to explain perceptions of process-related
3See, e.g., the seminal works of Thibaut and Walker (1975) or Lind and Tyler (1988)
where different procedural characteristics have been discussed at some length.
4Note that in the literature, voice is sometimes used in a less narrow sense in that it is
a mere synonym to representativeness. Anand (2001) defines voice as the extent to which
a person has control over a decision. Folger (1977) defines voice as the extent to which
opinions and preferences of affected parties are considered in the decision-making process.
5Whereas some studies highlight distinctions between procedural and interactional fair-
ness (e.g., Bies, 2001; Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001), others (e.g., Greenberg, 1990;
Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Bies, 1990) argue that interactional fairness should be
subsumed under the rubric of a broader conceptualization of procedural fairness, an ap-
proach which we will follow throughout.
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fairness partially (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2001). Dolan et al. (2007) systemat-
ically evaluate the literature on procedural fairness6 and identify six broad
procedural characteristic categories: voice, neutrality, consistency, accuracy,
reversibility and transparency. This short list of definitions should give the
reader an understanding of the complexity of what may constitute a fair
procedure.
Yet, despite these comprehensive classifications, the general understand-
ing of the importance of various procedural characteristics and their interac-
tional effects remains limited. The characteristics are described in a variety
of ways making it thus difficult to compare findings across studies. Besides,
only few studies provide data on more than one of the procedural character-
istics and none provides information on trade-offs (see Dolan et al., 2007).
Others (e.g., Sondak and Tyler, 2007) collect questionnaire data on various
characteristics, but combine them into an overall index. Empirical evidence
on the relative importance of different procedural characteristics as well as its
interactive effects has been identified as a future challenge (e.g., Leventhal,
1980; Skarlicki and Folger, 1997) but is still limited. One exception is a
meta-analysis by Colquitt et al. (2001). They find that voice explains 26%
of the variance in perceptions of procedural fairness. When controlling for
voice, the Leventhal criteria mentioned above explain an additional 21% of
the variance in procedural fairness perceptions. Further research in this di-
rection would help to identify those procedural characteristics which matter
most for procedural fairness judgments. Hereby deduced results would be
an asset for advising decision makers within organizations and society on
how to shape institutions to bring about desired reactions (e.g. acceptance
of decisions or obedience towards rules). Sondak and Tyler (2007) note that
procedural design has successfully been implemented in the realm of dispute
resolution institutions. As studies have shown that people evaluate proce-
dural elements associated with mediation to be fairer than those associated
with arbitration or formal trials (Tyler, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1997), the legal
system has increasingly adopted mediation processes. This change resulted
in increased satisfaction with the legal system and greater willingness of dis-
putants to defer to third party dispute resolution decisions.
Thus, separating various procedural characteristics can be of value. Re-
search also suggests, though, that these characteristics interact to affect in-
dividuals’ fairness perceptions and subsequent behaviors. In the following,
we will focus on procedures per se and discuss of what importance they are.
6Dolan et al. (2007) use keyword searches of electronic databases and hand searches of
specific journals and papers by selected authors. They identify a total of 107 articles and
books from across a range of decision-making contexts based on a systematic literature
review.
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2.2.2 Why do people care about procedures?
It has been shown that procedures with their various characteristics play an
important role in human decision-making. Possible reasons why procedures
matter can be grouped into two rough categories (e.g., Konow, 2003): (1)
procedures as means for fair/favorable outcomes (instrumental, consequen-
tialist or direct reason), and (2) procedures as aim independent of therewith
achieved outcomes (non-instrumental, expressive, proceduralist or indirect
reason).7
Reason (1) states that people care about procedures because they affect
outcomes. In their classic work on procedural fairness, John Thibaut and
Laurens Walker (1975) still subscribe to this view, arguing that procedures
matter because they permit people to feel that they can help mold outcomes.
For example, people are more likely to appraise a procedure as being fair if it
gives them control over the decision-making process. Thus, process control
is not seen to matter as an end in itself but as a means to an end: a way of
improving one’s prospects given the inevitability of not having full decision
control. Hence, they suggest that people’s desire to express their opinion
is directly linked to their view that these arguments influence the decision.
Later psychological research, however, has incorporated non-instrumental
reasons due to increasing evidence pointing in other motivational directions
(cf. the following paragraph). On the other hand, neo-classic economic theory
(especially traditional welfare economics) still values procedures only to the
extent to which they promote utility-leading outcomes as standard models
are based on utilitarianism, which requires that every choice is judged only
by the consequent states of affairs.
Reason (2) is based on the idea that people may also attribute an in-
trinsic value to the process itself. Political scientists (e.g., Lane, 1988) early
started to argue that the democratic process per se provides utility to citi-
zens. A proceduralist explanation why procedures are of prime importance
has been offered by Lind and Tyler (1988) and Tyler (1990). They propose
an identity-based group-value model in which they suggest that procedures
are valued because they communicate status and inclusion in groups. By ex-
pressing their own view, people are informed of their connections with group
members and authorities. In this sense, procedures may lead to positive
feelings and are associated with the perceived quality of social relationships
between individuals and decision-makers. Tyler and Lind (1992) have ex-
7An exception is the categorization by Dolan et al. (2007) which distinguishes between
three potential reasons: (a) procedures affect outcomes, (b) procedures affect any other
factors than outcomes, and (c) procedures are valued in their own right. However, Dolan
et al. (2007) cannot clearly explain the differences between reason (b) and (c).
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tended this line of thinking to the study of authority relations. They argue
that people view group authorities as representatives of the group, and are
therefore sensitive to how those authorities exercise their authority. Using
fair procedures to exercise authority both communicates that people are re-
spected by the group, and it also suggests that the group is worth identifying
with and being involved in. Besides, it has been shown that fair procedures
tend to evoke feelings of loyalty to one’s group and legitimize the authority of
leaders (Tyler and Belliveau, 1995). Related research reviewed above is not
restricted to perceived procedural fairness, but many other intrinsic benefits
of a procedure have been identified, among them the utility gained by facing
and meeting challenges, expressing oneself, using one’s talents, and reporting
experiences. Note that procedures may also lower utility, for instance by be-
ing cognitively taxing, or by forcing one into making a decision (e.g., Lane,
1988).
Whereas a growing literature in the social sciences, especially in psychol-
ogy, political science and sociology helps to shift the focus to non-instrumental
issues of procedures, only few economists early admitted that people care
about procedures for non-instrumental reasons (e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2001;
Hahn, 1982; Ng, 1988; Sen, 1995, 1997). However, as we will reveal in the
following chapters, economists have begun to investigate non-instrumental
roles procedures play in human decision-making.
We can summarize that the distinction between instrumental and non-
instrumental reasons has transformed the way we think about the meanings
and implications of procedures. Procedures do matter not only because of
their effects on outcomes but those on other factors as well. In a next step,
we will discuss these non-instrumental effects in more detail.
2.2.3 The effects of procedures: How do they matter?
Remarkable advancements have been reached in integrating processes and
outcomes by studying their interactive effects, primarily procedural fairness
effects (e.g., Folger, 1984; Frey and Stutzer, 2001; Greenberg, 1986; Lind and
Tyler, 1988; Sweeney and McFarlin, 1993). But when comparing procedural
and outcome fairness, what matters most? Meta-analyzes by Cohen-Charash
and Spector (2001, 2002) and Colquitt et al. (2001) suggest that fairness judg-
ments have independent effects on a variety of attitudinal and behavioral
outcomes. MacCoun (2005) notes that in some studies, procedural fairness
has better predicted attitudes toward one’s supervisors and organization,
whereas distributive fairness has better predicted pay satisfaction and job
satisfaction. However, as he points out, direct horse race comparisons of pre-
dictor strength between procedural and distributive fairness are problematic
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due to its multiplicative, interactive effects.
The psychology of justice research (most notably done by Tom Tyler,
Allan Lind, and colleagues) early raised the question why people care about
and react to their evaluations of the fairness or unfairness of procedures.
A particular effect has attracted remarkable attention: the fair process ef-
fect (also referred to as the fair outcome effect, depending on the individual
viewpoint).
The fair process effect, describing the finding that people are more likely
to accept decisions when they feel that they are made via fair procedures
(Folger, 1987), is said to be extremely robust. There is enormous support
for this effect (Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996; Van den Bos et al., 1999).8
It is of particular importance for negative outcomes as a fair process en-
hances the perceived fairness of those unfavorable outcomes and thus results
in higher satisfaction with negative outcomes. The effect is of great practical
relevance because authorities’ effectiveness depends heavily on the volun-
tary acceptance of rules and decisions by group members (Sondak and Tyler,
2007). For example, legal authorities seek voluntary compliance with law,
political officials seek voluntary payment of taxes, and managers seek accep-
tance of workplace rules. Lind et al. (1993), for instance, found that real-life
litigants who judge the arbitration process as fair are much more likely to
accept the court’s decision, irrespective of the actual instrumental outcome.
Further, Tyler and Lind (2000) show that people are more likely to obey the
commands of an authority if they regard the authority to be entitled to their
obedience. This holds irrespective of their judgments about the authority’s
decision.
The form of the process-outcome-interaction can be expressed in two dif-
ferent ways. From one viewpoint, process fairness mitigates the effects of
outcomes, such that when process fairness is low, outcomes exert stronger
effects on overall fairness perceptions. When process fairness is high, how-
ever, outcomes exert less impact on fairness perceptions. From another per-
spective, outcomes moderate the effects of process fairness such that when
outcomes are negative, process fairness has stronger effects on fairness per-
ceptions. When outcomes are favorable, however, process fairness has less
impact on fairness perceptions.
Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) reviewed 45 studies examining the in-
teraction between procedural fairness and outcome perceptions. The results
8However, empirical and experimental economic evidence on the fair process effect is
still rare. An exception is the study by Bischoff et al. (2008) who show by analyzing rep-
resentative survey data that procedural fairness plays an important role for the acceptance
of a given income distribution. Recent findings from the field of experimental economics
are discussed below.
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revealed strong interaction effects in 43 samples which suggest that both
effects exist. Thus, processes and outcomes have substitutable effects since
people perceive overall fairness as existent as long as either the process or the
outcome is fair. However, Lind and Tyler (1988) show that there is consid-
erably more support for the mitigating effect of fair procedures on negative
outcomes (fair process effect) than for the mitigating effect of fair outcomes
on unfair procedures (fair outcome effect).
Of course, procedures are not similarly important to each individual; for
example, Gonzales and Tyler (2008) note that procedural fairness is more
important to those who believe themselves to be socially excluded, periph-
eral, or marginalized than to those perceiving themselves as socially included,
central, and integrated. Besides, procedural fairness is found to be especially
important when issues of identity and relationship are salient (Tyler and
DeCremer, 2005). Brockner et al. (1995), for instance, show that the per-
ceived favorability of outcomes depends on how they are framed. They find
that when procedural fairness was high, decision frame had no effect on layoff
survivors’ reactions. When it was low, survivors reacted more favorably in
the positive than in the negative frame.
Two distinct theories explaining the interaction between procedures and
outcomes have been proposed: referent cognitions theory (e.g., Folger, 1984,
1987) and fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 1995, 2001; Van den Bos et al.,
1997). For a review on both theories, see, e.g., MacCoun (2005).
In contrast to the overwhelming majority of studies that validate the ro-
bustness of the fair process effect, some studies find under certain conditions
the opposite to be true (see, e.g., Cohen, 1985; Folger, 1977; Kulik and Clark,
1993; Lind and Tyler, 1988): fair procedures can also result in less satisfac-
tion with negative outcomes than unfair procedures. Folger (1977) show
that outcomes that improved after an opportunity for “voice” are perceived
as less fair than the same outcome without voice. Voice was operationalized
here as the opportunity to express to an allocator one’s own perception of
just deserts. Folger referred later to this apparent contradiction to the usual
finding of a positive relationship as frustration effect. Cohen (1985) suggests
that the effect occurs likely in situations where allocators receive whatever
amount they do not pay to recipients. He explains this with the recipients’
impression procedures including an opportunity for voice could rather serve
as an insincere attempt to give the allocation the semblance of fairness than
be a real attempt to solicit views. In that case the recipient will not expe-
rience any enhancement of procedural fairness from the voice procedure and
thus is expected to view the outcome as dissatisfying. Lind and Tyler (1988)
add that the frustration effect only occurs in settings where the character-
istics that give the procedure a procedural fairness advantage are relatively
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weak.
Procedures not only provoke outcomes or influence subsequent behavior
in respond to these outcomes, but may also have a value on their own. This
value has been subsumed under the notion of procedural utility: the use of
the preferred procedure may directly yield utility. For example, if people pre-
fer the rule one-person-one-vote, the use of it yields immediate utility (Ng,
1988). The idea that procedural utility can explain deviations from standard
interpretations of rationality is not new. In other social sciences than eco-
nomics, procedural utility has a long tradition. It refers to the concept of
Aristotelian eudaimonic well-being. However, the notion of procedural util-
ity has received recent attention. It has been empirically shown (notably by
Bruno Frey and colleagues) that people have preferences over procedures and
that utility is provided if their preferences regarding the process as such are
satisfied. For example, econometric analyzes by Frey et al. (2004) suggest
that people derive utility from mere participation in the political process.
Their approach is based on self-reported and hence subjective well-being,
happiness or satisfaction with life. Happiness measures outcome in the sense
that a higher level is preferable to a lower level. They compare data on
subjective well-being of Swiss citizens and non-nationals. Since only citizens
have direct democratic rights and thus the opportunity to participate, while
non-nationals are excluded, their data suggests that two-thirds of the gain in
well-being is based on the possibility to be able to participate in the direct
democratic process. Frey et al. (2004) add that individuals gain procedural
utility in addition to outcome utility not only through actual participation
but even through the mere possibility of participation. The same outcome
may be evaluated differently, depending on whether it is a market outcome
or the result of voting, bargaining, or command. They suggest that people
are concerned about how they are treated by institutions and procedures
because this has an impact on their identity and how positively (negatively)
they feel about themselves.
Last but not least, decision-making procedures also convey important
information about individuals’ relationships within a group and with its au-
thorities. In their seminal work, Lind and Tyler (1988) argue that people
are concerned about issues of identity and status. They suggest that people
use the fairness of procedures to learn about their status and to evaluate the
degree to which they want to define their identity according to the groups to
which they belong (group-value model of procedural justice).9
9In their 1992 publication, Tyler and Lind present their relational model of authority
which extends the earlier model more generally beyond decision procedures to public
support of authorities and rules more generally.
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2.3 Procedures in economic experiments
Until recently, there was a noticeable lack of evidence in economic research
on the behavioral effects of procedures which was partly due to some kind of
willful ignorance, partly to the difficulty of disentangling the effects of out-
come and process considerations. We argue that with the rise of laboratory
experiments, a powerful method that is able to clearly differentiate between
both aspects has been established. All studies discussed here refer to the
general issue of whether people’s motivation and subsequent behavior is af-
fected by the process by which an allocation is reached in the presence of real
incentives. There are many different procedural aspects that may have some
influence; a few of them have been studied so far, the most notable ones are
reviewed below, namely the roles of appointment procedures, intentions, and
procedural fairness.
2.3.1 The role of appointment procedures
Frequently, decisions are made by decision makers, i.e. individuals or groups
who decide on issues whose outcomes affect others. In these cases, deci-
sion makers have to be appointed by the preceding use of a role assignment
procedure. Typically, roles in bargaining experiments (e.g. proposers and
responders in ultimatum game settings) are assigned via random procedures.
In these cases, the strength of property rights seems to be accompanied by a
fairness norm suggesting that all players have (more or less) the same right to
a share, resulting in a high probability for 50:50 allocations. This normative
right has been shown to be altered by the introduction of real effort (e.g.
cracking walnuts or solving a general knowledge quiz) to obtain the pie (see,
e.g., Frey and Bohnet, 1995; Ruﬄe, 1998). There is substantial experimental
evidence on this “entitlement effect”. It says, in short, the larger an individ-
uals’ input into obtaining a pie, the fairer it is for them to keep a large share
(Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2000; Frey and Bohnet, 1995).
Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) and Hoffman et al. (1994), for example,
show that proposers offer less and responders accept more unequal offers
whenever the role of the proposer was earned (e.g. by scoring high on a
general knowledge quiz) rather than randomly assigned. Further evidence is
provided by Cherry et al. (2002) who conduct a dictator game with earned
surplus and high anonymity and observe that 95% of the dictators keep the
whole amount at stake.
In a three-player ultimatum game, Grimalda et al. (2008a) implement a
particular procedural characteristic by varying the degree of participation:
in the non-participation treatment, a proposer is randomly selected ex ante,
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and she becomes the only person to propose a division of the pie. In the
participation treatment, all of the three group members, individually and
simultaneously, make a proposal. One proposal among the three is then se-
lected by a random draw, and the responders decide whether to accept or
reject by majority vote. The authors emphasize that these two treatments
are strategically equivalent in the sense that the expected payoffs are ceteris
paribus the same. They find only weak evidence that participation makes
a difference: after players have gained some experience, proposers seem to
demand less, and responders seem to concede less in the participation treat-
ment which might be due to an entitlement effect. The authors conjecture
that the effect of a higher number of institutions allowing more participation
in the decision-making process also brings about more “socially responsible”
behavior in the players and more equality in payoff distribution. They note
that at the same time, however, this effect may also result in more conflict,
as individuals are less prone to accept unequal offers from the proposer.
Backes-Gellner et al. (2008) recently criticized that many experimental
games were not appropriate to represent real relationships (e.g. in the realm
of employment). Brandts et al. (2006) meet these concerns by introducing
a role allocation beyond chance or effort, i.e. they test whether a selection
procedure on the basis of information about personal characteristics may
not only have an allocative impact, but may also cause other effects. They
find that the very fact that people are selected on the basis of information
about their personal characteristics results in lower demands compared to
situations in which people are randomly determined. They provide statistical
evidence for two different effects. First, knowingly selected allocators keep
less for themselves than randomly selected ones (“I-want-YOU effect”). This
effect has weakly been confirmed in round 1, but not in the following rounds.
Second, selected players reward the selecting player more generously than a
third party involved (“gratitude effect”) with weak statistical significance in
the first round but not in the following rounds.
Mertins (2008a) and Albert et al. (2008) study another aspect of appoint-
ment procedures. They test whether individuals’ procedural satisfaction, and
their procedural fairness judgments on appointment procedures affect peo-
ple’s behavior. Albert et al. (2008) focus on both, responders’ and proposers’
behavior. They show that proposers claim significantly less if they were cho-
sen by majority vote (which implies the satisfaction of the responders’ group
preferences regarding the proposer’s appointment procedure) thus confirming
the result by Brandts et al. (2006) within a different framework. Further-
more, Mertins (2008a) and Albert et al. (2008) show that the behavior of
responders also depends on procedural satisfaction. Responders’ demands
vary depending on whether proposers obtain their roles with or without the
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responders’ support: procedural satisfaction results in stronger resistance
against various outcomes. People rather seem to accept decisions made by
proposers which they have not supported (individually or by majority vote).
As discussed before, this counterintuitive finding may be explained by the
“frustration effect” (see, e.g., Folger, 1977; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Besides,
the judgment whether a procedure is seen to be the fairer one out of two did
not prove to significantly effect different reactions to outcomes.
2.3.2 The role of intentions
Numerous findings in experimental economics suggest that individuals de-
viate from the standard economic model in having strong social preferences
(e.g. DellaVigna, forthcoming). That is, people care about fairness, equity,
and reciprocity (for an overview, see Camerer (2003) or Kagel and Roth
(1995)). However, there is disagreement within the scientific community
whether outcome preferences are sufficient to predict the reciprocal actions
observed, or whether it is necessary to account for intentions to measure
reciprocal response. People might care not only about outcomes but also
about intentions underlying distributional decisions.
Two different procedural settings are feasible to study the effects of in-
tentions. First, responders receive information about which alternatives were
available to proposers. The alternatives not chosen may yield information
about the intention or attitude of the decision-maker, which in turn may trig-
ger reciprocal behavior. Second, the same outcome may be chosen by either
a human decision-maker or a random procedure. The former is assumed to
act with consciousness, thus may be perceived as intentional while the latter
is assumed not to be perceived as intentional.
Experimental evidence on the role of intentions is mixed. For example,
Charness (2004) and Offerman (2002) find little or no evidence that the at-
tribution of fairness intentions matters in the domain of positively reciprocal
behavior, i.e. reward. Blount (1995) and Offerman (2002) find weak evidence
that it matters in the domain of negatively reciprocal behavior, i.e. punish-
ment. Bolton et al. (1998) report on an experiment that allows studying both
positive and negative reciprocal action in a single framework. In the reward
treatment, results can fully be explained by outcome (instead of procedural)
considerations. For the punishment treatment, there is some evidence that
intentions might play a role. However, the difference in behavior is not sta-
tistically significant. Charness and Levine (2007) find strong evidence that
intentions matter for both punishment and reward situations. We will review
some of these findings in more detail below.
Building upon early findings by psychologists on the non-instrumental
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value of procedures, Blount (1995) was among the first who designed an
economic experiment to analyze the effects of intentions.10 She compares
reactions to decisions either made by humans (perceived as intentional as
humans can think about their actions and control them) or non-humans
(random or natural occurrences are typically not perceived as intentional
due to the absence of consciousness). She compares responder rejections in
a standard ultimatum game with (a) rejections in a treatment in which an
outside party, receiving no payoff for the game, proposed the allocation and
(b) rejections in a treatment in which the proposal is said to result from a
random number generator with equal probabilities. She finds rejection rates
to be lowest in the random treatment, but still significantly positive.
Charness (2004) compares second movers’ behavior in reaction to first
movers’ decisions with first movers being either human participants having
an interest in the outcome (standard), having no interest (third party) or
being a random machine. By analyzing a gift exchange game he finds that
second mover contributions are slightly higher in the third party and random
treatments than in the standard game. But positive correlation between first
mover and second mover contributions is found in all three treatments, which
is a contradiction to the intentions hypothesis: if intentions matter, there
should be no correlation for random and third party treatments.
Kagel et al. (1996) study an ultimatum game in which treatments vary
according to pie size and information thereon. Incomplete information treat-
ments consist of second movers knowing both, but first movers knowing only
their endowment, making it more difficult to attribute unfair intentions to
the first mover. If intentions play a role, rejection rates are expected to be
lower in the incomplete information treatments than in the complete ones.
Indeed, Kagel et al. (1996) report evidence supporting the intentions hy-
pothesis, but at the same time they also find the opposite to be true for
another comparison of treatments. These observations suggest alternative
interpretations including strategic considerations.
Falk et al. (2008) show that proposers’ intentions matter for responders’
behavior: it seems that responders wish not (only) to avoid unequal or unfair
outcomes but (also) to punish intentionally unfair proposers. The authors
present three experiments which suggest that many of the observed punish-
ments are actually triggered as a response to unkindness, not as an attempt
to reduce inequality.
Charness and Levine (2007) analyze workers’ reactions to pay decisions
10Note that Blount’s studies follow the methodological requirements of economic exper-
iments with one exception: one treatment involves deception in subjects believe that other
participants (and not the experimenter) made the proposals.
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by firms following different wage-setting procedures. Each randomly paired
group consisted of 2 players, one being the firm, the other representing the
worker. Firms, endowed by $12, had the choice between paying a high ($8)
or a low wage ($4) to the worker. Then, a coin determined whether the
economic conditions were good (bad) resulting in a worker’s wage increase
(decrease) by $2. After having experienced the firms’ decisions and the coin
flips, workers chose an effort level: low effort cost $1 and reduced the firm’s
payoff by $4, medium effort cost workers nothing and did not change the
firms’ initial payoff, and high effort cost also $1, but increased the firms’
payoff by $4. Thus, the same wage of $6 could be determined by two different
procedures: high wage (good intention) coupled with bad condition and low
wage (bad intention) coupled with good condition. The authors find that
workers who end up receiving medium wages respond much more positively
when this is due to the firm offering a high wage but bad luck lowering the
worker’s pay than when the opposite holds: the firm offering a low wage
and good luck raising the pay. Thus, participants’ effort levels (i.e. rates of
punishment and rewards) react strongly to intentions and more modestly to
distributional outcomes.
Betrayal aversion is in line with recent theoretical models and empirical
evidence that people care about how outcomes come to be and about others’
intentions. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) study this concept by examining
whether the decision to trust a stranger in a one-shot interaction is equivalent
to taking a risky bet, or if a trust decision entails an additional risk premium
to balance the costs of trust betrayal. They state the hypothesis that it is
fundamentally different to trust another person than to rely on a random
device that offers the same outcomes: people are averse to being betrayed.
The authors compare a binary-choice trust game with a structurally identi-
cal, binary-choice risky dictator game with good or bad outcomes and elicit
individuals’ minimum acceptable probabilities of getting the good outcome
such that they would prefer the pure chance for the sure payoff. Supporting
their hypothesis, first movers state higher minimum acceptable probabilities
in the trust game than in situations where nature determines the outcome.
Bohnet et al. (2008) build upon this experimental design in testing whether
betrayal aversion can be found outside the United States. In their cross-
country study among Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey and the
United States, they found people to be betrayal averse in each of these na-
tions. The effect has been found to be most pronounced in Oman.
Although being psychological research, we discuss the work by Fukuno
and Ohbuchi (2003) here as their research is strongly related to the ques-
tions raised. Their study addresses both the role of appointment procedures
and that of intentions at the same time. Participants playing an ultima-
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tum game received one of three offers: unfavorable and unequal, equal, or
favorable but unequal. These offers were determined by either the other par-
ticipant or by a computerized lottery, thus manipulating the arbitrariness of
the role assignment procedure. The authors find that outcome acceptance
is determined by distributive and procedural fairness judgments, and that
these types of fairness are influenced by different situational characteristics,
such as intentionality, the size, and the equality of the offer. Participants
perceive the intentional small offer as more unfair than the unintentional
small offer, while they perceive the same offers as unfair in the distributive
sense, regardless of intentionality. They rather reject the intentional than the
unintentional small offer. Besides, people perceive the arbitrary procedure of
the role assignment as highly unfair, whereas the difference of arbitrariness
in role assignment procedures has no significant impact on their reactions to
the offer.
2.3.3 The role of procedural fairness
Given that procedural fairness is an integrative part of any of the issues dis-
cussed above, we address the procedural fairness effect in a separate chapter.
As pointed out before, the fair process effect is one of the most frequently
replicated findings in social psychology (Van den Bos et al., 1999), and is said
to be one of the most important discoveries in justice research (Van den Bos
et al., 1998). Surprisingly, there is still extremely little experimental evidence
for cases where the participants’ decisions have monetary consequences. The
first experimental economists explicitly tackling the question of procedural
fairness are Bolton et al. (2005) who show that allocations resulting from
fair procedures (implemented by unbiased random procedures), are more ac-
ceptable than the same unfair outcome chosen by a third-party. Bolton et
al. (2005) investigate within ultimatum games whether the allocation bias of
a random fair procedure influences the ex post acceptability of the outcome
of the procedure. Their main result is that settings with fair procedures
leading to unequal outcomes and settings with equal outcomes seem to be
equivalently treated by responders. That is, procedural fairness – even when
leading to unequal outcomes – is indeed a substitute for outcome equality.
A related study is provided by Grimalda et al. (2008b), who study fair-
ness regarding the allocation of initial opportunities by varying the prob-
ability (opportunity) that a player becomes the proposer in an ultimatum
game (i.e., 0%, 1%, 20% and 50% opportunity). That is, whereas Bolton et
al. (2005) analyze whether the allocation bias of a random fair procedure
influences the ex post outcome acceptability, Grimalda et al. (2008b) focus
on fairness prior to the unfolding of the interaction. In particular, the latter
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hypothesize that opportunity has a symbolic value (e.g. some kind of proce-
dural utility) to participants. That is, responders will accept more unequal
outcomes, as the procedure becomes relatively more unbiased and hence more
procedurally fair. Since proposers are expected to anticipate these reactions,
they will increase their demands on average. In other words, the fairer the
procedure, the higher the inequality in outcomes. The authors find that a
1% probability of becoming a proposer leads to significantly lower offers and
higher acceptance rates compared to the case where participants have no
such a chance. By raising this probability further, the observed effect con-
tinues but is no longer significant with respect to the 1% treatment. The
authors draw the conclusion that people in this setting are motivated solely
by the symbolic aspect of opportunity, rather than by the actual fairness in
the allocation of opportunities.
Albert and Mertins (2008) study the influence of more or less partici-
pation in the decision-making process, thus testing the procedural fairness
hypothesis that more participation (higher fairness) increases acceptance of
unfavorable decisions. Their work tests this conjecture in a three-person
power-to-take game. Two takers decide which fraction of the responder’s
endowment to transfer to themselves; the responder decides which part of
the endowment to destroy. Hence, the responder can punish greedy takers,
but only at her own expense. The authors modify the game by letting the
responder participate in the takers’ transfer decision and consider the effect
of participation on the destruction rate. They conclude that participation
matters. Responders destroy more if they (1) have no opportunity to par-
ticipate in the decision-making process and (2) are confronted with highly
unfavorable outcomes. This participation effect is highly significant for those
responders (the majority) who show negative reciprocity (i.e., destroy more
when takers are more greedy).
By focusing on procedural fairness norms the study by Dittrich and
Tontrup (2008) aims on facilitating the analysis of institutional processes
like administrative procedures. They recently started investigating the exis-
tence and impact of several factors related to procedural fairness norms. In
their experimental setting, a decision-maker earns an entitlement to some ob-
jectively determined payoff in a real effort task. His actual payoff is, however,
determined by a neutral third party, which decides based on incomplete in-
formation. Rational, risk-averse decision-makers should accept the sure offer,
but many participants filed an objection against it and subsequently faced a
gamble with expectations equal to the payoff determined by the neutral third
party. The authors show that higher transparency of the decision process of
the third party reduces objections by 40 percentage points. Their future re-
search is intended to elicit the willingness to pay for filing an objection and
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for increasing the transparency of the third party’s decision process. Besides,
institutional factors will be manipulated to gain insights into the sensitivity
of procedural fairness norms.
Tontrup and Gaissmaier (2008) analyze the effects of perceived legitimacy
of procedures on people’s willingness to cooperate. In their experimental
public good game, they allow participants to vote on a set of rules vs. im-
posing the same institutions exogenously. They provide statistical evidence
for their hypothesis that average contributions to the public good are higher
in the voting than in the control condition (85.2% vs. 58.5%). That is, par-
ticipation in the procedure is sufficient to increase cooperation rates. The
authors show that the size of the effect does not depend on the set of rules
participants actually decided for nor on whether subjects actually received
the institution they personally voted for. The authors assume the perceived
legitimacy of procedures to be an important determinant of people’s willing-
ness to cooperate with one another in social dilemmas. To provide evidence
for this explanation, the authors replicate the experiment in China, since
China is perceived as a country where the democratic majority rule is not
seen to be particularly legitimate. As hypothesized and in sharp contrast to
the results in Germany, they find no increased contributions in the voting
groups of the Chinese sessions.
As mentioned before, procedural fairness is the best analyzed aspect of proce-
dural concerns; procedural favorability has mostly been treated interchange-
able as both concepts overlap to a great extent. The same is true for outcome
fairness and outcome favorability. There is empirical evidence that strong
correlations between individuals’ perceptions of outcome fairness and out-
come favorability (e.g., Greenberg, 1994; Tyler and Caine, 1981) or even no
differences at all exist (Brockner andWiesenfeld, 1996). More recent research
suggests, however, that fairness and favorability judgments do not always
show the same effect (Van den Bos et al., 1997, 1998). To our knowledge,
Mertins (2008a) and Albert et al. (2008) are the first papers by experimental
economists which explicitly differentiate between the effects of procedural
satisfaction and procedural fairness judgments. Mertins (2008a) finds that
resistance against any feasible claim is higher if the proposer’s appointment
procedure is judged to be the fairer one (in comparison to another proce-
dure available). However, the differences in the willingness to offer resistance
were not statistically significant. On the other hand, resistance differs signif-
icantly depending on whether people’s procedural preferences are satisfied or
not. Surprisingly, the author cannot provide evidence for the robust fair pro-
cess effect, but for the rather exceptional frustration effect (Folger, 1977).
That is, people rather seem to accept decisions (i.e. offer less resistance)
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made by proposers which they have not supported (individually or by ma-
jority vote). This observation may be explained by people asserting a claim
on their behalf (i.e. demand fair treatment like a generous offer) when voting
for a procedure and thus for a proposer.
2.4 Procedures in economic theory
Due to the recent popularity of the field of behavioral and experimental eco-
nomics, an impressing amount of interesting results has been produced. Con-
currently, Bergh (2008) argues the supply of theoretical explanatory frame-
works remained rather limited. This is particular true for the research on
procedures. Whereas increasing experimental evidence indicates that proce-
dures matter, their impact on human decision-making still awaits a proper
theoretical foundation as both, traditional economic theory and even most
models of social preferences, are based on a consequentialist view (see Sobel
(2005) for a survey).
One class of models of social preferences assumes that individuals max-
imize their utility according to well-defined preferences, but permit prefer-
ences to depend on the payoffs of others. Let us, for example, consider the
theory of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and the ERC model
by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). These models of distributional concerns
assume that people’s utility depends only on outcomes and is independent
from any procedures preceding the outcome. Indeed, economic models are
expected to be simplified to focus the attention on the important mechanisms
of behavior. However, in case of a theory of fairness, reduction to distribu-
tional fairness and thus neglect of an enormous amount of evidence on the
behavioral importance of procedural fairness seems not to be adequate (see
Bergh (2008) for a critical discussion).
There is another class of models of social preferences (see e.g., Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Rabin, 1993) which incorporates procedural aspects
in the form of perceived intentions by assuming them to trigger corresponding
responses (positive or negative reciprocity). Falk and Fischbacher (2006)
expand this approach by presenting a formal theory of reciprocity which
takes into account both that people evaluate the kindness of an action by
its consequences and also by the underlying motivation, i.e. intention. The
theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental
games. Among them are the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a
reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, public
good games, and the investment game. Furthermore, the theory explains why
subjects behave differently in treatments where they experience the actions
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of real persons compared to treatments where they face actions caused by a
random device.
However, both classes of theories cannot explain all observed behavior.
Thus, it has repeatedly been argued that fairness models that go further by
combining both intentionality and distributional concerns are needed (see
e.g., Bereby-Meyer and Niederle, 2005). Besides, some recent experimental
findings focusing on procedural effects can neither be explained by distribu-
tional nor by reciprocity models, resulting in the appearance of completely
new theories. Grimalda et al. (2008b), for example, observe a discontinuous
jump from no opportunity to 1%-opportunity. They propose a combination of
inequality aversion models with Nozick’s symbolic utility. The authors note
that this is not the attempt to introduce a new social utility model. How-
ever, their approach demonstrates the increasing effort to explain observed
behavior associated with procedural effects. Another attempt to explain data
that are neither outcome-based nor explainable by reciprocity models is the
process model by Trautmann (2007). He proposes a model of individual
preferences for process fairness that complements the Fehr-Schmidt model
for outcome fairness. The introduction of process fairness raises issues of dy-
namic consistency of fairness preferences. The author discusses theoretical
and policy implications of inconsistency in a dynamic decision context. He
provides applications to welfare improvements and illustrates the integration
of the process model in economic theory. Konow (1996, 2000) proposes a
positive theory of economic fairness giving a fundamental importance to pro-
cedures and context. It is based on the accountability principle: A person’s
fair allocation varies in proportion to the relevant variables she can influence,
but not according to those she cannot reasonably influence.
In the context of expected utility theory and in search of a model for the
utility of gambling, Le Menestrel (2001) introduces a first model of procedu-
ral utility by treating it as a qualitative argument outside the utility function.
It allows distinguishing the game of payoffs presented to the individuals from
the psychological game that is perceived and played. Le Menestrel (2006)
introduces a game-theoretic model of rationality that combines procedural
utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. Thus, empirically
observed cooperative behavior can be rationally explained by a procedural
utility for cooperation. The conventional interpretation of the Prisoners’
Dilemma is that individuals should defect, whatever the payoff differentials
between cooperation and defection. In the proposed model, mutual coopera-
tion can emerge as the unique Ideal Nash Equilibrium when procedural utility
for cooperation is sufficiently strong. Moreover, a given game of consequences
may be played differently by different individuals with different procedural
utility. The results of the model allow predictions about the dependence of
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rational behavior upon individuals and the social context. Similar work has
been done by Sebald (2007a), who provides a game-theoretic framework that
integrates procedural concerns into economic analysis.11
The experiment by Bolton et al. (2005) is accomplished by an extension
of the ERC model to address the observed findings by meshing procedural
fairness norms with allocation fairness norms. They argue the key insight is
that changing the feasible outcome space, or determining the allocation by
randomization, creates alternative fairness norms. The authors embed these
competing norms into the ERC model by refining the reference point. They
note that refining the reference points in social utility models indeed appears
to be a promising research path. But since the model is extended post hoc,
the experimental data cannot be considered a test. Besides, the authors view
their theoretical attempt as a sketch because they want to demonstrate that
a relative payoff model with a more refined reference point can, in principle,
capture the observed phenomena.
A similar approach is employed by Krawczyk (2007), who also provides
an extension of the ERC model, allowing for indirect modeling of reciprocal
behavior. In presenting a new model aimed at predicting behavior in games
involving a randomized allocation procedure, he builds upon the central pro-
cedural fairness hypothesis (see the preceding discussion). The model is de-
signed to capture the relative importance and interaction between procedural
and distributive fairness. The author drops the consequentialist perspective
by explicitly incorporating a new term into the utility function, which cap-
tures the way in which outcomes are generated. By doing so, procedural
considerations including procedural fairness can be accounted for. By apply-
ing the model to ten experimental games, the author shows that the model
predicts well. However, he suggests further verification of the model and
possible extensions.
Bolton et al. (2005) intend to open the way to a more careful consideration
of how allocation and procedural fairness interact, and to point to a role for
competing fairness norms in understanding procedural fairness. They argue
that different situations might systematically evoke different fairness norms,
so that a practical taxonomy can be developed by identifying natural classes
of games to which they apply. At the same time, they admit that even the
most sophisticated models do not capture the heterogeneity of individuals’
perceptions of what is fair in games. Additionally, these models cannot be
general enough to capture different fairness norms that might emerge in other,
possibly more complex games.
11Sebald (2007b) provides an application of the general framework.
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2.5 Conclusion
Indeed, clear evidence for procedures influencing human decision-making ex-
ists. This survey article shows that, on the one hand, social scientists other
than economists have provided a vast number of empirical, experimental, and
theoretical studies validating the conjecture that not only outcomes shape
human behavior but also the way in which decisions are taken. On the other
hand, procedures have been neglected by economists for a long time. Re-
cently, the economic research increased its attempts to identify procedural
effects and started to build theories based on these observations.
We argue that behavioral economics may serve as an important link be-
cause it integrates insights by psychologists as well as experimental economists
with neoclassical economic theory. Future economic research should make use
of the experimental method, as it is able to systematically investigate eco-
nomic behavior under controlled and replicable laboratory conditions. It has
been argued that many experimental games are not appropriate to represent
real relationships, e.g. real employment relationships (Backes-Gellner et al.,
2008). Their survey shows that only recently, laboratory experiments have
begun to meet these concerns by introducing additional factors like com-
petition, social interaction or real effort. We perceive the introduction of
procedural aspects as part of the same line of reasoning and argue that its
implementation is already overdue.
By discussing some recent experimental findings focusing on procedural
effects, we provide evidence for a promising new research agenda to be de-
veloped and to demonstrate at the same time the shortcomings of existing
models. Neither traditional models nor those based on distributional or re-
ciprocal fairness explain the observed behavior. We agree with Grimalda et
al. (2008b) who argue that recent experimental results demand an altogether
different conceptual approach or at least some generalization of previous eco-
nomic models. But if different games systematically trigger different fairness
perceptions, a general model explaining the facts without addressing the het-
erogeneity of fairness norms is hard to imagine. Further, Bolton et al. (2005)
argue if there is no such thing as a universal fairness or reciprocity norm
to guide social behavior independent of the game, any model with a simple
statement of those norms is bound to be incomplete. However, this does not
mean that such models are useless. A large literature has shown that we
can go a surprisingly long way with very simple models of fairness in some
important classes of games. For more challenging games, systematic varia-
tions of fairness norms could be incorporated in a way that allows subsequent
empirical tests and theoretical refinements.
The increasing awareness for procedures is a step in the right direction
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though there is still a lot to do. As long as procedures are excluded from
an experimental design (e.g. by assuming a pie to appear like manna from
heaven) simplistic models of human behavior might explain observations.
However, when applying a more realistic approach by introducing particular
procedures, we find strong evidence from various fields and methods that
procedures do matter.
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Chapter 3
Experimental methodology:
Selected topics
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this survey article is to discuss two important conceptual
issues in experimental economics: preference elicitation methods and player
types.1 These topics are of particular relevance for experimental economics,
such as the studies by Mertins (2008a), Albert and Mertins (2008) and Albert
et al. (2008). Studies such as those mentioned ask participants to indicate
their complete strategy to a specific game, which has been explained to them.
Thus, the players state their contingent responses for each information set in
the game. This method is the subject of some controversy. Some researchers
stress its exceptional advantages, while others do not use it for fear that it
may alter the actions of the players relative to other methods.2 It is this
necessity to discuss the relevant literature in greater detail.
Furthermore, as the studies mentioned above focus on social preferences,
one may argue that these types of preferences are relevant only to particular
types of individuals. Recently, economists began to classify people according
to several criteria. Albert and Mertins (2008), for example, distinguishes be-
tween four types of responders, which differ in their behavior, and notes that
non-reciprocal responder types are not influenced by treatment variation. If
these non-reciprocal responders are frequent enough, treatment effects on re-
1Fundamental summaries of experimental methodology can be found in Bergstrom and
Miller (1997), Camerer (2003), Davis and Holt (1993), Friedman and Cassar (2004),
Friedman and Sunder (1994), Guala (2005), Kagel and Roth (1995), and Plott and Smith
(2008).
2When presenting work among economists not familiar with this method, some have
noted that they felt like this method seemed to be an “experiment trick.”
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ciprocal types do not show up in the aggregate. Thus, averages may mask
substantial heterogeneity in individual behavior.
The present chapter is divided into two parts. The next part (section
3.2), presents two alternative preference elicitation procedures and examines
whether behavior patterns are independent of the method used. The experi-
mental evidence is mixed, with some studies finding that the method matters
while others find that it does not matter. In particular, some experimental
findings raise the possibility that people play games differently depending on
the elicitation method. The advantages and disadvantages of both methods
are discussed. To conclude this section, I apply these findings to experimen-
tal work I have conducted or participated in. In the last part (section 3.3), I
examine recent attempts to classify player behavior into types and consider
whether this is a promising approach for future research.
3.2 Preference elicitation methods
Experimental economics is among the fastest growing areas of economic re-
search. It has evolved over the past decades, with increases in both the range
of economic phenomena it addresses and in the methods it employs. How-
ever, there are some fundamental methodological concerns, such as concerns
over different methods of preference elicitation. Various experimental studies
indicate that human behavior may depend, sometimes dramatically, on how
a problem is presented.
Early research in cognitive psychology revealed that subtle differences in
elicitation can have a profound effect on stated preferences (e.g., Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). Brandts and Charness
(2000) state that there might be a natural concern that behavior depends
on specific features of the experimental procedures that do not correspond
to any issues of intrinsic motivation. Clearly, it is crucial that the experi-
mental design does not bias the choices made by subjects. In this section
I examine whether responses to more or less unfavorable actions depend on
the elicitation procedure.
In order to elicit participants’ preferences in an experimental setting, re-
searchers usually apply one of two procedures. The first one is called the
strategy method (Selten, 1967): subjects are asked to indicate their com-
plete strategy. In other words, the second player decides on a contingent
action for each and every possible move of the first player. Thus, subjects
state contingent responses at each information set. One of the responses will
correspond to the effective action(s) and will determine the individual exper-
imental payoff. The method has generally been used in simultaneous-move
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games, but its use is not restricted to them. There is a large field of applica-
tion within almost any experimental game. It has been used, for instance, in
an ultimatum game (Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993), an oligopoly experiment
(Selten et al., 1997), a moonlighting game (Falk et al., 2008), a public good
game (Fischbacher et al., 2001), a common pool resource game (Keser and
Gardner, 1999) and a prisoner’s dilemma game (Axelrod, 1984). Charness
and Rabin (2002) provide data from an array of 29 different simple games
using the strategy method.
The application of the strategy method is rather simple. Consider, for
example, a standard public goods experiment. Subjects are asked to indicate
for each (average) contribution level of other group members how much they
themselves want to contribute to the public good before finding out their ac-
tual choices (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Applying the strategy method to the
power-to-take game3 means asking responders to indicate their destruction
rate for any feasible take rate (Andreoni et al., 2003; Albert and Mertins,
2008). The strategy method can be changed slightly with the minimum
acceptable payoff procedure: responders are asked to state the minimum
payoff that they were willing to accept (see, for example, Knez and Camerer
(1995)). By doing so, researchers implicitly assume that strategies are mono-
tone. However, recent studies show that substantial fractions of responders
not only reject low, but also high offers and would only accept equal splits.
This kind of non-monotone rejection behavior is reported, for instance, by
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2008) and Güth et al. (2003).
The other method employed by researchers is the sequential elicitation
method: second movers respond to first players’ actual observed actions.
Thus, subjects spontaneously respond during the course of the play. This
method is usually used when a game is played in the ordinary manner as the
first mover is clear. By letting the same participants play the game repeat-
edly, experimenters also might gain insights about individuals’ contingent
strategies.
3.2.1 Does the elicitation procedure affect behavior?
Brandts and Charness (2000) explicitly test for differences in observed behav-
ior between the two methods in sequential prisoner’s dilemma and chicken
games. They let participants play the games both as first and second movers
using either the strategy or sequential method. Each participant is subject to
only one treatment of the game. The authors aimed at the simplest possible
3Andreoni et al. (2003, 2005) refer to the power-to-take game as the “convex ultimatum
game”, Rabin (1997) calls it “squishy game”.
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context by applying a 2 x 2 game matrix. In the sequential treatment, second
movers have to respond to actual decisions made by their paired first movers:
the row player first chooses a row. After being informed of row’s move, the
column player chooses a column. In the strategy treatment, the row player
chooses a row and simultaneously, the column player chooses a column for
each of row players’ feasible choices. From a game-theoretic point of view,
it should not matter whether the games were played with either method.
The payoff-maximizing column player strictly prefers one row choice over
the other in both games.
Brandts and Charness (2000) focus on choices that give people a lower
financial reward and compare these rates among treatments. They find that
behavior does not differ significantly: none of the differences in frequencies
between treatments is significant using a test of the equality of proportions
(p ≥ .26, two-tailed). Besides, they analyze first movers’ behavior across
treatments as those participants might anticipate any effects caused by the
used procedure that could have an effect on their choices. However, this is not
the case. To conclude, the experimental evidence provided by Brandts and
Charness (2000) suggests that preferences do not depend on the elicitation
method: the strategy method seems not to affect sequential responses.
A related study was provided by Schotter et al. (1994) who study fram-
ing or representation effects. They confront their participants with either the
normal form (presented as matrix with simultaneous moves) or the extensive
form (presented as tree with sequential moves) of simple games. Although all
games generate the same equilibrium outcome, data suggests that the strat-
egy chosen depends significantly on the presentation of the decision problem.
They observe significant differences in player behavior between a normal form
representation using the strategy method and an extensive form representa-
tion using the sequential method. Brandts and Charness (2000) argue that
the combined presentation and elicitation procedure effect may evoke these
significant differences. Indeed, one of the findings by Schotter et al. (1994)
is that player behavior is independent of the preference elicitation method
when holding the form in which the game is presented constant.
By contrast, Güth et al. (2001) report modest evidence on games in which
behavior is not robust to elicitation methods. In their experimental test, sub-
jects play a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game (Bolton and
Zwick, 1995) in which only two offers, a fair and an unfair one, are feasible.
Güth et al. (2001) replace exactly equal splits by nearly equal splits. If be-
havior is robust, these minor payoff changes would not matter. Indeed, this
is true when the strategy method is employed. However, when subjects play
the game sequentially significant differences are observed. Any other design
failed to reveal the behavioral relevance of exactly equal splits. Thus, their
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experimental data suggests that elicitation methods can significantly affect
behavior, at least in some games. Brosig et al. (2003) also find significant
differences between the sequential and strategy method. They asked subjects
to play one out of two one-shot sequential games presented in a 2 x 2 matrix
format which were similar to the trust game with one exception: if subjects
have chosen the inefficient outside option (no trust), second movers could
punish them. The authors test not only for differences between the elicita-
tion procedures but between different costs of punishment (high versus low).
They find that the use of the strategy method influences behavior in certain
environments. Second movers punish unfriendly first movers’ behavior only
when the strategy method is used and when confronted with low costs. Fur-
thermore, first movers’ behavior differs depending on whether participants
are in the sequential or strategy treatment.
In contrast, Cason and Mui (1998) find no considerable significant differ-
ence between the ordinary and the strategic play of the sequential dictator
game. In the standard treatment of the game, participants make two dictator
decisions and receive information regarding another subject’s dictator alloca-
tion before making their second decision. In the strategy method treatment,
participants receive no information between their two decisions. After having
submitted the first dictator allocation, subjects fill out a form specifying a
complete strategy contingent on all possible first dictator decisions selected
by the subject with whom they were randomly paired.
The authors compared first dictator choices as well as the second dictator
choice in the standard treatment with the realized second dictator choice in
the strategy method treatment. They did not observe behavioral differences
in distributions, means or the fraction of individuals’ maximizing payoffs.
They did note a minor difference between both treatments: 27 of 40 partici-
pants change their decisions in the strategy method treatment, while only 16
participants change their decisions in the standard treatment (Fisher’s exact
test, p= .03, two-tailed).
Besides direct experimental tests of whether there is a difference in player
behavior between games played with the sequential method and those played
with the strategy method, some papers examining other topics are relevant.
For example, Weber et al. (2004) show that the timing of unobserved moves
can affect decisions. Rapoport (1997) finds that two different extensive forms
corresponding to the same normal form yield different decisions. However, as
Brandts and Charness (2000) note, his games are of fairly high complexity.
Thus, they argue that the strategy method can be seen as a valid technique.
Blount and Bazerman (1996) demonstrate an inconsistency in how peo-
ple weight fairness concerns depending upon how preferences for outcomes
are elicited. They compare responder behavior in the ultimatum game under
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two different elicitation procedures: choice and minimum acceptable offer.
In the choice treatment, responders are asked to respond in advance to each
possible proposal by stating whether they accept or reject it. In the mini-
mum acceptable payoff treatment, responders are asked to state the minimum
payoff that they are willing to accept. In doing so, participants determine
how much deviation from the equal split they are willing to tolerate. This
frame is expected to result in an evaluative process that focuses greater at-
tention on comparative, rather than absolute, payoff concerns. Blount and
Bazerman (1996) find that subjects place significantly more weight on fair-
ness considerations in the minimum acceptable offer treatments and accepted
more unequal offers under the choice treatment.
3.2.2 Differences between preference elicitation proce-
dures
Researchers using the strategy method do not believe that the use of this
elicitation method is an important factor in the results observed (Charness
and Rabin, 2002). Indeed, some experimental findings support this belief
(Brandts and Charness, 2000; Cason and Mui, 1998; Oxoby and McLeish,
2004). Besides, neither standard game-theoretic nor extended models based
on reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher,
2006; Rabin, 1993) or inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999) predict any impact of the elicitation procedure on be-
havior.
However, there are plausible reasons why the strategy method induces
different behavior than a direct-response method. These are discussed in the
next section. There is also experimental evidence suggesting some differences
in the behavior of players based on which methods is employed (Brosig et
al., 2003; Croson, 2000; Güth et al., 2001; Shafir and Tversky, 1992). It
should be noted that the preference elicitation procedures differ in at least
three points:
1. available information
2. number of decisions
3. order of play
First, under the strategy method, participants are asked to base their
decisions on hypothetical actions that might be taken. That is, they have
information about any feasible first move, but not about the actual move
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taken. In contrast, the sequential elicitation method allows players to ob-
serve the action taken before deciding how to react. Participants definitely
know the first move, but they do not necessarily know all of the feasible
ones. Thus, the procedures differ with respect to the information that play-
ers have available to base their decisions upon. Second, both environments
vary according to the number of decisions. In the strategy method, people
are required to consider decisions for each of the subgames, not just for those
subgames which arise during the course of play. That is, depending on the
structure of the game in question, participants have to make not only one,
but several or even many decisions. Third, the order of play is different and
thus the timing of the decisions differs. When considering the temporal struc-
ture of either method, we find that under the strategy method, decisions are
presented simultaneously and thus are temporarily combined. In contrast,
the sequential elicitation method usually requires players to make only one
decision at a time. None of these differences has an effect upon the resulting
payoff, and thus, game-theoretic predictions do not differ depending on the
preference elicitation method.
However, a broad body of evidence suggests that any of these method-
ological differences can affect decisions. For instance, Bazerman et al. (1999)
provide evidence that the number of decisions may have an effect on the
decisions themselves, and Weber et al. (2004) show that the temporal order-
ing of decisions is of great importance. Why do participants take different
actions under the different procedures? The literature contains a number
of suggested explanations. Whereas experimental environments using the
strategy method have been referred to as “cold”, “hot” environments are
given by situations in which only effective actions are recorded, i.e. partic-
ipants have to respond to the decisions made by their partners. From a
standard game-theoretic point of view, results should be the same whatever
decision procedure. However, it seems intuitive that people show stronger
emotional responses to real actions than to hypothetical ones. Especially in
games where individuals can sacrifice part of their own monetary payoff in
order to reward (i.e. increase the other person’s payoff) or punish someone
(i.e. decrease the other player’s payoff), one might expect different actions
depending on the elicitation method.4 This argument is closely connected
with the psychological phenomenon that individuals attach too much weight
to salient or vivid events and too little weight to non-salient events (Cason
and Mui, 1998).
Furthermore, there is evidence that simply knowing one player moves
first can affect behavior, even when the first mover’s action is unobservable.
4See Loewenstein and Schkade (1999) for a discussion of the “hot-cold empathy gap”.
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Building upon it, Weber et al. (2004) conduct an experiment that avoids,
unlike many previous studies, confounding timing and response modes by
either confronting participants with specific offers or eliciting an minimum
acceptable offer (MAO). Their findings suggest that timing matters even
when players can not observe each other’s moves. They suggest that similar
findings by other researchers may be explained by focusing on the timing
of decisions. For example, Blount and Bazerman (1996) find differences
in players’ MAOs when players were asked to provide the MAOs directly
compared to when the players were provided with a list of possible offers from
which to select. Weber et al. (2004) explain the observation of substantially
higher MAOs in the direct treatment compared to the list method by noting
that the list method creates a proposer-first timing cue that the direct method
does not create.
Bazerman et al. (1999) review a broad body of evidence demonstrating
that the temporal structure of elicitation, i.e., whether the options are se-
quentially or simultaneously presented, determines preferences. The authors
discuss several alternative cognitive explanations, including the norm theory
(Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Ritov and Kahneman, 1997), the want/should
proposition (Bazerman et al., 1998) and the evaluability hypothesis (Hsee
et al., 1998). The norm theory notes that people tend to use comparisons
to make decisions and must work harder to evaluate a single option than to
evaluate several options presented together. In fact, when faced with a single
item to evaluate, the player evokes a set of available, internal references for
comparison and evaluates the item in the context of these references. How-
ever, when individuals are presented with more than one item to evaluate, the
alternatives themselves provide the comparison set of evaluation. If there are
differences in category membership across the alternatives, reconciling these
category differences will dominate assessment.
The want/should proposition presumes a tension between what individ-
uals want to do versus what they think they should do. If only one item
is presented, a counterbalancing alternative is lacking and there is a ten-
dency to do what we want instead of what we should. However, if confronted
with more than one option, we lean towards the most justifiable option. An
alternative explanation is provided with the evaluability hypothesis. It sug-
gests that when two options involve trading off between a hard-to-evaluate
attribute and an easy-to-evaluate attribute, the hard-to-evaluate attribute
will have less impact when items are sequentially evaluated due to a system-
atic bias: in the presence of ambiguous or confusing information, a decision
maker will always overweight familiar information. It can be thought of as an
informational effect: When more information about the value of an attribute
is available in simultaneous evaluation, individuals weight that information
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more heavily. Bazerman et al. (1999) evaluate whether these three theoret-
ical explanations predict their results. They find that each explanation has
one or more limitations and that none of them is able to describe all their
data. Thus, the authors develop a framework through which the different
approaches are integrated.
Brandts and Charness (2000) provide a possible explanation for the ob-
served lack of differences between the hot and the cold treatment. They
hypothesize that their results may be due to two psychological factors op-
erating in different directions and thus reducing the overall effect: First,
reactions toward unfavorable first moves might be stronger than hypothet-
ical decisions. Second, it is also easier to hypothetically sacrifice money to
punish or reward someone than to actually pay a certain amount of money
with certainty.
3.2.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the strategy method
The strategy method as a procedure to generate information on players’
preferences has both strengths and weaknesses. Roth (1995) notes that its
advantages are clear: experimenters acquire data on all information sets of
the game for a relatively low cost. Brosig et al. (2003) add that the strategy
method is often seen as a cost saving substitute to those comparatively more
expensive experimental designs where the on-the-spot reactions of individuals
can be observed. In order to gain the same number of data by either the strat-
egy or the sequential elicitation method, there is the choice between hiring
more participants or conducting various repetitions. Repetitions, however,
complicate matters by introducing intertemporal considerations on strategy
choices. In these cases, the use of the strategy method avoids a further source
of errors. Furthermore, as Roth (1995) states, observing participants’ entire
strategies helps to gain insights into their motivation. Hennig-Schmidt et al.
(2008) note that for some research agendas it is essential to apply the strat-
egy method as it provides the information needed. Fischbacher et al. (2001),
for instance, elicit a contribution schedule (i.e. a vector of contribution) for
each player in a standard linear public goods game. If participants choose a
contribution schedule that is increasing in the average contribution of oth-
ers, the authors argue that this can be taken as an unambiguous measure of
participants’ willingness to be conditionally cooperative. The method even
allows them to classify people’s behavior according to different “types” of
players (see Section ).
On the other hand, Roth (1995) points out that the possible effects of
physical timing in the course of the game are removed as subjects are re-
quired to simultaneously make all choices at the same time. For the case of
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ultimatum games played by the strategy method, it will not be possible to
observe all effects that are due to the responder making her decision after
the proposer has made his decision. Besides, since both players know the
timing structure of the game, this could also have an effect on the proposer.
The author notes that this might be true for purely behavioral reasons not
captured in formal game-theoretic models of idealized rationality, but also
for reasons rejected in formal game-theoretic models. The notion of subgame
perfect equilibria, for example, is lost in transition from the extensive to the
strategic form of the game.
Another possible concern with the strategy method is that subjects might
be less focussed when submitting entire strategies instead of concentrating on
those information sets that arise in the course of the game. This might lower
the incentive to think carefully about every possible element of the strategy
which in turn may lead to more variance in choices in strategy method treat-
ments (Cason and Mui, 1998; Walker and Smith, 1993). Note that Selten
(1967) himself views the strategy method as a more general procedure that
attempts to increase the transparency of the environment.
In addition, the strategy method can be criticized on the behavioral
grounds that its hypothetical character may reduce the seriousness with
which players play; the strategy method may appear too abstract to sim-
ulate a natural setting (Brandts and Charness, 2000). Albert et al. (2008)
argue that the abstract character of the strategy method would be an ad-
vantage if it leads to more thoroughly considered decisions - it makes it more
plausible that the results are relevant to important decisions that are not
taken at the spur of the moment.
The choice of the elicitation method seems to depend to a great extent
on the research question. If the examination of emotions is part of the focus
of the research, then the strategy method would not be the best choice.
However, its use seems to be appropriate if researchers are interested in
decisions formed in the absence of strong emotions.
3.2.4 The strategy method within our own experimen-
tal work
The experimental work I have conducted or participated in has been realized
with the strategy method; a sequential treatment was not utilized. Given
our reliance on the strategy method, should we expect our findings to be-
ing influenced by our selection of it? Obviously, both preference elicitation
procedures differ and each has its own strengths and weaknesses. Common
sense suggests that different procedures might result in different behaviors.
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Changing from ordinary play of the game to having participants simultane-
ously make all potential decisions at the same time may amount to a mean-
ingful change in the game itself. However, as this is a change that leaves the
game-theoretic predictions unchanged, an unambiguous conclusion cannot
be drawn. The experimental findings reviewed in this work suggest that the
actual influence of the elicitation method seems to depend on the structure
of the game. For some games, it makes a (modest) difference, for others, it
does not make a difference. The games analyzed here are rather simple and
strategic interdependence is nonexistent, so we should not expect any be-
havioral differences. However, as only one decision is payoff-relevant, there
is a reduced incentive to think carefully about each decision.5 This effect
might be important in the games analyzed here. However, as we observe
significant differences between treatments, the effect should not be of prime
importance. Besides, we find that data are in line with previous research
using the sequential elicitation method. In addition, Roth (1995) argues that
the strategy method forces individuals to think about each information set
in a different way than if they could primarily concentrate on the informa-
tion sets that arise in the course of the game. As we want individuals to
make thoroughly considered decisions that are not taken at the spur of the
moment, that argues in favor of the strategy method; the abstract nature of
the method may induce players to more fully consider all possibilities. Brosig
et al. (2003), among others, report that second movers are more willing to
bear the costs of punishment in a hot environment. Thus we should expect
responders’ willingness to resist to be higher if our games would have been
played in a sequential manner, i.e. without using the strategy method. In
addition to these reasons to select the strategy method, we decided to use the
strategy method because we intended to obtain data on the whole strategy
space and could thus gain valuable insights on people’s motivation. That
is, we asked participants to make decisions not only about resistance levels
(Mertins, 2008a; Albert et al., 2008) or destruction rates (Albert and Mertins,
2008) as reaction to the actual offer, but also to any feasible offer. In case of
the study on the behavioral effects of participation opportunities (Albert and
Mertins, 2008), the method even allows us to give evidence on the behavior
of different player types. This is the topic of the following section.
5In the threshold public good games, responders are asked to make 6 contingent deci-
sions. In the power-to-take game, responders decide on 6 or 9 decisions, respectively.
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3.3 Player types
Contrary to the standard assumption of a universal homo oeconomicus, a
substantial number of people exhibit social preferences. That is, they are
not solely motivated by material self-interest but also care about the mate-
rial payoffs of relevant reference agents (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). As the
standard assumption that people are exclusively motivated by their material
self-interest does not be hold up, how should we model player behavior? I
argue that focusing on individual differences among participants may help
to better understand and model behavior in experimental games. The study
of individuals’ heterogeneity is a promising approach for future research for
several reasons. First, various theoretical approaches, inspired by numer-
ous robust empirical findings, model social preferences by focusing on rela-
tive payoffs. These approaches include preferences for reciprocity (Charness
and Rabin, 2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Rabin, 1993), inequity aver-
sion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), pure altruism
(Andreoni, 1989) and envious preferences (Kirchsteiger, 1994).
Such models of social preferences predict different behavior than models
focusing solely on the individual’s payoff. One may argue that any model
can be justified if it accurately predicts behavior. However, a model may be
more accurate with one group of individuals than with another group of indi-
viduals. By assessing the predictive power of the Fehr/Schmidt (1999) model
of inequity version, Blanco et al. (2007) show that the model performs well
at the aggregate level, but less well at the individual level. Thus, classifying
individuals according to their behavior seems to be legitimate. Furthermore,
to better understand individual behavior, recent approaches analyze whether
individual differences in personality dimensions and demographic variables
are correlated with player types. Kurzban and Houser (2001), for instance,
find that player types are correlated with the personality dimensions self-
monitoring, self esteem, neuroticism and conscientiousness. It has also been
shown that different types differ in their ability to signal the own type and
to recognize the type of others (Brosig, 2002).
Second, different player types influence the dynamics of play in group
environments and thus alter a group’s cooperative outcome.6 Consider for
example the well-established phenomenon of declining contributions in public
good experiments. Cooperative decay has been shown to depend on a group’s
composition (see e.g., Burlando and Guala, 2005; Houser and Kurzban, 2003;
Kurzban and Houser, 2001). By identifying different player types, one might
6The overwhelming majority of analyzed experimental studies mentions this argument
as motivation for their conducted research.
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better predict outcomes and even may influence the outcomes. Recent work
on “assortative regrouping” (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2008) uses the typ-
ing approach to form groups exogenously (e.g., Burlando and Guala, 2005;
Dannenberg et al., 2007; Gächter and Thöni, 2005; Gunnthorsdottir et al.,
2007; Page et al., 2005). Dannenberg et al. (2007), for example, show that
groups consisting of two fair players contribute more to the public good than
groups with two egoistic players or mixed groups. However, it turns out that
information about the co-player’s type is crucial: As long as fair players are
not informed on the fact that their co-player is fair too, they act like egoistic
players. By forming groups exogenously according to player types, Burlando
and Guala (2005) have shown that it is possible to raise the overall level of
contribution to a public good. They note that homogenous group formation
can be seen to have a similar function to cooperation-sustaining mechanisms
such as the punishment of free-riders. Thus, forming groups by player type
may also have some practical benefit, for example, in a management con-
text, by preventing free-riding in working groups. Similarly, the presence of
free-riders has been shown to put the group in a spiral toward lower and
lower levels of contribution with the decay happens faster the more free-rider
types are in the group (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter, 2008; Kurzban and
Houser, 2001). A similar line of reasoning has been provided in the context
of agent-based simulations. Numerous studies suggest that results are highly
sensitive to the fraction of player types and the frequency with which they
interact (e.g., Halpin, 1999; Lomborg, 1996).
The third reason that focusing on heterogeneity is a promising approach
is that the study of averages might mask substantial differences in individual
behavior.7 Assume a standard one-shot public goods experiment. Purely
selfish individuals will contribute zero regardless of others’ contributions.
Treatment variations that lead to high contributions by others will not influ-
ence their homo-oeconomicus behavior. Consider a treatment variable that
changes only the behavior of reciprocity-minded players. If this type is not
frequent enough, treatment effects will not show up in the aggregate. How-
ever, when focusing solely on reciprocal types, one may identify important
influencing factors on their behavior. This approach has been used by Albert
und Mertins (2008) to examine the effects of participation in the decision-
making process.
Thus, I argue that it seems to be appropriate to take a further look
at people’s heterogeneity. I subscribe to the view of Andreoni and Miller
7To my surprise, this important argument in the realm of experimental economics has
been raised rather seldom, exceptions include Albert and Mertins (2008) and Kurzban and
Houser (2001).
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(2002) who postulate that a model that predicts well in the aggregate is
not necessarily useful for explaining individual behavior. They suggest that
capturing the variety of individual choices and then aggregating them would
help to better understand people’s behavior.
Kurzban and Houser (2001) point to the similarity of the concept of a
“type” in both fields of research, economics and psychology: the concept
includes ways in which individuals systematically differ from one another.
However, they also identify differences in the use of the concept in these
different fields. Whereas the game-theoretic concept captures differences in
agents’ information, belief, and preferences in a particular game-theoretic
environment, the psychological concept stresses the important ways in which
people differ in their behavior in consistent ways in social settings. Houser
(2003) defines a person’s type by the decision rule (i.e. the way a person’s
actions depend on personal information) they use. In this respect, decision
rules form the link between a person’s situation and decisions, and thus, it
seems to be natural to define a person’s type by the decision rule an individual
uses.
Although the discussion of agents’ heterogeneity has a long history in
psychology (e.g., Johnson and Nohrem-Hebeisem, 1979; Kelley and Stahelski,
1970; Messick and McClintock, 1968) and is increasingly significant in the
realm of economics (e.g., Heckman, 2001a, 2001b), experimental evidence on
the existence of different player types and studies of its implications and rele-
vance, is still very imperfect. In particular, there is neither a well-established
methodology, nor even a “common practice” broadly shared by practition-
ers. There is only some experimental work explicitly accounting for partic-
ipants’ heterogeneity that is reviewed below. What is lacking is a standard
approach for classifying people into player types. In this survey article, I
review different methods, e.g. type classification based on observed behavior,
pre-experimental tests or multi-method approaches. Whereas there is wide
variety in the methods used to classify players, there appears to be a conver-
gence concerning the specific types identified and the frequency with which
each occurs. This work is intended to clarify the current state of research
in the field and to integrate our own experimental work on player types into
the broader context.
3.3.1 Classification schemes
I agree with Kurzban and Houser (2001) who note that there seems to be
agreement that players use strategies that differ in systematic and discernable
ways but do not find consensus on the correct classification scheme. Early
studies such as Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) use rather broad schemes,
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dividing participants in three groups of players: those who are concerned with
equity, those who try to maximize their utility, and those whose play defied
easy categorization.8 Later studies propose a division into four categories.9
However, some consistent features of these disparate classification schemes
can be identified.10 Most studies divide their participants in a category con-
sisting of players who behave as the standard economic theory predicts. This
type is called Homo Oeconomicus (Albert and Mertins, 2008) or (Strong)
Free-rider (Burlando and Guala, 2005; Kurzban and Houser, 2001, 2005),
depending on the game in question. This type shows no reciprocity, be-
having instead just like the homo oeconomicus model predicts. Albert and
Mertins (2008) analyze behavior in a power-to-take experiment and find that
25% of responders behaving like payoff-maximizers, whereas Andreoni et al.
(2005) observe in a similar game that only 12% appear motivated to maxi-
mize their own payoffs.11 Kurzban and Houser (2001) note that about 28%
of participants belong to this type, Kurzban and Houser (2005) classify 20%
as Free-riders, and Burlando and Guala (2005) observe a fraction of about
32%.
The next category consists of Unconditional Cooperators (Albert and
Mertins, 2008) or simply (Strong) Cooperators (Burlando and Guala, 2005;
Kurzban and Houser, 2001, 2005). This type also shows no reciprocity but
behaves cooperatively even in the face of non-cooperative behavior. The
number of people belonging to this type seems to be similar with observed
fractions ranging from 13% (Kurzban and Houser, 2005) or 18% (Burlando
and Guala, 2005) to 25% (Kurzban and Houser, 2001).
The third category contains players who reciprocate, called Reciprocators
(Burlando and Guala, 2005; Kurzban and Houser, 2005), Homo Reciprocans
(Albert and Mertins, 2008), or Conditional Cooperators (Fischbacher et al.,
2001). This type responds to others’ behavior by using a conditional strat-
egy and shows reciprocity to various degrees. By studying reciprocation in
a one-shot public goods experiment, Fischbacher et al. (2001) count those
players to this group who are willing to contribute more to a public good
the more others contribute. They note that the underlying behavior can be
8Weimann (1994) also suggests that there are three types of players (Cooperative
Types, Strong Free-riders and Weak Free-rider), but do not account for noisy behavior as
a type on its own.
9For instance, Fischbacher et al. (2001) suggest that players can be classified as Con-
ditional Cooperators, Free-riders, Hump-shaped Types, and Others.
10As Kurzban and Houser (2005) mention, it is interesting to note that social psychol-
ogists and economists have postulated similar classification schemes.
11Note that Albert andMertins (2008) do not differentiate between this and the following
type.
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considered as either a motivation of its own or as a consequence of prefer-
ences related to fairness, such as altruism, warm-glow, inequity aversion, or
reciprocity. Reciprocators constitute a large portion of the experimental pop-
ulation (Albert and Mertins, 2008; Burlando and Guala, 2005; Fischbacher
et al., 2001). Observed fractions start from 29% (Kurzban and Houser, 2001)
and 35% (Burlando and Guala, 2005) and raise up to 51.7% (Albert and
Mertins, 2008) or even 63% in one study (Kurzban and Houser, 2005).
A residual group of Noisy players (Burlando and Guala, 2005) comple-
ments the list of standard types.12 These participants do not fall clearly into
one category (ambiguous or borderline cases) and thus their data are not
easily interpretable. The fraction of participants classified as noisy players
seems to depend heavily on the aggregation scheme (in the case of cumula-
tive methods) or on the definition of remaining classification groups. Accord-
ingly, Fischbacher et al. (2001) classify less than 7% of participants as noisy
whereas Burlando and Guala (2005) and Kurzban and Houser (2001) found
15% and 18%, respectively. Albert and Mertins (2008), who use a rather
narrow definition for remaining types, find a fraction of 23.3%. In his early
attempt to separate the hypotheses of kindness and confusion as potential
explanations for cooperative behavior in public good experiments, Andreoni
(1995) shows that about half of all cooperative behavior is the result of errors
or confusion.
A further category used in several studies consists of Hump-shaped behav-
ior (Fischbacher et al., 2001) or Triangle Cooperators (Kurzban and Houser,
2001). These are participants who are (on average) close to Conditional Co-
operators up to a certain contribution level by other players. Beyond this
level, they steadily reduce their contributions. Kurzban and Houser (2001)
observe a fraction of about 3% and thus, they disregard this type in their fur-
ther research (e.g. in Kurzban and Houser, 2005). Against the background of
other studies classifying these behavioral patterns as noisy (e.g., Albert and
Mertins, 2008), the observed results of Fischbacher et al. (2001), who find
that 14% fall into this category, appear noteworthy. However, when added
to the small fraction of players classified as noisy, 7%, their results are indeed
similar to the findings of others.
3.3.2 Classification methods
As Burlando and Guala (2005) point out, it is rather difficult to identify and
classify subjects according to types. Several techniques have been used in
12Whereas some authors define a category called Erratic Type (Albert and Mertins,
2008) or Other Patterns (Fischbacher et al., 2001), the usual approach seems to be to
arrange these participants as an out-of-classification group.
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the literature and these are discussed below. Some categorization attempts
are more behavioral and others more psychological in nature. However, any
classification approach consists of two steps: First, identification of behav-
ioral patterns or attitudes and second, designation to particular pre-defined
types. I identified three methods used in the field of experimental economics
which I will discuss in greater detail: classification based on observed be-
havior, classification based on value orientation and classification employing
multiple approaches.13
3.3.2.1 Classification based on observed behavior
The standard approach for player type classification is based on observed
behavior. However, classification methods differ in their concrete realizations
in several points which are reviewed in detail below:
• preference elicitation method (sequential elicitation vs. strategy method)
• preference description (utility function vs. best reply)
• timing of classification (pre-experimental vs. simultaneous typing)
• type designation
Classification schemes may either use individual data obtained by repeti-
tion of simple measurements (sequential method; see e.g. Burlando and Guala
(2005) or Burlando and Webley (1999)) or strategy profiles achieved through
the use of the strategy method (Albert and Mertins, 2008; Fischbacher and
Gächter, 2008; Fischbacher et al., 2001).14 Basically, any appropriately de-
signed game (e.g. public good game, ultimatum games, dictator games) may
be suitable to measure individual preferences. However, as Kurzban and
Houser (2005) note, public good games provide a natural environment be-
cause the results of previous experiments are consistent with the conjecture
that types exist and affect cooperative outcomes. Thus, the overwhelming
majority of studies employs public good experiments.
13Some experimental studies use questionnaire answers referring to the understanding
of the game’s rules, expectations on others’ behavior, individual objectives or the chosen
strategy itself to support their type classification approach (see, e.g., Burlando and Guala,
2005; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2008). Both, Kurzban and Houser (2005) as well as
Fischbacher and Gächter (2008) asked individuals to complete a 10-question quiz that
had to be answered correctly before participants could proceed. However, as I am not
aware of any study basing its classification solely on questionnaires, I do not consider
questionnaires as a classification method on its own.
14For a discussion of preference elicitation methods see section 3.2.
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By allowing to revise their decisions repeatedly, Kurzban and Houser
(2001) propose a particular method of sequential preference elicitation to
observe participants’ contribution decisions to a public good contingent on
the information about others’ average contributions. They implement a cir-
cular public goods game. At the beginning, players take an initial decision on
how many tokens they want to transfer to their individual private accounts
and to the single group account.15 Then, one player at a time is informed of
the aggregate contribution in the group account and is given the option to
change the own contribution. Play continues as each player in turn is given
the same opportunity. The game ends at a pre-determined random point
that is unknown by players. Payoffs are given by the final allocation of to-
kens to the group and private accounts. This procedure allows the researcher
to observe how the individual contribution decisions depend on the average
contribution to the group account.
However, whereas the authors themselves highlight the straightforward-
ness of their approach, it builds upon granting players the option of changing
their decision after having observed others’ decision. Thus, the instructions
explicitly advice participants of making the own decision contingent on oth-
ers’ decisions. This may cause people to decide in a different way than when
having received the information about others’ behavior in a different setting.
In particular, an experimenter demand effect, describing a phenomenon of
experimental testing in which participants attempt to behave they feel the
experimenter wants, cannot be ruled out. In the same line of reasoning,
Fischbacher and Gächter (2008) argue that the approach comprises strate-
gic incentives and repeated game effects.
Classification methods differ also in the applied description of prefer-
ences. Whereas some methods aim on eliciting or estimating individuals’
utility functions (Andreoni et al., 2005; Blanco et al., 2007; Brosig et al.,
2005), most approaches are satisfied with knowing individuals’ best replies
conditional on others’ decisions. In the latter case, these responses are in-
terpreted as particular preferences. Fischbacher and Gächter (2008), for
instance, interpret individuals’ willingness to voluntary contribute to a pub-
lic good as a participant’s cooperation preference; Albert and Mertins (2008)
explain people’s willingness to shrink the pie in a power-to-take game as
a preference for negative reciprocity. Blanco et al. (2007) use the utility
function approach to answer a particular research question, i.e. whether the
inequality aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) has predictive power
15As tokens in the private account yield a higher monetary return to the participant than
tokens in the group account, but tokens in the group account improve the groups aggregate
outcome, the public good game in general is considered a clean way to investigate how
people trade off their own interests against those of a group.
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not only at the aggregate but also at the individual level. By employing
the strategy method, Blanco et al. (2007) obtain (near) point estimates of
the parameters for aversion to advantageous (βi) and disadvantageous in-
equality (αi) for each individual i. The parameter αi can be derived from
the minimum acceptable offers in the ultimatum game. It is defined as the
offer that makes responder i indifferent between accepting and rejecting the
offer. The parameter βi is given by the egalitarian allocation, such that the
dictator is indifferent in a modified dictator game between keeping the entire
endowment and the egalitarian outcome.16
Classification methods based on behavior also differ in the key ques-
tion whether behavior is observed before or during the actual experiment.
Dannenberg et al. (2007) and Burlando and Guala (2005), for instance, fol-
low the pre-experimental typing approach by using a two-steps procedure.
In the first step, preferences are measured. Subsequently, participants are
classified according to types. In the second step, the same participants inter-
act in a controlled environment under the games’ rules for which hypotheses
regarding the individual behavior have been derived in advance (Dannenberg
et al., 2007). By contrast, type classification and hypotheses testing can
be simultaneous (see, e.g., Albert and Mertins, 2008; Kurzban and Houser,
2001).17
Last but not least, classification methods differ in their applied type des-
ignation procedure. A systematic categorization of how individual behavior
is assigned to types seems not to be achievable due to the evident hetero-
geneity in type assignment approaches. Thus, I am not able to discuss all of
these procedures as nearly each experimental study uses a different approach.
Some methods are extremely simple. Dannenberg et al. (2007), for example,
define types according to the individual value of βi, the parameter for aver-
sion to advantageous inequality. Participants with βi ∈ [0.3;1[ are defined as
egoistic (very little inequity averse) whereas participants with βi ∈ [0;0.3] are
typed as fair (highly inequity averse).18
Albert and Mertins (2008) provide a technical characterization of play-
ers’ strategies and classification into pre-defined types. They define types
according to responder behavior, which they describe by an n-tupel of de-
struction rates (d1,d2, ...,dn) ∈ Dn, where dj is the type’s response to take
rate tj , t1 < t2 < .. . < tn, and where the number n of possible take rates
and their values depend on the treatment. Specifically, they consider the
16Dannenberg et al. (2007) use nearly the same method.
17The following section provides a discussion on underlying assumptions and conse-
quences of the two basic approaches.
18No participant has βi = 0.3 and the authors do not clarify whether βi = 0.3 is counted
among the egoistic or fair types.
52 CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
following strategies:
• d0 := (0, ...0) (never destroy)
• d+ := (0,0, ...0,x) with x > 0, x ∈ D (destroy iff this is costless)
• d++ := (d1,d2, ...,dn) with d1 ≤ d2 ≤ . . .≤ dn and dn−1 > 0 (nondecreas-
ing, destroy in spite of costs)
• d− := (d1,d2, ...,dn) with dj+1 < dj for at least one j (nonmonotonic)
The authors assume that types play only certain strategies. Type 0
(Homo Oeconomicus) maximizes its experimental payoff, which implies d0
or d+. Type 1 (Unconditional Cooperator) is always cooperative and there-
fore plays d0. Type 2 (Homo Reciprocans) shows (negative) reciprocity, that
is, plays d+ or d++. Type 3 (Erratic Type) may play any strategy; however,
if there is a strong random influence on the behavior of type 3, it will most
likely play d−, because this is the largest class of strategies.
Hence, the authors tentatively classify types on account of their behavior.
They classify users of d0 and d+ as type 0/1, users of d++ as type 2, and
users of d− as type 3. They then validate this classification by looking at
some relevant statistics and find that types differ not only in their strategy
choices but differ also significantly in their reactions to take rates. This is not
implied by the type definition and suggests that types are really different.
A similar approach is used in the seminal work by Fischbacher et al.
(2001).19 Participants indicate how much they want to contribute to the pub-
lic good for each average contribution level of other group members. Thus,
by using the strategy method, the authors elicit the contribution schedules
of each individual. The category of Conditional Cooperators include those
schedules that are increasing and either (weakly) monotonic or have at least a
highly significant and positive Spearman rank correlation coefficient between
own and other’s contributions. Free-riders have contribution schedules that
contain zero at all entries, and Hump-shaped contributions are those which
are on average close to perfect conditional cooperation for contribution levels
of up to 10 tokens of the other group members. Beyond this level, contri-
butions are decreasing. Fischbacher and Gächter (2008) use the same pref-
erence elicitation mechanism but assign types in a different way, i.e, they
assign types by evaluating the slope of a linear regression of the schedule and
the mean contribution in the schedule. Free-riders have a slope and a mean
contribution of zero, Perfect Conditional Cooperators have a slope of one and
19The same procedure is used by Fischbacher and Gächter (2008). Ockenfels (1999)
suggests a similar design independently of Fischbacher et al. (2001).
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a mean contribution of 10 (= half of the endowment).20 Any schedule is de-
picted in a scatter plot as dot. The abscissa shows the slope of the schedules,
whereas the ordinate shows the average contribution in the schedule.
Another approach used in several experimental studies (e.g., Kurzban and
Houser, 2001) is the procedure suggested by El-Gamal and Grether (1995).
It requires one to specify in advance a set of candidate decision rules. A
statistical procedure chooses the best subset of these rules and each partic-
ipant is subsequently assigned to one of the rules in the subset. I exemplify
the application by the work of Kurzban and Houser (2001). They assume
that each participant is one of four possible types (Free-riders, Cooperators,
Conditional Cooperators, and Triangle Cooperators).21 They label a con-
tribution as consistent with a particular type if it is in accordance with a
pre-determined move.22 Note that some contributions may be consistent
with more than one type or may not be consistent with any type. In a last
step, the authors assign to each participant the type that is consistent with
the greatest number of their moves.23 If less than one-third of a participant’s
moves are consistent with one of the types, the player is dropped from the
sample. More than 15% of participants are thus eliminated. Players may
be classified by only one-third of their moves, ignoring two-thirds of their
actions. Thus, their approach can be criticized on the ground that it ac-
counts only for participants’ predominant behavior, but that this may still
comprise the minority of the players’ actions. They find that 60% of players’
moves are consistent with their assigned types, thus disregarding a consider-
able amount of decisions. In particular, the authors observe that Free-riders
occasionally contribute relatively high amounts to the public good, whereas
Strong Cooperators sometimes contribute little. Kurzban and Houser (2001)
themselves note that their approach might be too simplistic to capture more
complex behavioral regularities.
Kurzban and Houser (2005) expand their own approach by implementing
a statistical procedure that uses an individual’s linear conditional-contribution
profile (LCP) to classify each participant as one of three types.24 A LCP is
defined as the outcome of an ordinary least-squares regression of the indi-
20For any other type, the authors do not provide clear specifications.
21Houser et al. (2004) provide a similar type classification algorithm that does not
require one to specify the types of interest a priori.
22The authors apply rather broad categories. For example, they define a contribution
as consistent with the Free-rider type, if it is less than 20% of the endowment. To be
consistent with the Conditional Cooperator type requires the contribution to be within 5
tokens (= 10% of the endowment) of the groups’ average contribution.
23The authors note that El-Gamal and Grether (1995) provide a rigorous statistical
foundation for this approach to type players.
24In this study, the authors do not account for Triangle Cooperators any more.
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vidual’s contribution decisions on the mean contribution that the participant
observes immediately before making a contribution decision. Hence, any con-
tribution strategy reflects two parameters: the intercept and the slope of an
individual’s LCP. The intercept measures how willing a subject is to coop-
erate even when the counterparts contribute little to the public good. The
slope provides a measure of an individual’s responsiveness, both in direction
and magnitude, to other’s contributions.
Participants are classified according to the individual estimated LCP as
follows: If the LCP lies everywhere below 25, the person is typed as Free-
rider. This means that the participant is expected to contribute less than
half of the endowment at all levels of other’s contributions. A Cooperator
is defined as having a LCP at or above 25. Hence, this type is expected to
contribute more than half of the endowment to the public good regardless
others’ contributions. The third type, the Reciprocator, is defined for LCPs
with positive slopes lying above and below the 50%-line. The Reciprocators’
contributions are expected to increase with the group average increasing.
Participants with any other LCP are not classified as one of these three
types.25
The authors themselves note that there are more sophisticated (and cum-
bersome) procedures than the one they use. However, they stress an impor-
tant advantage of the applied approach: It provides a simple, fast, and,
as they say, accurate method for inference about individual differences. In
order to demonstrate that contribution decisions differ substantially among
these types, Kurzban and Houser (2005) conduct a three-sample Medians test
showing that the median per-round contributions for three different average
contributions of others are statistically significant with p < .001. Further-
more, they validate their type classifications by demonstrating that types
predict well the decisions individuals’ make in games played afterward (see
the discussion on type stability below). In their view, their algorithm is
a formal extension of the visual-inspection approach by Fischbacher et al.
(2001).
3.3.2.2 Classification based on value orientation
Classification may also be based on an independent measure of value orienta-
tion, i.e. the weight an individual attaches to her or his own welfare relative
to the welfare of others. As Liebrand (1984) states, it is assumed in the defi-
nition and measurement of social motivation that each motivation has its own
utility function as determined by the linear combination of own and other’s
25Kurzban and Houser (2005) observe less than 4% of all participants to have any other
LCP.
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outcomes. Griesinger and Livingston (1973) devised a geometric taxonomy
defining various social motives by using this procedure which is extensively
used in social psychological (see, e.g., Liebrand 1984) and, to a lesser extent,
in economic research (see, e.g., Brosig, 2002; Levati et al., 2007; Offerman et
al., 1996). The decomposed game technique can be employed to test individ-
uals for cooperative behavior. To test for different other-regarding behavior,
another classification method must be used.
Individual value orientations are assessed by the so-called “decomposed
game technique”: Each participant is asked to make several binary choices
over combinations of own and other monetary payoffs. All pairs of outcomes
lie equally spaced on a circle, centered at the origin (0,0) and with a radius
of 15 units of a particular currency. Participants are asked to make choices
between two adjacent outcomes on the circle. The horizontal axis measures
the amount of money allocated to oneself (x) and the vertical axis measures
the amount of money offered to the other (y). A motivational vector in the
circle-space is a measure of an individual’s preferences regarding own and
other individuals’ payoffs. It is calculated by adding all the participant’s
responses. This vector is then mapped back onto the circle and is used to
characterize the individual into one of five categories, from most social to
least: Altruistic, Cooperative, Individualistic, Egoistic and Competitive.26
Social psychologists have developed this standard classification scheme on
the basis of the observed motivational vectors. More specifically, motiva-
tional vectors between degree -112.5 and -67.5 are classified as aggressive,
between -67.5 and -22.5 as competitive, between -22.5 and 22.5 as individu-
alistic, between 22.5 and -67.5 as cooperative, and between 67.5 and 112.5
as altruistic.27
3.3.2.3 The multi-method classification approach
Another method is the multi-method approach which builds its categorization
upon various methods as done for example by Burlando and Guala (2005).
The authors triangulate between various methods: They use four sources of
evidence and the aggregate classification comes from weighted single clas-
sification results. There are various reasons for a multi-method approach.
26Offerman et al. (1996) concede that this classification is ad hoc, but is in their view
very natural.
27Carpenter (2005), among others, uses 4 categories: Motivational vectors that fall
in the range of 112.5 to 67.5 degrees are classified as altruistic, between 67.5 and 22.5 as
cooperative, between 22.5 and -22.5 as egoistic, and between -22.5 and -67.5 as competitive.
Liebrand (1984) argues for distinguishing between four classes of social motivations, that
is: altruism, cooperation, individualism and competition.
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First, a single method may to be considered as insufficient to adequately
classify types due to its inherent shortcomings. Accordingly, the authors
state that a multi-method approach is better than the one that would be
provided by each method applied in isolation. For the case of questionnaires,
Burlando and Guala (2005) note that this method is not highly valued in ex-
perimental economics. Second, different tasks may tap on different aspects
of a complex psychological construct that a single approach might overlook.
Last but not least, the authors stress that their experimental data would
clearly support their approach. Participants were classified according to the
multi-method approach discussed before. Then, people were redivided in
homogenous groups and played the game again. As behavior differs sig-
nificantly between both sessions, the categories cannot be considered to be
totally arbitrarily or ill-defined. Besides, the authors observe a high degree of
convergence between the various classification methods. Note that this find-
ing also speaks in favor of any of the methods used. Thus, a multi-method
approach seems not to be mandatory. Burlando and Guala (2005) recognize
that their approach can be criticized for its reliance on intuitive rather than
theoretically-founded measures. Indeed, their assignment of weights to the
four classification methods seems to be ad-hoc: they put 40% weight to the
observed data, and only 20% to each of the three other measurements. Be-
sides, only in cases where the different procedures do not converge at all or
ties occurred, a player was assigned to a “noisy” group. Thus, it was sufficient
to reach a 50% threshold in order to be assigned to one of the types.
The crucial factor for Brosig (2002) to use different classification pro-
cedures is the objective to test for different forms of other-regarding be-
havior. She identifies participants’ cooperative behavior by employing the
decomposed game technique and tests for individuals’ fairness by using a
dictator game. Type classification according to the degree of cooperative be-
havior follows the standard classification procedure developed for this tech-
nique. Depending on individuals’ dictator game giving, people are labeled
“self-centered” (responder receives less than one-third of the endowment) or
“beneficent” (responder receives one-third or more of the endowment).
The use of a multi-method approach in order to classify individuals points
to the still preliminary character of player type classification. To date, there
is no generally used method, no common practice yet.
3.3.3 Consistency and stability of individual behavior
When typing individuals according to their observed behavior, we are not
obliged to make any assumption about consistency and stability of individual
behavior. Following Kurzban and Houser (2005), I subscribe to the view that
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the notion of type must be understood with respect to a particular class of
decisions building upon specific institutions. Experimental evidence suggests
that even minor changes (e.g., whether cooperation is more or less costly) may
change individual behavior significantly (see, e.g., Isaac and Duncan, 2000).
Accordingly, Kurzban and Houser (2005) postulate the need for additional
research to determine the conditions under which individuals separate into
types, and which institutions have the effect of homogenizing play.
Some studies, however, use pre-experimental tests28 to classify player
types (e.g., Burlando and Guala, 2005; Dannenberg et al., 2007; Fischbacher
and Gächter, 2008). When doing so, the questions occur whether individ-
uals behave consistently within and across different classes of games and
whether individuals behavior is stable over time. Brosig et al. (2007) note
that standard economic theory as well as any theory of other-regarding be-
havior assumes that individual preferences do not vary across games and over
time. Dannenberg et al. (2007) merely assume that preferences are stable at
least within a short time period.
Fischbacher andGächter (2008) measure people’s cooperation preferences
in a public good game and observe the same participants in a sequence of
ten one-shot games. Then, they analyze whether elicited preferences have
any predictive power in explaining actual contributions. They provide clear
evidence that observed behavior significantly depends on measured prefer-
ences: average cooperation levels are highly correlated (Spearman’s ρ= .40,
p= .0000). Besides, they provide experimental evidence that elicited prefer-
ences are not affected by the order of the used elicitation procedure.
Kurzban and Houser (2001) point to the observed homogeneity in behav-
ior for a given player across different groups. They find that type differences
are consistent in the sense that players typed as Strong Free-riders tend to
pursue this strategy in different groups.
Within and across game consistency is investigated by Blanco et al. (2006)
and Brosig et al. (2007). Brosig et al. (2007) confront participants in a within-
subject design with different variants of modified dictator games and the
prisoner’s dilemma (three classes of games). They test whether participants
showing either purely self-interested behavior or other-regarding behavior
according to the theories by Charness and Rabin (2002), Fehr and Schmitt
(1999) or Andreoni and Miller (2002) have consistent preferences. Besides,
Brosig et al. (2007) test whether preferences are stable over time by repeating
28Note that I use the term “pre-experimental test” for any two-step approach observing
the same individuals twice, once in order to observe actual behavior and once to assign
types. Thus, I do not differentiate between pre- and post-experimental tests. Fischbacher
and Gächter (2008), for instance, control for possible order effects by applying a random
matching protocol.
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the experiment three times with the same participants within three months.
With regard to within game consistency, the authors find that all measures
of consistency explain a significant fraction of observed individual behavior,
with consistency increasing during the course of the game. This increase is
due to the fact that, over time, more and more subjects make consistently
selfish decisions. The strongest test for the consistency of individual behavior
is given with the concept of consistency across games, i.e. the comparison of
decisions made by a particular individual in different strategic situations.
Brosig et al. (2007) report a rather low proportion of consistent behavior
across games compared to the proportion of within-game consistency. In
the third wave, selfishness clearly dominates behavior and about 60% of all
decisions are consistent across games.
To test for stability of individual behavior, the authors observe whether
individuals make always the same decision in the same game. They find
that people change their behavior tremendously, but these changes have only
one direction, which is common to all participants. They show purely self-
interested behavior. Brosig et al. (2007) could not find any other-regarding
behavior which is stable over time. Stable behavior can be observed only
by those, who behave strictly selfish. Accordingly, in those classes of games,
which reveal a high number of selfish moves, a high frequency of stable be-
havior can be found (up to 60% on average over all three waves). The authors
offer two plausible explanations. First, individuals may learn to be selfish,
or second, individuals’ obligation to help others is fulfilled by helping once.
Blanco et al. (2006) add to the analysis of within and across game con-
sistency within a similar framework using four different experimental games.
They differ from Brosig et al. (2007) in that they solely focus on inequality
aversion as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Their data exhibit some
degree of consistency and correlation between decisions: about one third of
participants behave consistently in comparable games. The partial failure
of the model poses some questions. Are preferences inconsistent, indeed or
is the model simply not able to include the multiplicity of relevant behav-
ioral forces? The authors note that altruism, for example, is not consistent
across games if a participant behaves altruistically in one game but not in
another. Another explanation is that there is not such a simple motivation
as altruism. Instead, there are several motives. As further explanation for
observed inconsistent behavior, the authors mention that participants may
make different choices in the same game if the situation has changed in other
respects.
By letting participants play some out-of-sample games with randomly
reassigned partners, Kurzban and Houser (2005) also test for preference sta-
bility. They find that an individual’s type is stable over time: Free-riders
3.3. PLAYER TYPES 59
continued to contribute less on average than their counterparts, Cooperators
more, and Reciprocators about the same. Using a three-sample Medians test,
they find that the median contributions of the three types are statistically
significant at p < .001.
Brosig (2002) tackles a related question in evaluating the relationship be-
tween two kinds of other-regarding behavior (cooperation and fairness) mea-
sured by two different classification procedures. First, she finds that the order
in which the two classification procedures are administered exert a signifi-
cant influence on the allocation decisions in the dictator game. Participants
who played the dictator game first give significantly more to the anonymous
responders than participants who first filled in the questionnaires for the de-
composed games. Second, the two kinds of other-regarding behavior seems to
be unrelated to each other. The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients,
relating the vectors in the decomposed games to the dictator allocations, are
not significant. Thus, the decisions in both classification methods reveal dif-
ferent behavioral characteristics. Accordingly, Kurzban and Houser (2005)
suggest not to map social value orientations onto types derived from behavior
in two-player, two-option games as n-player and two-player interactions dif-
fer significantly. They refer to the mixed evidence found in the psychological
literature: Whereas Liebrand (1984) provides evidence that an individual’s
social value orientation can predict behavior in resource dilemmas, it does
not so in public good games (Parks, 1994). To conclude, individual-level
comparisons have rarely been conducted and thus, little is known to date
about how individuals play across and within games and over time.
3.3.4 Type classification within the own experimental
work
Albert and Mertins (2008) test the conjecture that participatory decision
making may increase acceptance even of unfavorable decisions using an ex-
perimental three-person power-to-take game. Two takers decide which frac-
tion of the responder’s endowment to transfer to themselves; the responder
decides which part of the endowment to destroy. Thus, the responder can
punish greedy takers, but only at a cost to herself. We modify the game
by letting the responder participate in takers’ transfer decision and con-
sider the effect of participation on the destruction rate. First, we analyze
people’s behavior in the aggregate and find that participation matters. Re-
sponders destroy more if they (1) had no opportunity to participate in the
decision making process and (2) are confronted with highly unfavorable out-
comes. However, we do not find significant treatment effects. As averages
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may mask substantial heterogeneity in individual behavior, we account for
this fact by classifying responders according to the strategy chosen. Simi-
lar to Fischbacher et al. (2001), we apply the strategy method (1967) to
directly elicit individuals’ preferences. According to the chosen destruction
rates depending on the claimed transfers, we distinguish between four types:
the Homo Oeconomicus (type 0), the Unconditional Cooperator (type 1), the
Homo Reciprocans (type 2), and the Erratic Type (type 3).29
Figure 3.1: Responder types
In figure 3.1, the destruction schedules of all 116 responders are displayed,
sorted by treatment and type.30 Note that the meaning of Homo Recipro-
cans in our design differs clearly from other classifications. As we capture
destruction rates depending on claims, the schedules do not reflect condi-
tional cooperation but rather conditional punishment and thus some kind of
negative instead of positive reciprocity. Thus, our schedules and those by
Fischbacher et al. (2001), similar at first sight, display a different relation-
ship. Nevertheless, the fraction of Reciprocators (irrespective of either being
motivated by positive or negative reciprocity) seems to be exceedingly robust.
29We do not differentiate between type 0 and 1, as in our design, their strategy can only
differ with respect to the case where destruction is costless.
30Appendix A.1 contains four separate figures, one for each treatment.
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Whereas we find 51.7% to be classified as Homo Reciprocans, Fischbacher
et al. (2001) report exactly 50%. Note that our classification scheme, in
contrast to Fischbacher et al. (2001) among others, is rather strict: Contri-
bution schedules that show an increasing trend but display at least one slight
negative deviation from the trend are assigned to the erratic type.
With respect to our research question, we can restrict the hypothesis of
participation affecting the outcome acceptance to type 2 as non-reciprocal re-
sponder types are not influenced by treatment variation. By definition, type
0 and type 1 behaviors cannot be affected by the treatments. With respect
to the erratic type, any influence is possible, but the literature contains no
hypotheses. Thus, we use the type classification approach to identify those
individuals who might be affected by participation opportunities. For the
Homo Reciprocans a clear hypothesis emerges: If, as conjectured, participa-
tion is an aspect of fairness, negative reciprocity should be less pronounced
in the participation treatments. Indeed, we find that the participation effect
is highly significant for those responders who show negative reciprocity.
Note that our work differs from any of the discussed studies in that we use
the type classification approach to identify those reciprocity-minded individu-
als who are potentially affected by treatment variation. We then focus solely
on this particular type and compare their behavior within different treat-
ments. By contrast, other studies identify various types to explain group
outcomes by the groups’ actual compositions (e.g., Burlando and Guala,
2005; Fischbacher et al., 2001) or to evaluate different motivations for co-
operative behavior (e.g., Levati et al., 2007) without implementing differ-
ent treatments. Our approach can be criticized on the ground that we did
not assess a priori preferences. Whereas we do not expect preferences to
be influenced by treatments, we cannot completely eliminate the possibility
that people’s chosen strategies are affected by the assigned treatment. For
instance, a player having the opportunity to participate in the decision mak-
ing process (treatment part) may behave like the homo oeconomicus model
predicts, whereas the same individual might have shown some kind of re-
ciprocal behavior in the no-part treatment. Implementing an a priori type
classification method, accounting for negative reciprocity, before assigning
participants to treatments would rule out this possibility.
3.4 Conclusion
The literature on type classification reviewed above is primarily concerned
with the identification and analysis of individuals’ cooperation preference
and its implications for group outcomes. Accordingly, the existence of dif-
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ferent behavioral types has been confirmed by experiments using threshold
public good games. This class of games is commonly used to investigate
how individuals trade off their own interests against those of a group. Thus,
the study by Albert and Mertins (2008) differs from what has been done
before in several aspects. By analyzing a power-to-take game, it focuses on
negative reciprocity and categorizes individual behavior according to that
dimension. It aims on identifying those individuals that are concerned with
reciprocity and thus are likely to respond to procedural variations. In doing
so, the study applies the strategy method to classify players into types. As
discussed before, this method is extensively used and seems to be an appro-
priate tool to elicit preferences and to classify behavior. It proves to be a
standard procedure and a legitimate tool in many contexts.
To conclude, this survey illustrates the recent increasing emphasis on
the importance of individual differences in understanding and modeling be-
havior in experimental games. I argue that future work should develop more
sophisticated type classification methods to extend the player type approach.
I follow Andreoni et al. (2005) who claim that accounting for people’s het-
erogeneity is key to a successful account of bargaining behavior. I discussed
attempts that provide several interesting findings. However, many open ques-
tions remain. Experimental research on player types is far from having pro-
vided a common practice for researchers to follow. In addition, more detailed
findings on individuals’ heterogeneity could perhaps put renewed emphasis
on theories and experiments on bargaining behavior. Furthermore, scien-
tific progress in the identification of different player types may inspire new
research on institutions that perform well in the presence of heterogeneous
agents.
Part II
Experimental evidence
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Chapter 4
Experiment 1: Procedural
judgements
4.1 Introduction
One persistent finding in experimental economics is that not only outcomes
but also procedures leading to them matter (e.g. Albert and Mertins, 2008;
Blount, 1995; Bolton et al., 2005; Brandts et al., 2006; Charness and Levine,
2007; Falk et al., 2008; Fukuno and Ohbuchi, 2003).1 In particular, proce-
dures seem to play an eminent role in workplace relations: behavioral reac-
tions to promotion decisions, bonus allocations or dismissals have been shown
to significantly depend on the selection procedure. Thus, it seems to be a
factual necessity – for organizations or any other institution – to respect the
procedural preferences within a group. In particular, one may argue that a
procedure needs to have at least some support within a group to ensure that
people submit information and respect outcomes (Dietrich, 2005; Dolan et
al., 2007). The latter aspect is the focus of our study.
Consider a group of employees which chooses a person among them to
be the “team leader”. With the selection, the team leader is given some de-
1Only recently, economists begun to investigate the role of procedures. In contrast,
there is a broad consensus among other social scientists that people react differently to
identical outcomes depending on the way in which decisions were taken, see e.g. Grimes
(2006), Konovsky (2000), Thibaut andWalker (1975), Tyler (1990), Tyler and Lind (2000).
Economists just started to theoretically address the issue of procedural concerns. Recent
work includes Bolton et al. (2005), Krawczyk (2007) and Trautmann (2007). Sebald (2007)
provides an game-theoretic framework that integrates procedural concerns into economic
analysis. Empirical work on procedures include Bischoff et al. (2008) who show by ana-
lyzing representative survey data that procedural fairness plays an important role for the
acceptance of a given income distribution.
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gree of distributive power. Henceforth, she makes allocation decisions whose
outcomes affect all group members.2 Do team members judge allocations
solely according to outcomes or do they consider the procedure that led to
the selection of the team leader and thus in turn led to the allocation chosen
by the team leader?3
Our research is closely related to the experimental study by Brandts et
al. (2006). They tackle the question whether or not a selection procedure
is able to change individuals’ goodwill towards others in general and/or to-
wards the selectors in particular. The authors presume that people may
have a tendency to avoid the guilt that results from disappointing the expec-
tations of others. Their first hypothesis posits that selected allocators are
more generous towards others than random allocators (“I-want-YOU effect”).
Their second hypothesis states that the selected party will favor the selecting
party more than the third party involved (“gratitude effect”). There is some
statistical evidence for both effects.4 Albert et al. (2008) confirmed this find-
ing within a different experimental framework. They show that proposers
claim significantly less if responders’ group preferences regarding proposer’s
appointment procedure were satisfied than if they were violated (p = .046,
Mann-Whitney test, one-sided). Both studies provide evidence that the se-
lected party’s (i.e. proposers’) motivation is affected by selection. We pick
up the topic by expanding their research question on the selecting party’s
(i.e. responders’) behavior.
There exits by now a broad consensus that property rights induce fairness
norms and are thereby crucial for any kind of outcome (Frey and Bohnet,
1995; Sudgen, 1986). Proposers claim a share and responders accept or reject
a proposed share according to their individual fairness norm. Typically, roles
in bargaining experiments are assigned by a random procedure. In these
cases, the strength of property rights seems to be accompanied by a fairness
norm suggesting that all players have (more or less) the same right to a
share, resulting in a high probability for 50:50 allocations. This normative
right was shown to be altered by the introduction of effort to obtain the pie.
Numerous studies provide evidence on this “entitlement effect”. Hoffman and
2Another example are employees who choose among them their representatives and thus
allow them to lobby. Beyond labor market relations, one might think of any democratic
system in which citizens elect the government.
3Note that in many situations, people do not choose a procedure leading to an outcome
but choose an allocator by an appointment procedure and thus give them some degree of
distributive power.
4By using a Mann-Whitney test, the “I-want-YOU effect” is confirmed in the first
round (p= .043), but not in the following rounds (p= .089 and p= .48). The same is true
for the “gratitude effect” (round 1: p= .042, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test)
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Spitzer (1985) and Hoffman et al. (1994), for example, show that when the
role of the proposer was earned (e.g. by scoring high on a general knowledge
quiz) rather than being randomly assigned proposers offer less and responders
accept more unequal offers.
We argue that besides role allocation by chance or effort, there is a further
variable deserving recognition: role assignment by a procedure judged right
to use or fair. A growing literature in the social sciences indicates that
people seem to care not only about outcomes themselves but also about how
they emerged in the first place (for a review, see Mertins (2008b)). We test
whether individuals’ procedural judgments affect their behavior. Responders’
demands may vary depending on whether proposers obtained their roles with
or without responders’ support.
Based on a simple experimental game, we shed light on these questions.
One proposer faces four responders who can offer resistance against allocation
proposals. Resistance is modeled as a threshold public good.5 The public
good “resistance” is provided if and only if the sum of voluntary contributions
is greater than or equal to a specific threshold. In this case, the proposer
gets nothing. We implement an experimental setting with two feasible ap-
pointment procedures (AP). These AP’s appoint the role of the proposer
and thus distributive power. We elicit participants preferences and fairness
evaluations over both procedures. Then, we assign either the AP which is
favored by a majority or not. Hence, the individual and group procedural
preferences of responders may either be satisfied or violated. We consider dif-
ferent procedural aspects discussed in the literature: We investigate whether
AP’s themselves, fairness evaluations and procedural satisfaction have an ef-
fect on responders’ willingness to offer resistance against various outcomes.
By measuring people’s resistance levels, we can identify their willingness to
accept various outcomes.
First, we refer to the appointment procedures themselves. A number of
studies provide evidence which allocative mechanisms are considered “ac-
ceptable” and which not. Stutzer and Frey (2005) quote some examples
where random mechanisms were chosen because they were considered to be
an adequate tool, e.g. the selection of persons to form a jury in criminal and
civil cases, or random mechanisms to select politicians and public officials
in classical democracy in Athens. The authors propose the usage of ran-
dom selection as a principle in international organizations in order to give
every citizen an equal chance of being chosen. Surveys, however, show that
a considerable number does not agree with the use of random mechanisms.
5The study of threshold public good games may be said to begin with the work of
Marwell and Ames (1979) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984).
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Frey and Pommerehne (1993) report that raising prices to ration demand
is considered to be fair by less voters than allocation by a “first come, first
served” rule or allocation by an authority. Accordingly, Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee (1996) report on people’s unwillingness to accept any solutions where
to site environmental hazards that include monetary values. Pommerehne et
al. (1997) rank people’s procedural preferences (in descending order): expert
judgment, layperson judgment, allocation by lottery and an auction mech-
anism. We put two alternative mechanisms to the vote: (AP 1) allocation
by an authority (the experimenter), and (AP 2) election. In the following,
we try to assess which mechanism is favored and whether the allocated AP’s
themselves influence responders willingness to resist.
Second, we investigate the possible impact of procedural fairness evalua-
tions. A critical finding in this line of research is the fair process effect: Out-
comes from fair procedures are rather accepted than outcomes from unfair
procedures, even if the outcomes themselves are viewed as unfair (Brockner
andWiesenfeld, 1996; Greenberg and Folger, 1983; Thibaut andWalker, 1975;
Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Lind, 2000). Whereas the fair process effect is said
to be extremely robust and one of the most frequently replicated findings
in social psychology, there is still little experimental evidence with decisions
having monetary consequences (for a survey, see Mertins (2008b)). An ex-
ception is Bolton et al. (2005) who show in an economic experiment that
an unfair outcome chosen by a fair (i.e. unbiased) lottery is more acceptable
than the same unfair outcome chosen by a third-party. We will test whether
participants self-reported procedural fairness judgments on both AP’s af-
fect their willingness to offer resistance against various outcomes against the
background of monetary consequences.
Third, we consider participants’ satisfaction with an applied appointment
procedure. Procedural fairness judgments and procedural satisfaction judg-
ments have mostly been treated interchangeable as both concepts overlap to
a great extent. However, there is empirical evidence that the two constructs
do not always show the same effect (Van den Bos et al., 1998). Our exper-
imental setting is able to differentiate between effects resulting from either
procedural fairness or procedural satisfaction judgments. That is, we test
whether perceived procedural fairness and/or procedural satisfaction posi-
tively affects how people react to outcomes. To our knowledge, there is no
experiment that has explicitly examined this issue before. It has been ar-
gued, e.g. by Ng (1988), and empirically shown (notably by Bruno Frey and
colleagues) that the use of the preferred procedure directly yields utility. The
latter propose the term “procedural utility” to denote people’s utility pro-
vided if their preferences about the process as such are satisfied. Frey et
al. (2004) measure utility by individuals’ reported subjective well-being or
4.2. THE EXPERIMENT 69
happiness. Frey and Stutzer (2002) show that individuals obtain procedu-
ral utility, i.e., by having the mere opportunity to participate in the political
decision-making process. Furthermore, it has been said that the way in which
decisions are made can affect people’s reactions to those decisions (Dolan et
al., 2007). In particular, it has been argued that a procedure needs to have
at least some support within a group to ensure that people respect outcomes
(Dietrich, 2005) or support even apparently unfavorable decision (Dolan et
al., 2007). This consideration is related to the literature on perceived legit-
imacy as the primary explanation for compliance. Tyler and Lind (2000)
state the so-called “legitimacy and deference hypothesis”: People obey a de-
cision if they regard the authority, who made the decision, as entitled to be
obeyed, irrespective of their own judgment about the decision. We intend
to examine the assumed causality: Do people rather comply with a decision
(i.e. invest less in the public good resistance) if they support the underlying
procedure? We state the formal hypotheses in the following section.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 de-
scribes the experimental design and procedures, and states the behavioral
hypotheses we intend to test. Section 4.3 presents experimental results. Sec-
tion 4.4 provides some discussion and concludes.
4.2 The experiment
4.2.1 The basic game
Consider the following game between five players, one proposer and four re-
sponders. Each responder has an initial endowment of p4 , where p > 0 (in
chips) is the total experimental payoff at stake in the game. The proposer
has no endowment. The proposer tells responders the tax, that is, the num-
ber x∈ [0, p4 ] of chips she would like to get from each of them. If her proposal
goes through, she gets 4x while each responder keeps p4 −x. However, each
responder i can pay yi ∈ [0, p4 ] on a group account. Responders’ decisions are
simultaneous. Payments to the group account are lost to the group. If the
amount on the group account reaches a threshold t with p > t > p4 , that is, if∑
i yi ≥ t, the proposal is rejected, and each responder keeps p4−yi while the
proposer gets nothing. Note that no single responder can achieve rejection.
If, however, the group account stays below the threshold t, each responder
has to pay up to x to the proposer, depending on how much of his endowment
is left, and the proposer gets up to 4x, depending on whether responders can
pay her in full or not. Thus, each responder pays zi := min{p4 − yi,x} ≥ 0
and keeps p4 −yi− zi ≥ 0, while the proposer gets
∑
i zi ≥ 0.
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Resistance is modeled as a threshold public good. The public good is pro-
vided if and only if the sum of voluntary contributions is greater than or equal
to the cost of the public good t with t being the threshold. The value of a
provided public good is x, which equals the proposed tax and is the same for
all responders. As the public good is fixed-sized, contributions exceeding the
threshold do not affect the level of provision. The applied decision rule is not
simply a binary one as players can choose to contribute any integer yi ∈ [0, p4 ].
This reflects the idea that resistance in real world is seldom an all-or-nothing
decision. People typically have more responses than either to accept or reject
a decision or a claim, e.g. they can join a protest as instigators or mere sup-
porters. Thus, different grades of participation, corresponding with different
costs, are conceivable.
In the experiment, the group endowment was p= 100 chips, and the thresh-
old was t = p4 +1 = 26. The tax proposal was restricted to multiples of five
chips plus zero: x ∈ {0,5,10,15,20,25}. Responders could choose any contri-
bution yi ∈ {0,0.5,1,1.5,2, ...,24.5,25}.
For the theoretical analysis, we consider only subgame perfect equilibria in
pure strategies assuming that players maximize their own experimental pay-
offs. Under these assumptions, a subgame perfect equilibrium is a strat-
egy profile (x∗,y1(x),y2(x),y3(x),y4(x)) with the following properties. First,
yi(x)≤ x, that is, no responders invests more in resistance than the tax pro-
posal x, because x is the return of successful resistance. Second, yi(x) = 0
for x ≤ 6.5 because then the maximum collective investments are 4x < 26,
that is, resistance cannot be successful. Third,
∑
i yi(x) ∈ {0,26} if x≥ 6.5,
that is, whenever x is high enough for successful resistance, responders either
coordinate on no resistance or on exactly the right amount of resistance be-
cause otherwise at least one responder could profit by reducing his investment
unilaterally. Thus, for proposals x ≥ 6.5, the game becomes a coordination
game: there are many subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies which
compete against each other.
Given the responder strategies, the best response of the proposer is x∗ :=
max{x:∑i yi(x) = 0}, that is, to select the highest value of x for which there
is no resistance. Since x ∈ {0,5,10,15,20,25}, it follows that x∗ = 5. Note
that x = 5 means equal division of the 100 chips among all five players if
there is no resistance.
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4.2.2 Experimental design and procedures
The game is explored by applying Selten’s (1967) strategy method6 for three
reasons: First, we intend to acquire a maximum of data. Second, we aim at
eliciting contingent decisions that cover the strategy space. Third, we expect
that highly unfavorable claims could trigger strong emotional responses in
a hot (i.e. emotional) environment, which we intend to avoid. The applied
cool frame even strengthens the results offered.
Furthermore, the experimental design has the feature of asking subjects to
decide in both roles (as proposer and as responder) before the participant’s
final role is determined. The purpose is not to connect behavior in both
roles but to allow responders to have an idea of proposer’s decision situation.
However, we will solely focus on responders’ behavior.
A total of 100 participants took part in the non-computerized experiment
conducted at Saarland University.7 The experiment took about 35 minutes
and participants earned 4.47 Euro on average.
As indicated in figure 4.1, the experiment consisted of a pre-experimental
questionnaire (appendix B.1), three decision stages (appendix B.2) and a
post-experimental questionnaire (appendices B.3 and B.4).8 Before running
the (one-shot) experiment, each participant was asked to fill out a sign-up
sheet serving as pre-experimental questionnaire9 Thus, participants provided
basic demographic information and indicated their average time spent in
voluntary work. As part of our experimental design, we had to generate
information about participants’ age and social commitment. Their answers
were used in a subsequent stage to allow voting for a specific group member
(the oldest one or the one which volunteers most). Then, all participants
were assembled in a large room and randomly assigned to a group of n= 5.
In stage one, all participants were asked to decide in the role of the
proposer on how to allocate the group pie of p= 100 chips with the monetary
value of 1 chip being 0.25 Euro. In the beginning, each responder i was given
6By applying the strategy method, subjects are asked to submit entire strategies by
stating what they do conditional on each of the proposers‘ choices prior to observing the
proposers‘ actual choice.
7Session 1-3 with 55 subjects was conducted on 2nd July 2005 and session 4 and 5
with 45 subjects on 12th July 2005. In the former case, participants were visitors of the
university’s Open Day (most of them were prospective students), and in the latter case,
participants were students from various fields. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed
that no significant differences in the behavior of students and non-students were observable
(p ≥ .168) and thus, data are pooled. We had 51% female participants. The average age
was 23.2 with age ranging from 17 to 53 years.
8Original (German) instructions are available from the author upon request.
9The sign-up sheet is given in appendix B.1.
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Figure 4.1: Sequence of events
pre-experimental questionnaire
?
stage 1: decision on x as proposer
?
stage 2: preference elicitation
?
treatment allocation
+
stage 3: decision on yi as responder
?
stage 4: post-experimental questionnaire
an initial endowment of 25 chips (6.25 Euro), whereas the proposer had
nothing. The proposer proposed a tax x ∈ {0,5,10,15,20,25} to be paid by
each responder.
In decision stage 2, participants were asked to consider two appointment
procedures (AP) for the group’s proposer:
• AP 1 (experimenter despotism): The experimenter appoints a proposer.
• AP 2 (majority vote): Group members appoint a proposer by majority
vote.
AP 1 was in fact a random mechanism. We drew a lot to determine the
proposer; participants, however, did not know this. AP 2 was more difficult
to implement since anonymity had to be respected. We asked participants to
vote for a criterion to determine the proposer. They had the choice between
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age (the oldest group member) and high engagement in student and voluntary
activities (the one who spent most time per week on such activities). The
relevant information was available from the pre-experimental questionnaire.
First, participants casted their vote for AP 1 or AP 2. Abstention was
impossible. As each group consisted of five members, there was necessarily a
majority—large (5:0), medium (4:1) or narrow (3:2)—in favor of one AP. In a
next step, participants gave reasons for their choice. Moreover, independently
of their own preferences with respect to the AP, participants had to vote for
one criterion, high age or high engagement, so that, in case of AP 2, a
proposer could be chosen. Again, abstention was impossible. Furthermore,
participants stated their opinion on the importance of the APs using a seven-
point scale ranging from 1 (very important) to 7 (not important at all).
Besides, participants ranked both APs on a seven point scale from 1 (very
unfair) to 7 (very fair). When stage 2 was completed, we counted the votes
and completed instructions for stage 3.
Instructions for decision stage 3 contained information about the results
from stage 2. We told participants the preferences of their group, that is,
the AP preferred by the majority and the size of the majority. We then told
them whether the preference of the majority was respected (treatment M+)
or not (treatment M−), and which AP, 1 or 2, had accordingly been used to
appoint the proposer. For instance, a group may have voted 4:1 in favor of
AP 2; participants were given this information together with the information
that the will of the majority did not prevail and that, instead, AP 1 was used
to appoint the proposer. Another group may have voted 3:2 in favor of AP 2;
participants were given this information together with the information that
the will of the majority prevailed and that we had determined the proposer
according to the criterion preferred by the group. Half of the groups (50
participants) were randomly assigned to treatment M+, the other half to
treatment M−. We applied a between-subject design where participants
were not aware of the different treatments.
In stage 3, all participants were asked to decide as responders whether
or not offering resistance against any feasible allocation. Participants chose
their contributions yi ∈ {0,0.5,1,1.5, ...,25} to the responders’ group account
for each x ∈ {0,5,10,15,20,25} the proposer might have chosen (strategy
method). The instructions emphasized that these contingent contribution
choices were binding and that one would be carried out depending on the
actually proposed tax.
When all subjects have finished all three decision stages, completed de-
cision forms were taken to another room to determine the roles according
to the rules of the game and to calculate payments. While the calculations
lasted, all subjects filled in a post-experimental questionnaire intended to
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check their understanding of the game.
4.2.3 Hypotheses
Each responder finds himself in one of four possible situations (see table
4.1 below): Individual AP preferences may be satisfied (situation I+) or
not (situation I−), and group AP preferences –that is, the preference of the
majority– may be satisfied (situation M+) or not (situation M−). These
situations were determined partly by our treatment (M+ versus M−) and
partly by the responder’s preference in combination with our treatment (I+
versus I−).
Table 4.1: Responder situations
individual preference
satisfied not satisfied
group preference satisfied I
+M+ I−M+
not satisfied I+M− I−M−
Game-theoretic predictions of responders’ behavior on the basis of egois-
tic or purely distributional social preferences do not differ between the four
situations. Besides, neither the appointment procedure itself nor fairness
assessments of it should affect responders’ behavior. Thus, we state the fol-
lowing null hypothesis:
H0. Responders’ behavior is the same under any AP, any fairness
evaluation of the applied AP and any treatment situation for any
claim and claims altogether.
The possibility that participants have procedural preferences, however,
motivates different hypotheses. Specifically, we investigate the following be-
havioral hypotheses, which are suggested by the literature on procedural
preferences discussed in the introduction and apply to any tax x > 0.
First, the appointment procedure itself may have an impact on respon-
ders’ willingness to offer resistance against proposers’ claims:
H1. Responders’ behavior differs between AP 1 and AP 2.
Second, previous findings on procedural fairness suggest that individual
procedural fairness evaluations play an important role in responders’ will-
ingness to accept or reject an offer by the selected party. In particular, the
4.2. THE EXPERIMENT 75
procedural fairness hypothesis states that outcomes from fair procedures are
rather accepted than outcomes from unfair procedures, even if the outcomes
itself are viewed as unfair. This yields the following directed hypothesis:
H2. Responders offer less resistance if the procedure through
which the proposer has been assigned distributive power is seen
to be fairer (or at least as fair) as the other AP available (c.p.).
Third, we try to assess the impact of procedural satisfaction, an issues
which has not attracted much attention – at least in the realm of experi-
mental economics – yet. When arguing for procedural autonomy (i.e. group
decisions should be taken on the ground of procedural judgments within the
group), justification may be based on normative reasons as well as on the
pragmatic argument that people would otherwise not accept outcomes. In
the long-term, it has been argued, this could even generate major instabil-
ity within the organization. The satisfaction of procedural preferences can
possibly reduce negative reciprocity. Individuals may think it is right that
their individual or group preferences are satisfied, and may react negatively
if this is not the case. According to the legitimacy and deference hypothesis,
responders are expected to obey a decision if they regard the proposer as
entitled to be obeyed. Entitlement is assumed to be given if responders’ pro-
cedural preferences are satisfied. These considerations result in the following
hypotheses:
H3a Responders offer less resistance if their individual preferences
regarding the AP are satisfied than if they are not satisfied (c.p.).
H3b Responders offer less resistance if their group preferences re-
garding the AP are satisfied than if they are not satisfied (c.p.).
Moreover, the effect becomes stronger the larger the majority set-
ting the group preference.
H3c Responders offer least resistance if their individual and group
preferences regarding the AP are satisfied (c.p.). Responders offer
most resistance if they are both not satisfied (c.p.). Responders
offer medium levels of resistance if either their individual or group
preferences are satisfied (c.p.).
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4.3 Experimental results
4.3.1 Procedural preferences
On the question whether AP 1 or AP 2 should by applied in their group,
64% voted for AP 1 (experimenter despotism) and 36% for AP 2 (majority
vote). In case that AP 2 was applied, 42% advocated “age” as key criterion
and 58% “engagement”.
According to treatment variation rules, 50 participants (10 groups with
5 members each) get exactly the rule which the majority wants (M+), and
other 50 not (M−). AP 1 is thus applied in 45 cases, and AP 2 is applied in 55
cases. The result of this assignment is that 51 participants decide under I+,
49 participants decide under I−. The frequency of each responder situation
is given in table 4.2 below.10
Table 4.2: Participants n in each responder situation
I+M+ I+M− I−M+ I−M−
n 35 18 15 32
Only 8% of all participants indicate that proposers’ appointment proce-
dure is of little or no importance (6 or 7 on a seven point scale). Importance
attach 46% of all subjects (1 or 2). On a seven point scale with 7 meaning
very fair, participants perceive AP 1 as fairer (median 5) than AP 2 (median
4). By defining the AP which received a higher fairness evaluation as “fair
AP” and the other AP as “unfair AP”, we find that 55 participant are as-
signed a fair AP (45 an unfair AP). All together, 87% choose those rule that
they judge to be the fairer one (or the one which was seen as fair as the other).
This means that only 13% choose exactly the other rule (mostly for selfish
reasons according to their self-reported motivation). Answer frequencies to
rule importance and rule fairness are given in table 4.3.
4.3.2 Allocated appointment procedures
We test for potential differences in resistance levels depending on whether
AP 1 or AP 2 is applied. Interestingly, we find no significant differences
10As group size is equal underM+/− and nearly equal under I+/−, we will analyze these
date by using ANOVA/ANCOVA. For the analysis of responder situations, where groups
are extremely unequal, we refer to non-parametric test statistics like Mann-Whitney or
Kruskal-Wallis.
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Table 4.3: Answer frequencies (in %) to decision stage 1 questions
points rule importance fairness AP 1 fairness AP 2
(1=very important) (1=very unfair) (1=very unfair)
(7=very unimportant) (7=very fair) (7=very fair)
1 14 2 3
2 32 12 25
3 21 7 17
4 20 19 18
5 5 14 9
6 5 26 15
7 3 20 13
between mean resistance levels under both appointment procedures (see table
4.4). Thus, participants do not behave differently depending on the allocated
appointment procedure for any x≥ 5 and for x altogether11.
Regularity 1. For any given value of x and for x altogether,
contributions to the provision of the public good resistance do
not differ significantly with respect to the allocated appointment
procedure.
Table 4.4: Responders’ mean contributions to resistance for AP 1 vs. AP 2
x AP 1 AP 2 differencea pb
5 .989 1.518 -0.529 .341
10 3.444 3.764 -0.320 .666
15 5.822 5.127 0.695 .247
20 7.067 6.427 0.640 .402
25 7.633 7.318 0.315 .728
all 4.991 4.831 0.160 .672
afirst column minus second column
bsingle-factor ANOVA, two-sided
11Note that mean resistance levels labeled with all include any decision taken for x ∈
{5,10,15,20,25}.
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4.3.3 Procedural fairness
We test whether individual procedural fairness evaluations influence respon-
ders’ willingness to accept or reject a tax. According to the procedural fair-
ness hypothesis, we expect responders to offer less resistance if the procedure
through which the proposer has been assigned distributive power is seen to
be fairer one.12
Indeed, we find that responders offer less resistance if the AP they deem
fairer is used. This is true for any tax and overall tax claims. However,
from the analysis of variance output (see table 4.5, we retain the overall null
hypothesis of equal population means in group “fair AP” and “not fair AP”.
Regularity 2. For any given value of x and for x altogether, con-
tributions to the provision of the public good resistance do not
differ significantly with respect to the individual fairness judg-
ment on the allocated appointment procedure. However, respon-
ders offer less resistance against any tax x and for x altogether if
a fair procedure has been allocated to them.
Table 4.5: Responders’ mean contributions to resistance according to proce-
dural fairness evaluations
x fair AP not fair AP differencea pb
5 .982 1.644 -0.662 .117
10 3.573 3.678 -0.105 .444
15 5.355 5.544 -0.189 .376
20 6.473 7.011 -0.538 .240
25 7.245 7.722 -0.477 .300
all 4.725 5.120 -0.395 .149
afirst column minus second column
bsingle-factor ANOVA, one-sided
4.3.4 Individual preference satisfaction
According to hypothesis H3a, we expect responders to offer less resistance
if their individual procedural preferences are satisfied. However, we find
12We define “fair AP” as the procedure which is deemed fairer (or at least as fair) as
the other AP available according to questionnaire answers on a seven-point scale on AP
fairness. The other procedure is called “not fair AP” and it describes the procedure which
was seen to be less fair (lower scale value) than the other one.
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that the opposite is true for any x: mean contributions y to resistance are
lower in situations I− as compared with I+ (see columns 2 and 3 of table
4.6 below). Thus we should reject H3a. However, to detect any regularity
underlying responders’ behavior, we test the alternative hypothesis whether
mean resistance levels are significantly higher for I+ than for I− using an
one-factor ANOVA. Resulting p-values are given in column 4 of table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Responders’ mean contributions to resistance for I+ vs. I− de-
pending on tax proposal x
x I+ I− differencea pb
5 1.333 1.224 0.109 .4222
10 4.108 3.112 0.996 .087∗c
15 5.471 5.408 0.063 .459
20 7.176 6.235 0.941 .107
25 8.147 6.745 1.402 .059∗
all 5.247 4.545 0.702 .035∗∗
afirst column minus second column
bone-factor ANOVA, one-sided
c∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%
Regularity 3. For any given value of x, responders offer more
resistance if their individual procedural preferences are satisfied.
This is the opposite of what we have expected according to H3a.
The difference is significant for x = 10 (p = .087∗) and x = 25
(p= .059∗).
In order to further investigate the correlation between the satisfaction of
procedural preferences and resistance, we conduct an one-factor analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) overall tax claims x. Our variable of interest is a mea-
sure of how much resistance responders offer for all tax claims together under
I+ and I−. The ANCOVA tests whether the factor “individual procedural
preference satisfaction” has an effect on the outcome variable resistance after
removing the variance for the covariate “allocated AP (1 or 2)” accounts.
Mean resistance for I− is 4.545, and for I+, it is 5.247. We find that the
difference is significant at p= .035∗∗ (one-factor ANCOVA, one-sided)13.
Regularity 4. Taken over all tax claims x together, ANCOVA
reveals that responders offer significantly more resistance (p =
13Note that the covariate itself is not significant (p= .456).
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.035∗∗, one-sided) if their individual procedural preferences are
satisfied.
4.3.5 Group preference satisfaction
According to H3b, tax proposals should be more readily accepted, that is,
mean contributions y to resistance are expected to be lower in situationsM+
as compared with M−. Columns 2 and 3 of table 4.7 below show observed
values of y depending on tax proposals x for M+ and M−, respectively.
Table 4.7: Responders’ mean contributions to resistance for M+ vs. M−
depending on tax proposal x
x M+ M− differencea pb
5 1.438 1.080 0.358 .235
10 4.090 3.150 0.940 .100∗
15 5.900 4.980 0.920 .061∗
20 7.100 6.330 0.770 .156
25 7.950 6.970 0.980 .138
all 5.304 4.502 0.802 .013∗∗
afirst column minus second column
bone-factor ANOVA, one-sided
Obviously, we find that H3b is to be rejected due to the fact that for any x
the effect is reversed from what we have expected: contributions to resistance
are higher for M+ than for M−. Thus we tested whether the difference is
significant using an one-factor ANOVA (one-sided). For x = 10 and x = 15,
the difference is significant with p = .100∗, and p = .061∗ respectively. To
sum up, there is evidence that procedural satisfaction within the group has
an effect on outcome acceptance and a fifth result is:
Regularity 5. For any given value of x, responders offer more
resistance if their group procedural preferences are satisfied. This
is the opposite of what we have expected according to H3b. The
difference is significant for x = 10 (p = .100∗) and x = 15 (p =
.061∗).
By applying an ANCOVA test with allocated rule to be the covariate and
without distinguishing between tax claims, we find that responders under
M+ invest 5.304 on average in resistance, whereas responders under M−
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offer 4.502 mean resistance. The difference is highly significant at p= .013∗∗
(one-factor ANCOVA, one-sided).14
Regularity 6. Taken over all tax claims x together, ANCOVA
reveals that responders offer significantly more resistance (p =
.013∗∗, one-sided) if their group procedural preferences are satis-
fied.
4.3.6 Responder situations
Since we found a significant difference in average responder behavior de-
pending on whether individual preferences are satisfied (I+) or not (I−) and
whether group preferences are satisfied (M+) or not (M−), there might be
an interaction effect as well. We therefore compare behavior between the
four different responder situations I+M+, I+M−, I−M+ and I−M−. The
frequency of each responder situation is given in row 2 in table 4.8.
Table 4.8 shows average contributions to resistance for each of the four
situations. For any claim x ≥ 5, resistance is highest either for situation
I+M+ or for situation I−M+. This is a further indication that it is most
important whether group preferences are satisfied. The lowest average re-
sistance levels correspond either to situation I−M− (for any x but x = 15)
or to situation I+M− (for x = 15). Thus, hypothesis H3c can clearly be
rejected. Indeed, the causality is reversed from what we have expected. The
differences between the four situations, however, are not significant using a
Kruskal-Wallis test for any x and all x together.
Regularity 7. For any x (but x = 15), resistance is lowest if
neither individual nor group preferences are satisfied. For any
x (but x ∈ {5,15}), resistance is highest if both, individual and
group preferences, are satisfied. These results are the opposite
of those posited in H3c. The differences between the situations,
however, are not significant for any x (p≥ .399) and x altogether
(p= .125).
4.4 Conclusion
Any decision in human interaction is inherently associated with a procedure.
It is impossible to take a decision without deciding first on how to take it
(Sebald, 2007a). Besides, there is substantial evidence that not only outcomes
14The covariate “allocated rule” is not significant with p= .227.
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Table 4.8: Average contributions to resistance situation by situation depend-
ing on tax proposal x
x I+M+ I+M− I−M+ I−M− pa
(35)b (18) (15) (32)
5 1.371 1.306 1.733c 0.953 d .604
10 4.214 3.833 3.800 2.766 .399
15 5.700 4.889 6.367 5.031 .430
20 7.243 7.056 6.767 5.922 .799
25 8.343 8.056 7.033 6.359 .749
all 5.374 5.028 5.140 4.206 .125
aKruskal-Wallis test, two-sided
bnumbers in brackets: participants in each situation
cbold numbers: row maxima
ditalic numbers: row minima
but also procedures leading to them can affect people’s utility from and their
reactions to those decisions. However, there is a large gap between a vast
number of empirical, experimental, and theoretical studies by non-economists
and the fact that there is hardly any economic research on procedures. In
particular, experimental economists remained surprisingly silent about pro-
cedural aspects of strategic interactions. The present study is intended to
contribute to this issue by analyzing the effects of various procedures and
procedural judgments.
Our experimental data suggest that the effects of procedural fairness judg-
ments are not as strong as assumed. Indeed, people offer less resistance if
a fair procedure is used, but the effect is not significant. By contrast, satis-
faction of procedural preferences seem to outrank procedural fairness: The
willingness to resist various outcomes differs significantly according to the
satisfaction/nonsatisfaction of individual and group procedural preferences.
Following the common conjecture that the implementation of favored pro-
cedural characteristics increases the chances that individuals will support
even apparently unfavorable decisions (e.g. Dolan et al., 2007), we expected
procedural satisfaction to lower resistance. To our surprise, the causality is
reversed: Procedural satisfaction results in stronger resistance against various
outcomes. Experimental data show that both individual and group proce-
dural preference satisfaction increase significantly resistance against various
outcomes and taken over all outcomes together. Thus, responders’ demands
vary depending on whether proposers obtained their roles with or without re-
sponders’ support: People rather seem to accept decisions made by proposers
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they have not supported.
In an organizational context, subordinates are usually assumed to comply
with leaders’ directives because they come to believe that “what is” is “what
ought to be” in terms of leader behavior (Walker and Zelditch, 1993). How-
ever, we may explain the observed behavior by people’s belief in their leader.
By stating that a procedure should be used, people argue for that appoint-
ment procedure. If exactly this procedure is applied, people have indirectly
countenanced and maintained the authority. At the same time, responders
seem to assert a claim on their behalf: They insist on a fair treatment, or to
be precise, on moderate demands. By choosing a decision-maker, some kind
of agreement (following Hobbes’s Social Contract) seems to become effective.
Both the sovereign and the citizens have reason to honor their responsibilities
under the terms of the contract. If the sovereign breaks his agreement (e.g. by
claiming a disproportional large share), the citizenry might offer resistance,
join a protest or try to bring down the sovereign.
Some psychological studies refer to a similar finding, known as frustration
effect (see, e.g. Folger, 1977; Cohen, 1985; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Kulik and
Clark, 1993): Fair procedures can not only trigger positive reactions but can
also result in less satisfaction with negative outcomes than unfair procedures.
This apparent contradiction of the usual finding of a positive relationship
was observed under certain conditions. The present study provides evidence
that not only procedural fairness but also procedural satisfaction can trigger
strong resistance reactions against unfavorable outcomes.
Our experimental setting was intended to differentiate between procedu-
ral fairness and procedural satisfaction judgments. Indeed, the two concepts
of procedural fairness and procedural satisfaction are closely connected: Pro-
cedural fairness judgments frequently involve procedural satisfaction since
people usually prefer a procedure they deem fair. However, procedural sat-
isfaction is beyond procedural fairness: Fairness may motivate preferences,
but need not to. Many other motives are conceivable but rather elusive.
One key contribution of this study is to reveal the basic phenomenon
of procedural dissatisfaction causing compliance. The finding provides fur-
ther impetus to study procedural preferences and its consequences on human
decision-making. To conclude, experimental data discussed here suggest that
procedural concerns should not be excluded if we want to avoid overlooking
an important source of utility. Further research on the effects of individuals’
procedural judgments is necessary.
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Chapter 5
Experiment 2: Procedural
satisfaction
5.1 Introduction
This chapter reports the results of an experiment on resistance against cen-
tralized decisions in small groups. Common sense as well as experimental
economics suggests that the willingness to offer resistance depends not only
on the decision itself but also on how it comes about, that is, on the decision
procedure. There are many different aspects that may have an influence:
What were the alternatives? Who made the decision? According to which
rules? Who made the rules? And how was the decision maker appointed?
Some of these aspects have been studied experimentally. For instance,
the alternatives not chosen may yield information about the intention or
attitude of the decision maker, which in turn may trigger (negatively) re-
ciprocal behavior (Falk et al., 2008). The rules governing decision making
involve, among others, the issue of participation, which also influences recip-
rocal behavior (Albert and Mertins, 2008).
Subsequently, we are concerned with appointment procedures. We imple-
ment a game involving five players, a proposer and four responders, and a pie
that must be divided among the group.1 Each responder receives a quarter
of the pie as an initial endowment; the proposer gets nothing. The proposer
then claims a share of the pie in the form of equal payments, subsequently
called the tax, to be made by each responder. If there is no resistance, the
proposer receives the sum of the tax payment while the responders keep their
endowments minus the tax. However, after learning the tax proposal, respon-
ders can simultaneously invest in resistance. These investments reduce their
1This game and the basic design of the experiment are due to Mertins (2005, 2008a).
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endowments and are lost for the group. If responders’ investments taken
together exceed a threshold, resistance is successful: responders keep their
residual endowments, while the proposer gets nothing. If resistance fails,
each responder pays the tax, as far as his residual endowment allows, to the
proposer and keeps the rest.
Thus, among responders, successful group resistance is a threshold public
good (see Marwell and Ames (1979), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), and,
for an overview, Ledyard (1995)). This public good is provided (or not)
simultaneously through voluntary contributions.
In our experiment, we were concerned with the procedure for appoint-
ing the proposer and its effects on responders’ resistance.In this context,
three issues are important: social preferences, procedural preferences, and
the problem of coordination.
By social preferences, we mean that group members care about the dis-
tribution of the pie beyond what they get themselves. A distribution may,
in the eyes of group members, be unfair or too unequal, and this perception
can trigger resistance, as a special case of negative reciprocity. Effects of
social preferences on resistance are subsequently called “distribution effects”.
These effects have for a long time been in the center of interest among exper-
imental economists. In our setting, they can most easily be observed when
we compare reactions of the same responders to alternative tax proposals,
which requires the use of Selten’s (1967) strategy method.2 While distri-
bution effects are not the main focus of this experimental study, they are
nonetheless important because we expect an interaction between social and
procedural preferences. Specifically, we expect that higher taxes will lead
to more resistance, as has been observed in similar settings.3 The effects of
2The use of the strategy method could influence results because the method may force
participants to think about each information set in a different way than if they could
primarily concentrate on the information sets that arise in the course of the game (Roth,
1995). For instance, highly emotional responses may be suppressed: it is plausible that
people will have stronger emotional reactions to a real action than to a hypothetical one
(“hot” versus “cold” environments). Laboratory findings are mixed. Brandts and Charness
(2000), for example, find no significant difference in behavior between the hot and the cold
treatments. By contrast, Güth et al. (2001) report evidence on games in which behavior
is not robust to elicitation methods. In our view, it would be an advantage if the strategy
method led to more thoroughly considered decisions: it makes it more plausible that our
results are relevant to important decisions that are not taken at the spur of the moment.
3The basic regularities from a large body of experiments suggest that a considerable
number of individuals show reciprocity, especially negative reciprocity. These results led
to reciprocity-based models (Rabin, 1993; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) in which players form a judgement about
whether another player has treated them fairly, and respond negatively to unfair actions
and positively to fair actions. See Camerer (2003, chs. 2.8, 9.1) for an overview.
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procedural preferences, then, can modify this relationship.
By procedural preferences, we mean, following Ng (1988), that group
members care about aspects of the appointment procedure other than the
instrumental value of the procedure in bringing about a desired distribu-
tion.4 Dissatisfaction with these aspects of a procedure may again trigger
resistance. We speak of “procedure effects”. Procedure effects can be ob-
served by comparing responder strategies in different treatments which differ
with respect to these aspects (between-subjects design). Specifically, we ex-
pect dissatisfaction with the appointment procedure to raise resistance, at
least for sufficiently high taxes.
In the game described above, there are two channels by which distribution
or procedure effects can come about. First, social or procedural preferences
may lead responders to offer more or less resistance. This may be quite in-
dependent of expectations concerning the behavior of the other responders.
For instance, responders may wish to punish a high-taxing proposer by de-
stroying part of the pie. Second, the expectation that other responders are
going to offer resistance can make resistance rational even for an egoist who
does not care about distribution or procedure. For instance, in the face of
a high tax, a responder may reckon that other responders will offer suffi-
cient resistance so that his own contribution tips the balance. There can,
of course, be paradoxical effects; for instance, responders may reduce their
own contribution to resistance in the face of high taxes because they expect
the others to invest enough for resistance to be successful. Speculation of
responders about the social or procedural preferences of other responders (or
about other responders’ speculations) can modify these expectation effects.
In our experimental setting, we seek for procedure effects and for expecta-
tion effects with respect to procedural preferences. Such expectation effects
require that group members use information about procedural preferences
of other group members when deciding whether to offer resistance. For in-
stance, a responder may expect a higher level of resistance if the procedure
actually used was rejected by a majority. We call this a second-order proce-
dure effect. Observing second-order procedure effects requires the provision
of information about other players’ attitudes towards the procedure actually
used.
Of course, procedure effects and expectation effects may go in the same
direction. In this case, our experimental design does not allow us to distin-
4A growing literature argues for the importance of procedural preferences; see, e.g.,
Elster (1989), Tyler (1990), Sen (1997), Tyler and Lind (2000), Frey et al. (2004), Bolton
et al. (2005), Brandts et al. (2006), Trautmann (2007), Krawczyk (2007), Charness and
Levine (2007). For a systematic review of the theoretical literature on procedural prefer-
ences, see Dolan et al. (2007). Chapter provides an extensive survey on this literature.
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guish these effects. Discrimination between the two effects is only possible
when they go in different directions.
Subsequently, we speak of individual procedural preferences and group
procedural preferences.5 We say that a procedural preference is satisfied if
the preferred procedure is used. Our hypothesis coincides with the com-
mon sense: we expect satisfaction of procedural preferences to reduce group
resistance.
Instead of confronting all participants with an exogenous assignment of
participants to roles, we allowed each group of five participants to express
their individual preferences concerning different procedures for choosing a
proposer among them. We then told them the procedure preferred by the
group and the procedure actually used. This led to different constellations
concerning the satisfaction of individual and group preferences. By compar-
ing responders’ investments in resistance in the different treatment groups,
we were able to test our hypotheses concerning the influence of social and
procedural preferences on resistance and to provide first results concerning
the role of the satisfaction of procedural preferences.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the experi-
mental design and procedures and states theoretical predictions. Section 5.3
presents experimental results. Section 5.4 concludes.6
5.2 The experiment
5.2.1 The basic game
Consider the following game between five players, one proposer and four
responders. Each responder has an initial endowment of p4 , where p > 0 (in
chips) is the total experimental payoff at stake in the game. The proposer has
no endowment. The proposer tells responders the tax, that is, the number
x ∈ [0, p4 ] of chips she would like to get from each of them. If her proposal
goes through, she gets 4x while each responder keeps p4 −x. However, each
responder i can pay yi ∈ [0, p4 ] on a group account. Responders’ decisions are
simultaneous. Payments to the group account are lost to the group. If the
amount on the group account reaches a threshold t with p > t > p4 , that is, if∑
i yi ≥ t, the proposal is rejected, and each responder keeps p4−yi while the
5We consider only two alternatives; hence, problems of preference aggregation will not
occur.
6The appendices consist of translations of the instructions (appendix C.1), the post-
experimental questionnaire (appendix C.2) and answers to the questionnaire (appendix
C.3).
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proposer gets nothing. Note that no single responder can achieve rejection.
If, however, the group account stays below the threshold t, each responder
has to pay up to x to the proposer, depending on how much of his endowment
is left, and the proposer gets up to 4x, depending on whether responders can
pay her in full or not. Thus, each responder pays zi := min{p4 − yi,x} ≥ 0
and keeps p4 −yi− zi ≥ 0, while the proposer gets
∑
i zi ≥ 0.
In the experiment, the group endowment was p = 100 chips, and the
threshold was t = p4 +1 = 26. The tax proposal was restricted to multiples
of five chips plus zero: x ∈ {0,5,10,15,20,25}. Responders could choose any
contribution yi ∈ {0,0.5,1,1.5, . . . ,24.5,25}.7
For the theoretical analysis, we consider only subgame perfect equilibria
in pure strategies assuming that players maximize their own experimental
payoffs. Under these assumptions, a subgame perfect equilibrium is a strat-
egy profile (x∗,y1(x),y2(x),y3(x),y4(x)) with the following properties. First,
yi(x)≤ x, that is, no responder invests more in resistance than the tax pro-
posal x, because x is the return of successful resistance. Second, yi(x) = 0
for x < 6.5 because then the maximum collective investments are 4x < 26,
that is, resistance cannot be successful. Third,
∑
i yi(x) ∈ {0,26} if x≥ 6.5,
that is, whenever x is high enough for successful resistance, responders ei-
ther coordinate on no resistance or on exactly the right amount of resistance
because otherwise at least one responder could profit by reducing his invest-
ment unilaterally. Given the responder strategies, the best response of the
proposer is x∗ := max{x:∑i yi(x) = 0}, that is, to select the highest value
of x for which there is no resistance. Since x ∈ {0,5,10,15,20,25}, it follows
that x∗ ≥ 5. Note that x = 5 means equal division of the 100 chips among
all five players if there is no resistance.
This analysis shows that, for proposals x> 5, the game becomes a coordi-
nation game. There are many subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies.
Only some of them are symmetric in responder strategies. Symmetric equi-
libria require all four responders to choose the same function y(x) satisfying
y(0) = y(5) = 0 and y(x) ∈ {0,6.5} for x= 10,15,20,25.
Thus, two types of equilibria compete against each other: First, the free-
rider equilibrium where no responder contributes anything to resistance no
matter how high the tax. Second, the threshold equilibria where responders
successfully coordinate on resistance for at least one tax proposal.
7We allowed for half chips in order to make possible a symmetric equilibrium with
resistance, where each responder sets yi = 6.5. Indeed, 6.5 has been chosen relatively
frequent, e.g., by 16.3% of all responders confronted with x= 10.
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5.2.2 Experimental design
As indicated in figure 5.1 below, each session consisted of a pre-experimental
questionnaire inquiring for basic demographic information and the average
time spent in voluntary work, three decision stages (see appendix C.1), and
a post-experimental questionnaire (see appendices C.2 and C.3) where we
tested whether participants had understood the game. After answering
the pre-experimental questionnaire, participants were randomly assigned to
groups of five participants. However, nobody received information about the
composition of his own group or other groups.
Figure 5.1: Sequence of events
pre-experimental questionnaire
?
stage 1: preference elicitation
+
treatment variation
PROPOSER RESPONDER
? ?
stage 2: decision on x (payoff-relevant)
?
stage 2: decision on x (hypothetical)
?
stage 3: decision on yi (hypothetical)
@@R
stage 3: decision on yi (payoff-relevant)
  	
stage 4: post-experimental questionnaire
In decision stage one, participants were asked to consider two appoint-
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ment procedures (AP) for the group’s proposer:8
• AP 1 (experimenter despotism): The experimenter appoints a proposer.
• AP 2 (majority vote): Group members appoint a proposer by majority
vote.
Appointment procedure 1 was in fact a random mechanism. We drew
a lot to determine the proposer; participants, however, did not know this.
Appointment procedure 2 was more difficult to implement since anonymity
had to be respected. We asked participants to vote for a criterion to de-
termine the proposer. They had the choice between age (the oldest group
member) and high engagement in student and voluntary activities (the one
who spent most time per week on such activities).9 The relevant information
was available from the pre-experimental questionnaire.
First, participants stated their opinion on the importance of the appoint-
ment procedure using a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (very important)
to 7 (very unimportant). Second, participants ranked both APs on a seven
point scale from 1 (very unfair) to 7 (very fair).
Then, participants cast their vote for AP 1 or AP 2. Abstention was
impossible. As each group consists of five members, there was necessarily
a majority—large (5:0), medium (4:1) or narrow (3:2)—in favor of one AP.
Moreover, independently of their own preferences with respect to the AP,
participants had to vote for one criterion, high age or high engagement, so
that, in case of AP 2, a proposer could be chosen. Again, abstention was
impossible. Both APs were favored by a considerable number of partici-
pants. We were, however, not interested in these procedural preferences as
such. Rather, we were interested in whether behavior differed depending
on whether procedural preferences were satisfied or not. When stage one
was completed, we counted the votes and determined proposers as described
before.
Instructions for decision stage two contained information about the results
from stage one. We told participants the preferences of their group, that is,
the AP preferred by the majority and the size of the majority. We then
told them whether the preference of the majority was respected (treatment
M+) or not (treatment M−), and which AP, 1 or 2, had accordingly been
8At this stage, they were already informed about the structure of the game.
9“Student and voluntary activities” include for instance voluntary activities and (paid
and non-paid) internships and jobs at private or state organizations. In the Bulgarian cul-
tural context we use this criterion to distinguish between participants as “active” or “pas-
sive”. People who are considered to be active have a higher social esteem (cf. Tilkidjiev,
2002).
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used to appoint the proposer. For instance, a group may have voted 4:1 in
favor of AP 1; participants were given this information together with the
information that the will of the majority did not prevail and that, instead,
AP 2 was used to appoint the proposer. Another group may have voted
3:2 in favor of AP 1; participants were given this information together with,
say, the information that the will of the majority prevailed and that we had
determined the proposer according to the criterion preferred by the group.
Half of the groups (50 participants) were randomly assigned to treatment
M+, the other half to treatment M−. We applied a between-subject design
where participants were not aware of the different treatments.
Participants were also informed whether they were a proposer or a respon-
der.10 Accordingly, participants received different instructions for decision
stages two and three.
In decision stage two, proposers were asked to allocate the group pie of
p = 100 chips, with the monetary value of 1 chip being 0.25 Lev. Initially,
each responder i had 25 chips (6.25 Leva), whereas the proposer had nothing.
The proposer had to propose a tax x ∈ {0,5,10,15,20,25} of chips to be paid
to him by each responder. In decision stage three, the proposers were asked
how they would behave in case they were responders (hypothetical decision).
Responders were asked in decision stage two which tax x they would claim
in case they had been appointed as proposers (hypothetical decision). In
stage three, they had to chose their contribution y ∈{0,0.5,1,1.5, . . . ,24.5,25}
to the responders’ group account for each x∈ {0,5,10,15,20,25} the proposer
might have chosen (strategy method). The instructions emphasized that
these contingent contribution choices were binding and that one would be
carried out depending on the actually proposed tax.
Apart from the fact that we made clear that hypothetical decisions (stage
2 decisions of responders and stage 3 decisions of proposers) were not payoff-
relevant, instructions for proposers and responders were the same.11
Participants were one hundred undergraduate students from Sofia Uni-
versity’s faculty of economics and business administration with no previous
experience in economic experiments. The non-computerized experiment took
place on October 26, 2006 and consisted of four sessions. 61 percent of par-
ticipants were female. Age ranged from 18 to 27 years, with an average
of 20.23 years. According to their own statement, participants on average
spend 4.41 hours per week in voluntary work, varying from 0 to 17 hours.
10This is the main modification compared to the original design by Mertins (2005,
2008a), where participants took both decisions without knowing their payoff-relevant role.
11All participants were confronted with equal decision tasks independent of their role for
mostly two reasons: we wanted participants to put themselves in the role of the opponent
to understand the other’s task and the game as a whole.
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The experiment took about 45 minutes and participants earned 5.9 Leva on
average, including 1 Lev show-up fee (that is, 7.85 Leva per hour).12
5.2.3 Hypotheses
Each responder finds himself in one of for possible situations (see table 5.1
below): individual AP preferences may be satisfied (situation I+) or not
(situation I−), and group AP preferences—that is, the preference of the
majority—may be satisfied (situation M+) or not (situation M−). These
situations were determined partly by our treatment (M+ versus M−) and
partly by the responder’s preference in combination with our treatment (I+
versus I−). We were mainly interested in the question of whether these
situations had an influence on resistance.
Table 5.1: Responder situations
individual preference
satisfied not satisfied
group preference satisfied I
+M+ I−M+
not satisfied I+M− I−M−
Game-theoretic predictions of responder behavior on the basis of egoistic
or social preferences do not differ between the four situations. Neither the
appointment procedure itself nor participants’ preference satisfaction should
affect responders’ behavior. The possibility that participants have proce-
dural preferences, however, suggests different hypotheses. Specifically, we
investigate the following behavioral hypotheses, which are suggested by the
literature on procedural preferences discussed in the introduction:
1) Ceteris paribus, responders contribute more to resistance if their indi-
vidual preferences regarding the appointment procedure are not satis-
fied than if they are satisfied. That is, for any tax proposal x > 0 and
corresponding contribution y: y in situations I− is higher than y in
situations I+.
2a) Responders contribute more to resistance if group preferences regarding
the appointment procedure are not satisfied than if they are satisfied.
12One Lev is 0.51 Euro. A research assistant at Sofia University earns between 1.5
(undergraduate) and 4 Leva (graduate) per hour; a shop assistant in Sofia earns about 2
or 3 Leva per hour.
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That is, for any tax proposal x > 0 and corresponding contribution
y: y in situations M− is higher than y in situations M+. Moreover,
the effect becomes stronger the larger the majority setting the group
preference.
2b) Responders contribute less to resistance if group preferences regarding
the appointment procedure are not satisfied than if they are satisfied.
That is, for any tax proposal x > 0 and corresponding contribution
y: y in situations M+ is higher than y in situations M−. Moreover,
the effect becomes stronger the larger the majority setting the group
preference.
A potential explanation for behavior according to hypothesis 1 is that
satisfaction of individual procedural preferences reduces negative reciprocity.
The same explanation could be proposed for behavior according to hypothesis
2a: individuals may think it right, ceteris paribus, that group preferences
should be satisfied—they may have democratic preferences, so to speak—,
and may react negatively when this is not the case.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are alternatives. Both hypotheses can potentially
be explained by an expectation effect: even when individuals may not care
about group preferences, they may use the information that group preferences
were satisfied or not satisfied to form expectations about the contributions
of others. Such an expectation effect—which, in this case, is a second-order
procedure effect since it is triggered by information concerning procedural
preferences of other players—can go in either direction: it may raise contri-
butions or lower contributions, depending on whether one expects one’s own
contribution to be necessary or superfluous to make resistance successful.
Hypothesis 2b is just the simplest hypothesis that contradicts 2a and can
conceivably be explained by an expectations effect.
For simplicity, we label hypothesis 2a “democratic preferences” and hy-
pothesis 2b “expectation effect”, even though the expectation effect may also
offer an explanation of 2a.
In both cases, 2a and 2b, and independently of the explanation in terms
of democratic preferences or expectation effects, it is plausible that the effect
becomes stronger with the strength of the majority.
Our final hypothesis deals with proposers’ behavior. In their experimental
study, Brandts et al. (2006) addressed the issue whether a selection proce-
dure is able to change individuals’ goodwill towards others in general and/or
towards the selectors in particular. They presume that people may have a
tendency to prefer avoiding the guilt that results from disappointing the ex-
pectations of others. Their first hypothesis posits that selected allocators are
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more generous towards others than random allocators (“I-want-YOU effect”).
Their second hypothesis states that the selected party will favor the selecting
party more than the third party involved (“gratitude effect”). There is weak
statistical evidence for both effects.13
We will test the I-want-YOU hypothesis within a different experimental
setting by comparing the claims of allocators either selected by majority vote
(M+) or declined by the majority of responders (M−). According to the
findings by Brandts et al. (2006), we expect that selected proposers are more
generous towards responders (i.e. claim less) than non-selected proposers.
Thus, we state the following hypothesis:
3) Ceteris paribus, proposers claim less if responders have been chosen by
group majority vote. That is, tax proposal x is higher in situations
M− than in situations M+.
5.3 Experimental results
5.3.1 Aggregate results
In this subsection, we look at aggregate results, without distinguishing be-
tween the four responder situations.
5.3.1.1 Procedural preferences
On the question whether appointment procedure 1 or appointment procedure
2 should by applied in their group, 73% voted for AP 2 (majority vote) and
27% for AP 1 (experimenter despotism). In case that AP 2 were applied, 30%
advocated ’age’ as key criterion and 70% ’engagement’. Answer frequencies
to rule importance and rule fairness are given in table 5.2. Most participants
(56%) attach importance to the proposers’ appointment procedure (1 or 2 on
a seven point scale) and only 6% think that the procedure is of little or no
importance (6 or 7); the median answer is 2. On a seven point scale with 1
meaning very unfair, participants perceived AP 2 as fairer (median 6) than
AP 1 (median 4).
5.3.1.2 Tax proposals
In stage two, proposers were asked to propose the tax x ∈ {0,5,10,15,20,25}
to be paid by each responder. This was their main decision and critical for
13By using a Mann-Whitney test, the “I-want-YOU effect” has been confirmed in round
1 (p= .043), but not in the following rounds (p= .089 and p= .48). The same is true for
the “gratitude effect” (round 1: p= .042, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
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Table 5.2: Answer frequencies (in %) to decision stage 1 questions
points rule importance fairness AP 1 fairness AP 2
(1=very important) (1=very unfair) (1=very unfair)
(7=very unimportant) (7=very fair) (7=very fair)
1 20 11 3
2 36 15 6
3 16 19 8
4 12 19 15
5 10 11 13
6 1 10 27
7 5 15 28
their monetary payoff. An equal split of the pie (x = 5) was proposed by
35% of proposers and another 35% decided in favor of x = 10. A tax of
x = 15 was proposed by 25% and the whole pie was claimed by only 5% of
all proposers. No responder has chosen a tax x ∈ {0,20}. The average tax
choice of proposers is 10.25 (sd 5.250). 14
5.3.1.3 Contributions to resistance
In stage three, responders were asked, for any feasible tax x, which amount
y they would contribute to resistance. They could choose any contribution
y ∈ {0,0.5,1,1.5, ...24.5,25}. Average contributions are given in table 5.3.
Not surprisingly, mean resistance levels increased with the tax. Whereas
responders facing a tax of zero contributed only 1.35 chips on average to
resistance, average contributions for x = 25 were 8.46 chips (about 13 of the
individual endowment). For tax proposals x ≤ 10, the average contribution
was below 6.5 and therefore, on average, insufficient for a responder group
to reach the threshold of 26. For tax proposals x ≥ 15, on the other hand,
14Responders were assigned the same task but their decisions were just hypothetical and
had no monetary impact. We observed the following relative frequencies: x= 0 has been
chosen by 2.50%, x= 5 by 57.50%, x= 10 by 25.00%, x= 15 by 6.30%, x= 20 by 2.50%
and x = 25 by 6.30% of all responders. The mean tax proposed by responders was 8.38
which is slightly lower than proposers’ mean. Relative frequencies of tax proposals do no
differ significantly at p = .01 using a binomial test suggesting that responders took their
task seriously and tried to put themselves in the role of responders.
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average contributions were above 6.5 (see table 5.3 below).15
Table 5.3: Mean resistance y for each tax proposal x
x 0 5 10 15 20 25
y (mean) 1.350 1.594 5.263 6.594 7.494 8.456
5.3.2 Procedure effects
5.3.2.1 Frequency of responder situations
As already explained, ten groups, each with four responders, were assigned to
the treatmentM+ where the appointment procedure preferred by the major-
ity is used. The other ten groups were assigned to the treatment M− where
the appointment procedure rejected by the majority is used. Appointment
procedure 1 was applied in eight groups, and AP 2 in twelve groups. The
result of this assignment was that 39 of eighty responders decided under the
individually preferred AP (I+) and 41 under the non-preferred AP (I−). The
frequency of each responder situation is given in table 5.4 below.
Table 5.4: Participants n in each responder situation
I+M+ I+M− I−M+ I−M−
n 31 8 9 32
5.3.2.2 Procedures
We tested for potential differences in resistance levels depending on whether
AP 1 or AP 2 is applied. Interestingly, we found no significant differences
between resistance levels under both appointment procedures (see table 5.5).
Thus, the appointment procedure itself seems to be not very important for
explaining the level of resistance.
15Proposers were asked how they would behave in case they were responders (hypothet-
ical decision). Their contributions were also strictly increasing in x, with means ranging
from .90 for x=0 to 8.125 for x=25. Their hypothetical choices did not differ significantly
from responders’ payoff-relevant decisions (Mann-Whitney test, two-sided, p≥ .429).
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Table 5.5: Responders’ mean contributions to resistance for AP 1 vs. AP 2
depending on tax proposal x
x AP 1 AP 2 differencea pb
0 1.406 1.313 0.093 .258
5 2.016 1.313 0.703 .300
10 5.578 5.052 0.526 .333
15 6.828 6.438 0.390 .137
20 7.438 7.531 0.907 .700
25 8.078 8.708 -0.630 .796
afirst column minus second column
bMann-Whitney test, two-sided
5.3.2.3 Individual preferences
We tested our first hypothesis that tax proposals are more readily accepted,
that is, mean contributions y to resistance are lower, in situations I+ as
compared with I−. Columns 2 and 3 of table 5.6 below show observed values
of y depending on tax proposals x for I+ and I−, respectively.
Table 5.6: Responders’ mean contributions to resistance for I+ vs. I− de-
pending on tax proposal x
x I+ I− differencea pb
0 1.462 1.244 0.218 .159
5 1.538 1.646 -0.108 .501
10 4.628 5.866 -1.238 .084
15 5.859 7.293 -1.434∗∗c .007
20 6.346 8.585 -2.239∗∗ .002
25 7.103 9.744 -2.641∗∗ .002
afirst column minus second column
bMann-Whitney test, one-sided
c∗significant at 5%, ∗∗significant at 1%, ∗∗∗significant at 0.1%
For x= 0, mean resistance is higher for I+ than for I−, but the difference
is not significant. For any tax proposal x ≥ 5, mean resistance is, in line
with our hypothesis, higher for I− than for I+. For x ≤ 5, the difference is
not significant (p = .501); however, p values fall as x rises, reaching strong
significance for x > 10. Thus, a first result is:
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For high tax proposals (x ∈ 15,20,25) and taken over all situ-
ations, responders contributed significantly less to resistance if
their individual procedural preferences were satisfied. For low
tax proposals (x ∈ 5,10), there is no significant effect.
5.3.2.4 Majority preferences
In order to test whether hypothesis 2a or 2b holds, we compare mean con-
tributions y to resistance in situations M+ and in M−. Columns 2 and 3 of
table 5.7 below show observed values of y depending on tax proposals x for
M+ and M−, respectively.
Table 5.7: Responders’ mean contributions to resistance for M+ vs. M−
depending on tax proposal x
x M+ M− differencea pb
0 1.413 1.288 0.125 .651
5 1.438 1.750 0.312 .572
10 5.500 5.025 0.475 .698
15 6.825 6.636 0.189 .898
20 7.838 7.150 0.688 .618
25 8.863 8.050 0.813 .532
afirst column minus second column
bMann-Whitney test, two-sided
There is no evidence that procedural satisfaction within the group has any
effect on its own. For x = 5, contributions to resistance are higher for M−;
for any other x, contribution rates are lower for M−; however, all differences
in resistance are not significant. Thus, a second result is:
Taken over all situations, responders do not behave significantly
different depending on whether group preferences are satisfied
(M+) or not (M−).
5.3.3 Responder situations
While it makes no significant difference to average responder behavior whether
group preferences are satisfied (M+) or not (M−), there might still be an
interaction effect with the situation concerning individual preferences (I+ or
I−). We therefore compare behavior between the four different responder
situations I+M+, I+M−, I−M+ and I−M− (see table 5.1 above).
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Table 5.8 shows average contributions to resistance for each of the four
situations. For any claim x > 5, resistance is highest for situation I−M+,
followed up by situation I−M−. This is a further indication that it is most
important whether individual preferences are satisfied. The differences be-
tween the four situations are significant for high tax proposals (x≥ 15).
Table 5.8: Average contributions to resistance situation by situation depend-
ing on tax proposal x
x I+M+ I+M− I−M+ I−M− pa
(31)b (8) (9) (32)
0 1.823c .063 .000 1.594 .240
5 1.726 .813 .444 1.984 .731
10 4.839 3.813 7.778 5.328 .211
15 6.129 4.813 9.222 6.750 .034∗d
20 7.000 3.813 10.722 7.984 .001∗∗∗
25 7.806 4.375 12.500 8.969 .000∗∗∗
aKruskal-Wallis test, two-sided
bnumbers in brackets: participants in each situation
cbold numbers: row maxima
d∗significant at 5%, ∗∗significant at 1%, ∗∗∗significant at 0.1%
As a next step, we considered pairwise comparisons between situations.
Table 5.9 below shows differences in average contributions to resistance. For
low tax proposals (x ≤ 5), there are no significant differences. For medium
proposals (x ∈ {10,15}), there are three significant differences: between sit-
uations I+M+ and I−M+ (for both x-values) as well as between situations
I+M− and I−M+ (for x= 15). For high proposals (x≥ 20), most differences
are significant.
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Table 5.9: Differences in average contributions to resistance depending on
tax proposal x in pairwise comparisons of responder situations
1 2 3 4 5 6
I+M+ I+M+ I+M+ I+M− I+M− I−M+
x vs. I+M− vs. I−M+ vs. I−M− vs. I−M+ vs. I−M− vs. I−M−
0 1.760a 1.823b 0.229 .063 -1.531 -1.594
(.239)c (.126) (.448) (.471) (.566) (.309)
5 0.913 1.282 -0.258 0.369 -1.171 -1.540
(.887) (.328) (.760) (.598) (.709) (.260)
10 1.026 -2.939∗d -0.489 -3.965 -1.515 2.450
(.600) (.034) (.632) (.093) (.397) (.189)
15 1.316 -3.093∗ -0.621 -4.409∗ -1.937 2.472
(.311) (.014) (.134) (.015) (.135) (.205)
20 3.187∗∗ -3.722∗∗ -0.984 -6.909∗∗ -4.171∗∗ 2.738
(.006) (.006) (.128) (.003) (.005) (.069)
25 3.431∗∗ -4.694∗∗ -1.163 -8.125∗∗∗ -4.594∗∗ 3.531
(.004) (.005) (.144) (.001) (.005) (.055)
amean first situation minus mean second situation
bnumbers in boldface: highest absolute difference in the respective row
cMann-Whitney test with Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple test procedures,
two-sided
d∗significant at 5%, ∗∗significant at 1%, ∗∗∗significant at 0.1%
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For easier reference, we have numbered the pairwise comparisons from 1 to
6. We discuss each comparison separately under its number. In interpreting
our results, we make use of the idea of the expectation effect (hypothesis 2b).
1. Observation: When individual preferences are satisfied and tax propos-
als are high (x≥ 20), resistance is significantly higher when the group
preference is also satisfied. Interpretation: This observation is consis-
tent with hypothesis 2b (expectation effect) but not with hypothesis
2a (democratic preferences).
2. Observation: When group preferences are satisfied and tax proposals
are moderately high (x ≥ 10), resistance is significantly higher when
the individual preference is not satisfied. Interpretation: This effect
is in line with hypothesis 1. In this comparison, hypotheses 2a or 2b
should play no role.
3. Observation: In a comparison of a situation where individual and group
preferences are satisfied with a situation where both kinds of prefer-
ences are not satisfied, there are no significant differences in average
resistance for any tax proposals. Interpretation: This observation con-
tradicts the conjunction of hypotheses 1 and 2a, because according to
these hypotheses, we should observe an especially strong effect in this
comparison. A conjunction of hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2b, on the
other hand, allows for a cancelation of effects.
4. Observation: In a comparison of a situation where group preferences
are satisfied and individual preferences are not satisfied with a situ-
ation where this is just the other way round, we find that for high
tax proposals (x ≥ 15), resistance is significantly higher (indeed much
higher) when individual preferences are not satisfied. Interpretation:
Effects derived from hypothesis 2b should strengthen the effects ex-
pected according to hypothesis 1. Effects derived from hypothesis 2a
should have the opposite effect. Hence, the observation speaks in favor
of hypothesis 2b.
5. Observation: When group preferences are not satisfied and tax pro-
posals are high (x ≥ 20), resistance is significantly higher when the
individual preference is not satisfied. Interpretation: This effect is in
line with hypothesis 1. In this comparison, hypotheses 2a or 2b should
play no role.
6. Observation: When individual preferences are not satisfied, there are no
significant differences in resistance depending on whether group prefer-
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ences are satisfied or not. Interpretation: This is in line with hypothesis
1. Hypotheses 2a or 2b both predict a difference. The observed alge-
braic signs for high tax proposals favor hypothesis 2a, but since the
differences are not significant, the evidence is inconclusive.
Thus, our third result is:
Pairwise comparisons between the four responder situations con-
firm hypothesis 1 (cet. par., less resistance when individual pref-
erences are satisfied than when they are not) and speak against
hypothesis 2a (democratic preferences) and for hypothesis 2b (ex-
pectation effect).
5.3.4 Strength of majority
We next turn to the relationship between contributions to the public good
resistance and strength of majority. The strength of majority is the extent
to which voting results are more or less clear cut. As each group consists
of five members, there is necessarily an appointment procedure (AP) which
is preferred by a majority. This majority might be a large (5:0), medium
(4:1) or narrow (3:2) majority. Table 5.10 below describes the six possible
situations with the number of participants in each.
Table 5.10: Strength of majority
treatment narrow (2:3 and 3:2) medium (4:1 and 1:4) large (5:0 and 0:5)
M+ low M+ medium M+ high M+
(12)a (20) (8)
M− low M− medium M− high M−
(16) (16) (8)
anumbers in brackets: participants in each situation
Table 5.11 below shows the average contributions to resistance depend-
ing on the tax proposal for all six situations. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows
that resistance differs significantly between the three M− situations for high
claims (x ∈ {20,25}): Resistance is highest in case of a large majority (high
M−), and lowest in case of a narrow majority (low M−). The differences
are significant at p= .034 (x= 25) and p= .028 (x= 20), respectively. This
result is more in line with hypothesis 2a (democratic preferences) than with
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Table 5.11: Average contributions to resistance depending on tax proposal x
and strength of majority
x low M+ low M− medium M+ medium M− high M+ high M−
0 .833 1.031 2.300a 1.875 0.063 0.625
5 .667 1.094 2.225 1.750 0.625 3.063
10 6.875 4.344 5.025 5.375 4.625 5.688
15 7.917 5.531 6.425 6.688 6.188 7.375
20 8.583 6.094 7.675 6.781 7.125 10.000
25 10.875 7.156 8.175 7.750 7.563 10.438
anumbers in boldface: highest absolute value in the respective row
hypothesis 2b (expectation effect): Resistance increases if the group prefer-
ence, which is not satisfied, is more clear cut. For the three M+ situations,
the strength of majority does not result in any significant differences.
In table 5.12, we compare average contributions inM+ andM− situations
for a given strength of majority. We find significant differences only for the
case of a large majority: in this case, resistance is lower for any positive tax
proposal when the group preference is satisfied (M+); these differences are
significant for x= 5 and highly significant for x ∈ {20,25}.
Again, this effect is more in line with hypothesis 2a (democratic pref-
erences) than with hypothesis 2b (expectation effect): in the case of large
majorities, satisfaction of group preferences reduces resistance on average.
The results concerning the effects of the strength of majorities, then, are
weak but point in the same direction. Our fourth result is:
The few significant effects of the strength of majority speak for
hypothesis 2a (democratic preferences) and against hypothesis 2b
(expectation effect).
5.3.5 I-want-YOU effect
Our final observation is concerned with proposers’ behavior and thus hypoth-
esis 3. Proposers were asked to choose a tax x ∈ {0,5,10,15,20,25}. If an
I-want-YOU effect exists, proposers in the M+ treatment situation are ex-
pected to claim less than proposers in the M− treatment situation. Indeed,
M+ proposers claim an average tax of 9, whereas M− proposers claim 11.5
on average. A Mann-Whitney test shows that the difference is significant
(p = .046, one-sided), thus providing statistical evidence for hypothesis 3.
This finding is completely in line with Brandts et al. (2006). It underlines
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Table 5.12: Differences in average contributions to resistance depending on
tax proposal x and strength of majority
low M+ vs. medium M+ vs. high M+ vs.
x low M− medium M− high M−
0 -0.198a 0.425 -0.562b
(.382)c (.231) (1.000)
5 -0.427 0.475 -2.438
(.665) (.655) (.055) )
10 2.531 -0.350 -1.063
(.221) (.931) (.485)
15 2.386 -0.263 -1.187
(.175) (.438) (.145)
20 2.489 0.894 -2.875∗∗d
(.122) (.640) (.007)
25 3.719∗ 0.425 -2.875∗
(.050) (.595) (.022)
amean first group minus mean second group
bnumbers in boldface: highest absolute difference in the respective row
cp value acc. to Mann-Whitney test, two-sided
d∗significant at 5%, ∗∗significant at 1%, ∗∗∗significant at 0.1%
the robustness of our experimental design and can be seen as further evidence
for the importance of procedural judgements.
5.4 Conclusion
In this experimental study, we were concerned with the effects of procedu-
ral preferences on resistance against centralized decisions in small groups.
The procedure in question was the appointment procedure (AP) for a deci-
sion maker. We distinguished individual and group preferences concerning
the AP. Preferences concerning the AP differed considerably. The AP it-
self, although important in the eyes of most participants, did not explain the
observed level of resistance. In contrast, the satisfaction of individual pref-
erences significantly lowered resistance against unfavorable decisions. This
is a remarkable finding as it highlights the importance of procedural prefer-
ences in human decision making. This finding goes far beyond procedural
fairness considerations as it seems not to be important which procedure is
used or whether the applied procedure is deemed fair, but whether individual
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procedural preferences are satisfied.
In many situations, and also in our experiment, successful resistance re-
quires sufficiently high investments by the group, meaning that successful
resistance is a threshold public good. Information about group preferences,
then, may lead to successful coordination on resistance. Such coordination
may come about as a side effect of democratic preferences: Independently
from their own procedural preferences, individuals may dislike it when the
preferences of a majority are ignored and react with increased resistance.
Alternatively, coordination may result from expectations concerning the be-
havior of others. In the latter case, almost anything is possible.
Our results show no clear-cut effects of information about group pref-
erences as a coordination device. Resistance is neither significantly higher
nor significantly lower when group preferences are satisfied as compared with
the situation where they are not satisfied. When we consider the interaction
between satisfaction of individual preferences and satisfaction of group pref-
erences, we find some evidence against the idea of democratic preferences.
When we consider the effect of the strength of the majority, the evidence is
weak but points in the other direction. A clarification may be achieved within
the present experimental design by asking responders about their expecta-
tions concerning the contributions of the other responders in their group.
This is a topic for further research.
Last but not least, we provided further evidence that an “I-want-YOU
effect” exists. In particular, we showed that proposers who have been ap-
pointed by a majority are more generous towards responders than proposers
who have been appointed against the majority’s will. That is, procedure
judgements are able to change proposers’ goodwill towards responders. To
conclude, when neglecting the procedure by which a decision maker has been
appointed, a relevant behavioral issue has been left aside.
Chapter 6
Experiment 3: Participatory
decision making
6.1 Introduction
It is a common experience that people can get seriously annoyed if decisions
affecting them are taken ‘over their heads’. Reactions range from negative
comments over passive resistance to active resistance. From an economic
point of view, the interesting aspect is that it is often the perceived unfairness
of the decision procedure, and not so much the decision itself, which triggers
these negative reactions. This raises the question of whether a fair procedure,
and especially the involvement of the affected parties in the decision process,
may increase acceptance of decisions, especially unfavorable decisions.
A minimum requirement of procedural fairness1 seems to be that, if pos-
sible and feasible, the affected parties should be given a voice: they are to
be heard before the decision is made. This is also a cornerstone of most legal
systems. In accordance with the famous legal principle audiatur et altera
pars, judges are required to give a hearing to both sides in a dispute. In
many cases, people want more than just a voice; they want the possibility
of participation through, for instance, voting or vetoing. Again, legal pro-
cedures often contain such stronger representation rights, for instance, the
right to reject candidates for a jury. Depending on the decision in question,
then, procedural fairness requires representation of the affected parties in
the decision making process, where representation rights vary from voice to
1Economists mostly speak of procedural fairness, while psychologists and lawyers seem
to prefer procedural justice. We consider these expressions to be synonymous.
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participation.2
According to the homo oeconomicus approach, of course, the design of
decision procedures matters to the affected parties only through its effects
on outcomes. Specifically, whether someone is granted representation rights
or not at an earlier stage of the decision process should, ceteris paribus, be
irrelevant for his behavior in the face of a given unfavorable decision at a
later stage.3 Recent work in behavioral economics and social psychology,
however, indicates that this is probably false. People seem to care not only
about outcomes but also about the procedure through which an outcome is
achieved. They have procedural likes and dislikes, or procedural preferences,
which depend on the procedures’ perceived fairness or unfairness.4
Procedural preferences not only influence choices between procedures but,
more surprisingly, choices within procedures, specifically, the choice to offer
resistance. The explanation for this effect seems to be the connection between
fairness perceptions and negative reciprocity observed in many experiments.
By negative reciprocity, we mean the adoption of a costly action that
harms another person because that person’s intentional behavior was per-
ceived to be harmful to oneself.5 Of course, whenever people have to share
resources, taking something for oneself implies harming the others. How-
ever, this does not always trigger negatively reciprocal behavior. Typically,
negative reciprocity is caused by the perception of unfairness. In the ultima-
tum game, for instance, unfair proposals cause responders to reject positive
offers (Güth et al. 1982). Falk et al. (2008) have shown that proposers’ in-
2We take these distinctions from the psychological literature on procedural fairness.
Leventhal (1980) distinguishes between six different procedural rules of fair processes:
representativeness, consistency, correctability, bias suppression, accuracy, and ethicality.
Representativeness can be subdivided into two aspects: participation and voice. According
to Tyler et al. (1997), a process is considered fair if people can participate in the process
(participation) and are heard (voice); further criteria which are met by fair decision making
processes include adequate time for the process, adequate information, respectful treat-
ment, discussion of and dealing with issues, and lack of bias by authorities. Tyler and
Lind (2000: 67-77) add entitlement of authorities. We speak of representation instead
of representativeness, with voice (being heard) being the weakest form and participation
covering any stronger form of influence. Note that voice is sometimes used in a stronger
sense. Anand (2001: 249) defines voice as the extent to which a person has control over
a decision. Folger (1977) and Folger et al. (1979) define voice as the extent to which
opinions and preferences of affected parties are considered in the decision-making process.
3The ceteris paribus clause covers informational aspects: if the decision to exercise (or
not) representation rights reveals private information, this can affect the behavior of a
homo oeconomicus.
4On procedural preferences in general, see, e.g., Leventhal (1980), Lind and Tyler
(1988), Elster (1989), Tyler et al. (1997), Frey et al. (2004) and Bohnet (2006).
5See, e.g., Cox and Deck, 2005. Subsequently, however, we do not distinguish between
negative reciprocity as a motivation and negatively reciprocal behavior.
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tentions matter in this respect: it seems that responders wish not (only) to
avoid unequal or unfair outcomes but (also) to punish intentionally unfair
proposers.
There is evidence that the fairness of the decision procedure itself also
influences the degree of negative reciprocity. In a survey of forty independent
studies, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) show that people are more satisfied
even with unfavorable outcomes if these outcomes have been accomplished
on a fair basis. Tyler and Lind (2000) found that people are more likely
to obey the commands of an authority if they regard the authority to be
entitled to their obedience. This holds irrespective of their judgements about
the authority’s decision. Since entitlement is also an aspect of procedural
fairness, this indicates that people may be more likely to accept unfavorable
outcomes if the process leading to the outcome was fair (Tyler and Lind
1988; Tyler, 1990; Thibaut and Walker, 1975).
In a review of the psychological literature, Konovsky (2000) emphasizes
the particular importance of procedural fairness in business organizations.
Procedural fairness evaluations influence negative employee behaviors such
as theft (Greenberg, 1990), employees’ job satisfaction and organizational
commitment (Lowe and Vodanovich, 1995), organizational change (Tyler and
De Cremer, 2005), and turnover intentions (Olkkonen and Lipponen, 2006).
The special importance of participation is emphasized by Frey et al.
(2004), who measure procedural utility by individuals’ reported subjective
well-being or happiness, arguing that individuals gain procedural utility, in
addition to outcome utility, through actual participation or even the mere
possibility of participation. The same outcome may be evaluated differently,
depending on whether it is a market outcome or the result of voting, bar-
gaining, or command. In particular, judgements of procedural fairness, for
instance, whether participation is allowed or denied, may have an impact on
the acceptance of outcomes.
Despite the significance ascribed to procedural fairness in the literature,
there are few experimental studies where participants’ decisions have mone-
tary consequences. An important exception is Bolton et al. (2005), who show
that allocations resulting from unbiased random procedures, which are usu-
ally viewed as fair, are more readily accepted than the same allocations when
chosen by another person. Grimalda et al. (2008a) address a question similar
to ours. In a three-person ultimatum game6, they vary the degree of par-
ticipation: in the non-participation treatment (our term), a decision maker
is selected randomly; in the participation treatment, every player makes a
6With, it seems, monetary payoffs; however, Grimalda et al. (2008a) do not mention
the exact values.
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proposal and one of the proposals is selected randomly. As the authors
emphasize, these two treatments are strategically equivalent. Perhaps not
surprisingly, then, they find only weak evidence that participation makes
a difference: after players have gained some experience, proposers seem to
demand less, and responders seem to concede less, in the participation treat-
ment, which might be due to an entitlement effect.
As far as we know, the experiment reported here is the first incentivized
experiment varying the degree of strategically relevant participation.
We modify Bosman and van Winden’s (2002) power-to-take game, using
a setup with one responder and two takers. In the first stage of this game,
the takers decide which fraction of the responder’s endowment to transfer to
themselves (the take rate). In the second stage, the responder decides which
part of the endowment to destroy (the destruction rate). Thus, the responder
can punish greedy takers, but only at a cost to herself. In comparison to the
ultimatum game, the responder can vary the degree of rejection by destroying
only a part of her endowment. The game approximates social environments
characterized by appropriation, for instance, taxation, common agency, or
monopolistic selling (Bosman and van Winden, 2002).
We further modify the game by letting the responder participate in the
takers’ decision and consider the effect on her choice of the destruction rate.
To study the impact of the degree of participation, we consider four different
versions of the first-stage group decision making process. In all cases, the take
rate is determined as the weighted average of three simultaneous proposals,
two of which are made by the takers. The third proposal is made either by the
responder (participation treatment) or by a computerized dummy making a
random choice (no-participation treatment). While takers’ proposals have
always equal weights, the weight of the responder’s or dummy’s proposal is
either equal to the weight of a taker’s proposal (low-influence treatment) or
twice as high (high-influence treatment).
In contrast to previous studies based on the power-to-take game, we
use Selten’s (1967) strategy method for responders’ decisions on destruc-
tion rates, thus asking responders to choose destruction rates for all possible
take rates. This allows us to observe the extent of negative reciprocity shown
by a participant, that is, the extent to which participants choose higher de-
struction rates as a response to higher take rates.7
7It is plausible that the strategy method weakens the influence of emotions on decision
making since participants consider their reactions to hypothetical, and not actual, choices
of other players (“cold”, in contrast to “hot”, settings, see Brandts and Charness (2000)).
Evidence on the effect of applying the strategy method is mixed. Brandts and Charness
(2000) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2008) do not find a difference between hot and cold
settings, whereas Brosig et al. (2003) do.
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It is well-known from many experiments that not all participants show
reciprocal behavior. Instead, participants fall into different categories called
player types. The following types have been observed in many experiments.8
Type 0 (homo oeconomicus): This type shows no reciprocity, behaving
instead just like the homo oeconomicus model predicts.
Type 1 (unconditional cooperator): This type also shows no reciprocity
but behaves cooperatively even in the face of non-cooperative behavior.
Type 2 (homo reciprocans): Also known as conditional cooperator. This
type shows reciprocity to various degrees.9
Type 3 (erratic): This type shows erratic behavior.
Given that the occurrence of these types is a well-known phenomenon,
an analysis of average behavior differences between treatments is clearly in-
sufficient. A difference in averages may be due to changes in the frequency
of different types, or due to changes of the behavior of the types. From the
literature reviewed above, no hypothesis concerning the frequency of differ-
ent types in different treatments emerges. Our hypothesis is that responder
types are given exogenously and that, therefore, any observed differences in
frequency between treatments are due to chance. This seems to be the usual
hypothesis in the literature; it can, moreover, be tested.
This leaves changes in the behavior of types. By definition, type 0 and
type 1 behaviors, which in our experiment need not be different, cannot be
affected by our treatments.10 With respect to the erratic type, any influence
is possible, but the literature contains no hypotheses, again more or less by
definition, since susceptibility to systematic influences means that behavior
is only partially erratic.
In the case of type 2, homo reciprocans, which usually is the most frequent
type, a clear hypothesis emerges. If, as conjectured, participation is an aspect
of fairness, negative reciprocity should be less pronounced in the participation
treatments. Whether a higher influence also increases the perceived fairness
of the decision procedure is an open question.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 explains the experimental
design and procedures. Section 6.3 presents the experimental results. Section
8See, e.g., Fischbacher et al. (2001), Goeree et al. (2002), Kurzban and Houser (2005),
Burlando and Guala (2005), Fischbacher and Gächter (2008), and Albert et al. (2007).
Although the discussion of agents’ heterogeneity has a long history in economics, experi-
mental evidence on the existence of different player types is still very imperfect.
9See, e.g., Falk and Fischbacher (2006) for theories of reciprocity. Dohmen et al. (2006)
explore the prevalence of reciprocity in the population by analyzing survey data.
10Actually, this is not quite correct. Types 0 and 1 both do not engage in negative
reciprocity. However, type 0 is indifferent between all destruction rates when faced with a
take rate of 1. Strictly speaking, a treatment effect on indifferent choices is not ruled out
by the homo oeconomicus model.
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6.4 concludes.11
6.2 The experiment
6.2.1 Experimental design
Participants play a three-person two-stage one-shot game. In each game,
there are two takers, also called player 1 and 2, and one responder, also called
player 3. The responder has an endowment e. Takers have no endowments.
In the first stage, a take rate t ∈ [0,1] is determined in a simultaneous move.
In the second stage, the responder chooses a destruction rate d ∈ [0,1] in
response to the take rate determined in stage 1. The experimental payoff to
each taker j = 1,2 is pij = 0.5t(1−d)e as takers’ total payoff is equally split
among them. The responder’s experimental payoff is pi3 = (1− t)(1− d)e.
Thus, the responder can punish the takers by destroying more or less of her
endowment. As long as t < 1, punishment is costly.
To study the impact of participation and strength of influence, we consider
four different versions of the first-stage group decision making process. In all
cases, the take rate is determined as the weighted average of three simulta-
neous proposals, two of which are made by the takers. The third proposal is
made either by the responder (participation treatment) or by a computerized
dummy making a random choice (no-participation treatment). We imple-
mented a dummy in order to make the participation and no-participation
treatments comparable.
Let t1 and t2 be the proposals of taker 1 and taker 2 respectively. Let
t3 be the proposal of the responder (in the participation treatment) or the
dummy (in the no-participation treatment). The take rate is then determined
as t = t1+t2+wt32+w . The weight w/(2+w) of the responder’s or the dummy’s
proposal is either 13 for w = 1 (low-influence treatment) or
1
2 for w = 2 (high-
influence treatment). This results in 2× 2 = 4 treatment groups with the
mnemonic names PartLow, PartHigh, NoPartLow and NoPartHigh (see table
6.1).
In the actual game, we restrict proposals to three possibilities, tj ∈ T =
{13 , 23 ,1} for j = 1,2,3, and destruction rates to 101 possibilities, d ∈ D =
{ 0100 , 1100 , . . . , 100100}. The possible group take rates in the low-influence treat-
ments were therefore restricted to the set T Low = {39 , 49 , 59 , 69 , 79 , 89 ,1}. In the
high-influence treatments, possible group take rates were restricted to the
set T High = { 412 , 512 , 612 , 712 , 812 , 912 , 1012 , 1112 ,1}. Note that T Low∩T High = T . For
11Translations of the instructions, the post-experimental questionnaire and question-
naire answer frequencies can be found in appendices D.1 to D.3.
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Table 6.1: Treatment groups
Participation
yes no
Influence low PartLow NoPartLowhigh PartHigh NoPartHigh
t = 23 , the group’s endowment would be equally distributed among group
members, irrespective of d.
Table 6.2 shows the possible take rates t.
Table 6.2: Possible group take rates t
Low treatments: t= t1+t2+t33{t1, t2}=
{13 , 13} {13 , 23} {13 ,1} {23 , 23} {23 ,1} {1,1}1
3
3
9
4
9
5
9
5
9
6
9
7
9
t3 = 23
4
9
5
9
6
9
6
9
7
9
8
9
1 59
6
9
7
9
7
9
8
9 1
T Low = {39 , 49 , 59 , 69 , 79 , 89 ,1}
High treatments: t= t1+t2+2t34{t1, t2}=
{13 , 13} {13 , 23} {13 ,1} {23 , 23} {23 ,1} {1,1}1
3
4
12
5
12
6
12
6
12
7
12
8
12
t3 = 23
6
12
7
12
8
12
8
12
9
12
10
12
1 812
9
12
10
12
10
12
11
12 1
T High = { 412 , 512 , 612 , 712 , 812 , 912 , 1012 , 1112 ,1}
6.2.2 Equilibria under maximization of expected pay-
offs
Assuming rationality and maximization of own expected experimental pay-
offs, we can derive the subgame perfect equilibria of the game.12
12On the implied assumption of risk neutrality, see the discussion in n. 15 below.
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Responders’ behavior can be analyzed independently of the details of the
treatments. Responders should always propose the lowest take rate possible,
i.e., t3 = 13 . The optimal destruction rate of the responder in stage 2 depends
on the take rate determined in stage 1. We describe their strategies by an
n-tupel of destruction rates d := (d1,d2, ...,dn)∈Dn, where dj is the response
to group take rate tj , t1 < t2 < .. . < tn, and where the number n of possible
take rates and their values depend on the treatment. Maximizing one’s ex-
perimental payoff as a responder means to destroy nothing if this is costly
(if t < 1), and to destroy any fraction of the pie if this is costless (if t = 1).
We denote these strategies by dx := (0,0, . . . ,0,x) with arbitrary x ∈ D.
Let us consider treatment PartLow first. Given that t < 1 because of t3 =
1
3 , the responder’s choice among the strategies dx never matters. Moreover,
given that t < 1, the takers have no reason to play anything but t1 = t2 =
1. Hence, the subgame perfect equilibria are given by the strategy profiles
(t1, t2, t3,d) = (1,1, 13 ,dx), x ∈ D. The same reasoning, result, and notation
apply to treatment PartHigh, with the difference that the set of possible
take rates changes. Equilibria in the Part treatments are efficient because
the expected destruction rate is zero.
In the NoPart treatments, t1 = t2 = 1 results in a probability of 13 for the
event t = 1 (through t3 = 1). We first consider NoPartLow. If t1 = t2 = 1,
three take rates are possible and occur with probability 13 : t∈ {79 , 89 ,1}. Since
the responder plays dx in the second stage, the expected payoff of takers is
pi1 = pi2 =
15
54e+
1−x
6 e .
Destruction can be avoided if one of the takers chooses a take rate tj = 23 ,
which prevents t = 1.13 Again, three take rates are possible and occur with
probability 13 : t ∈ {69 , 79 , 89}. The expected payoff of takers is
pi1 = pi2 =
21
54e .
Note that taker payoffs depend on the group take rate, not on the individual
take rate, and are therefore identical for both takers.
The strategy profiles (t1, t2,d) = (1,1,dx) on the one hand and (t1, t2,d) =
(23 ,1,dx) or (t1, t2,d) = (1,
2
3 ,dx) on the other hand lead to the same expected
payoffs for the takers iff x = 13 (which cannot occur since x /∈ D). If x < 13 ,
the takers’ expected payoffs are higher for t1 = t2 = 1; if x > 13 , their payoffs
are higher if one of them chooses a take rate of 23 .
13In the absence of communication or repetition, of course, takers could coordinate on
asymmetric strategy choices only by chance.
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Hence, if we restrict considerations to pure strategies, we find two sets
of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. The first set is (t1, t2,d) = (1,1,dx),
x ∈ [0, 13 ]∩D. All these strategy profiles have an expected destruction rate
of x3 and are, therefore, inefficient if x > 0. The second set is (t1, t2,d) ∈
{(1, 23 ,dx),(23 ,1,dx)}, x ∈ [13 ,1]∩D. These profiles have a zero expected de-
struction rate and are, therefore, efficient.
Analogous considerations apply to NoPartHigh. If t1 = t2 = 1, three take
rates are possible and occur with probability 13 : t ∈ { 812 , 1012 ,1}. Since the
responder plays dx in the second stage, the expected payoff of takers is
pi1 = pi2 =
1
4e+
1−x
6 e .
If, however, one of the takers chooses a take rate tj = 23 , the three equiprob-
able take rates are t ∈ { 712 , 912 , 1112}. The expected payoff of takers, then, is
pi1 = pi2 =
9
24e .
If x= 14 ∈D, takers’ expected payoffs are the same in both cases. Hence, we
find the following two sets of equilibria: (t1, t2,d) = (1,1,dx), x ∈ [0, 14 ]∩D
and (t1, t2,d) ∈ {(1, 23 ,dx),(23 ,1,dx)}, x ∈ [14 ,1]∩D. Equilibria in the first set
are inefficient if x > 0. Equilibria in the second set are efficient.
Table 6.3 lists all subgame perfect pure strategy equilibria with (expected)
take rates, (expected) destruction rates and (expected) payoffs.
6.2.3 Experimental procedures
In each experimental session, the following procedure was used. By randomly
assigning a seat number, each participant was assigned a role (taker or re-
sponder) and was matched with two other participants whose identities were
never revealed. The instructions (see appendix D.1) were read, followed by
some role-independent exercises intended to check participants’ understand-
ing of the procedures. Participants then learned about their role and played
the game once. We framed the game as neutral as possible, avoiding any
suggestive terms.
In stage 1, takers and responder or dummy chose take rates tj ∈ T . Ad-
ditionally, we asked responders to indicate their preferred group take rate
tpref ∈ T . In stage 2, responders learnt about the take rate chosen by their
dummy (no-participation treatments) or were reminded of their own choice
(participation treatments). Thus, responders in all treatments received for-
mally the same information. However, as responders did not learn about
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Table 6.3: Subgame perfect pure strategy equilibria for treatment groups
PartLow Equilibrium (t1, t2, t3,d) = (1,1, 13 ,dx),x ∈ DGroup take rate 79Expected destruction rate 0
Payoffs pi1 = pi2 = 718e,pi3 =
4
18e
PartHigh Equilibrium (t1, t2, t3,d) = (1,1, 13 ,dx),x ∈ DGroup take rate 69Expected destruction rate 0
Payoffs pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = 13e
NoPartLow Equilibrium (t1, t2,d) = (1,1,dx),x ∈ [0, 13 ]∩DGroup take rate 89Expected destruction rate x3Payoffs pi1 = pi2 = 24−8x54 e,pi3 = 3−x27 e
Equilibrium (t1, t2,d) ∈ (1, 23 ,dx),(23 ,1,dx),x ∈ [13 ,1]∩DGroup take rate 79Expected destruction rate 0
Payoffs pi1 = pi2 = 718e,pi3 =
2
9e
NoPartHigh Equilibrium (t1, t2,d) = (1,1,dx),x ∈ [0, 14 ]∩DGroup take rate 1012Expected destruction rate x3Payoffs pi1 = pi2 = 15−5x36 e,pi3 = 3−x18 e
Equilibrium (t1, t2,d) ∈ (1, 23 ,dx),(23 ,1,dx),x ∈ [14 ,1]∩DGroup take rate 34Expected destruction rate 0
Payoffs pi1 = pi2 = 38e,pi3 =
2
8e
the take rates chosen by the takers, they did not know the group’s actual
take rate t yet. Responders then had to choose their destruction rate d for
each feasible group take rate t (strategy method).14 At the end of stage 2,
each participant learned about the take rate chosen by the group, the cor-
responding destruction rate, and the resulting individual payoff. Thereafter,
all participants filled in a post-experimental questionnaire (see appendices
D.2 and D.3) concerning preferences, expectations and social background.
Overall, 348 undergraduates from the introductory microeconomics course
at Saarland University participated in the experiment. Their fields of study
were business administration (81.3%), economic education science (10.6%),
14Note that responders were asked to make a decision on the destruction rate for any t.
As responders knew at that time their own or the dummy’s take rate choice, they might
have eliminated take rates no longer feasible. For instance, if a responder/dummy had
chosen t3 = 1, it follows that t≥ 59 in the low treatments and t≥ 23 in the high treatments.
Thus, choices on d(t) for small take rates were hypothetical. For the following analysis,
we ignore this fact because, first, we focus on treatment effects which are not touched by
these considerations, and second, main effects appear for high take rates and these are
feasible for most responders.
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business information management (3.2%), and other fields (4.8%). We had
54.6% male and 45.4% female participants. None of the participants had
participated in an economic research experiment before.
Participants formed 116 groups of three players. Thus, we collected data
from 232 takers and 116 responders. Each participant was assigned randomly
to one of the four treatments and each treatment was applied to 87 partic-
ipants (between-subject design). The experiment was computerized using
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We conducted twelve sessions, all on the same
day (3 sessions of 12 participants each, 1 session of 24 participants, 8 sessions
of 36 participants each).
Participants were paid in chips according to the decisions made. Every
earned chip was exchanged for a lottery ticket. Lottery tickets determined
participants’ chance of winning the lottery prize of 500 Euro (binary lottery
mechanism). The lottery mechanism was carefully explained to the partici-
pants. In order to avoid tournament-type rewards, the number of tickets was
fixed at 9 per group. In order to guarantee that one participant actually got
the prize, remaining tickets of group 1 were randomly distributed among the
members of group 2, remaining tickets of group 2 to group 3, and so on, with
the remaining tickets of the last group going to the participants of the first
group.15
As a show-up fee, every participant received some extra points for the
compulsory introductory microeconomics exam. The experiment took about
25 minutes; thus, average earnings per hour were about 3.45 Euro. The
average earnings in chips were 1.75 for takers and 1.63 for responders (see
also table 6.4 for average earnings per treatment).
15For participants who maximize the expected utility of monetary payoffs, the binary
lottery mechanism implies risk neutrality. See Roth and Malouf (1979), Berg et al. (1986).
For a critical discussion of the mechanism, see Selten et al. (1999), for an experimental
test, see, e.g., Prasnikar (1998). However, risk considerations do not play an important
role in our context. We used the lottery mechanism mainly because we assumed that
the chance of winning a large prize would make participation in the experiment more
attractive. For the same reason, we wanted to make sure that the prize would actually go
to some participant. This required the redistribution of “destroyed” tickets as explained
in the text. Thus, the final number of lottery tickets a participant received resulted from
two sources: earnings within the group, which provided the incentive to consider seriously
how to decide; and a possible windfall profit from unearned tickets from other groups,
which was unrelated to decision making within the participant’s own group.
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6.3 Experimental results
Table 6.4 shows means, standard deviations (sd), and medians of take rate
proposals of takers (t1, t2) and of responders (t3), as well as of group take
rates preferred by responders (tpref ), and of actual group take rates (t) for
each of the four treatments and overall treatments. Furthermore, average
earnings in chips for takers and responders are given. The last columns of
tables 6.5 and 6.6 (on pp. 122 and 123) provide a summary of destruction
rate data.
Table 6.4: Take rates: Overview
Variable Treatment
PartLow PartHigh NoPartLow NoPartHigh overall
t1, t2 mean 0.805 0.822 0.764 0.822 0.803
(sd) (0.188) (0.209) (0.234) (0.200) (0.208)
median 0.667 0.100 0.667 0.100 0.667
t3 mean 0.506 0.425 0.644 0.655 0.557
(sd) (0.211) (0.152) (0.266) (0.289) (0.252)
median 0.333 0.333 0.667 0.667 0.500
tpref mean 0.483 0.414 0.414 0.402 0.428
(sd) (0.191) (0.145) (0.145) (0.137) (0.157)
median 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333
t mean 0.728 0.632 0.747 0.750 0.714
(sd) (0.125) (0.103) (0.142) (0.151) (0.139)
median 0.777 0.583 0.778 0.750 0.667
mean earnings
takers 1.76 1.66 1.62 1.97 1.75
responders 1.55 2.14 1.52 1.31 1.63
For all statistical tests, data from different treatments are independent
as we applied a between-subject design. Take rates and destruction rates
are measured on an interval scale. While we restrict choices to a small num-
ber of values, we might conjecture that hypothetical unrestricted choices
would come from a continuous distribution; thus, we might treat the data as
grouped data from a continuous distribution. Nevertheless, we cannot use
normality assumptions since take and destruction rates are restricted to the
unit interval; thus, approximating normality would only be possible with a
6.3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 119
very small variance.16 For these reasons, we use only nonparametric tests.
6.3.1 Take rates
Although take rates are not immediately relevant to our purposes, we take
a closer look at them in order to exclude the possibility of freak results that
would shed doubt on the validity of our experimental procedures.
6.3.1.1 Takers’ choices
Averaging over all treatments, the mean take rate proposal of takers is 0.803.
Remember that in our design, we have 2 takers and 1 responder forming a
group. Thus, a take rate of about 80% means that each taker claims on
average about 40% of responders’ endowment e, leaving 20% to the respon-
der. This take rate is completely in line with the findings of Bosman et al.
(2006), who report for a game with three takers and three responders that
takers claim on average 81% of the whole pie.17 Exactly the same proportion
has been found by Reuben and van Winden (2008), who analyze a game with
one taker and two responders, and nearly the same by Sutter et al. (2003),
who report data of a two-person game and found a mean take rate of 78%
of the whole pie. This number seems to be astonishingly robust throughout
different group sizes and group compositions despite the fact that the over-
all take rate must by divided by the number of takers to obtain the share
claimed by the individual.18
The lowest take rate of 13 was chosen by only 7.3% of the takers, whereas
44.4% decided in favor of 23 , and a narrow majority of 48.3% chose 1, which is
the most obvious equilibrium strategy. However, in the NoPart treatments,
a subgame perfect equilibrium can also be reached by one taker choosing
1 and the other taker choosing 23 . This suggests that we might observe a
higher proportion of takers choosing 23 in the NoPart treatments than in
Part treatments. Actually, this is not the case: 43.1% of NoPart takers chose
2
3 (47.4%: 1; 9.5%:
1
3) whereas 45.7% of Part takers chose
2
3 (49.1%: 1; 5.2%:
1
3).
16We have tested and rejected normality in all relevant cases with the help of the one-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
17In a standard power-to-take game, both sides, takers and responders, have an initial
endowment, with responders’ endowment being at stake. Thus, the reported mean take
rate is not directly comparable to our result. Conversion based on the particular whole
pie is necessary.
18This robustness is even more surprising when taking into account that we restricted
take rate proposals to three possibilities, tj ∈ {13 , 23 ,1}.
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In order to evaluate whether takers take the applied decision rule into
account when choosing a take rate, we compare takers’ take rate proposals
of the four treatments. For both high influence treatments, take rates are on
average 0.822. For PartLow, the mean take rate is 0.805; for NoPartLow, it
is 0.764. The Kruskal-Wallis test finds no evidence that the take rates from
the four treatments come from different distributions (p= .491). A pairwise
comparison using the two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test finds also no
significant differences between takers’ take rate choices (all six p-values above
.186).
Low treatments allow for equal influence of all decision makers (2 takers
and 1 responder/dummy), whereas High treatments privilege the respon-
der/dummy. As this fact might cause takers to worry about the level of the
resulting take rate, we tested the directional hypothesis that take rates of tak-
ers are higher in High than in Low treatments. We find a weakly significant
difference between the pooled data of Low and High treatments using a one-
sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (p = .085). This effect seems to result
mainly from a weakly significant difference between the NoPart treatments
(NoPartLow vs. NoPartHigh: p= .102, PartLow vs. PartHigh: p= .251).
6.3.1.2 Take rate proposals of responders
Take rates chosen by responders (PartLow and PartHigh) and generated with
the help of pseudo-random numbers (NoPartLow and NoPartHigh) are la-
beled as variable t3. The mean take rate for PartLow was 0.506, for PartHigh
only 0.425. The average take rate of all responders was 0.466. Dummy mean
take rates were 0.644 (NoPartLow) and 0.655 (NoPartHigh). The overall
average was 0.557. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows a highly significant dif-
ference between all four groups (p= .001), thus providing evidence that not
all samples came from the same distribution. This is not surprising since we
used a uniform distribution for dummy take rate proposals in the NoPart-
treatments; it just shows that responder proposals were not uniformly dis-
tributed.
By comparing PartLow with NoPartLow, we can also show that respon-
ders’ choices are significantly different from dummys’ take rate proposals
(two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p = .002). The same is true for
High treatments (p= .043).
As responders in the PartLow treatment might try to compensate their
low level of influence (although they do not know that another treatment ex-
ists), the mean take rate for PartLow is expected to be higher than the mean
take rate for PartHigh. In fact, average take rate proposals in the PartLow
treatment are significantly higher (one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test,
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p= .068).
6.3.1.3 Responders’ preferred group take rates
Most responders (72.4%) reported that they preferred a group take rate of 13 ,
which is the lowest possible take rate and maximizes their own experimental
payoff. Almost all the others (26.7%) stated that their preferred group take
rate was 23 , which leads to an equal distribution of the pie. Only one partic-
ipant (0.9%) stated a preferred group take rate of 1. The average preferred
take rate is 0.428, the median is 13 . PartLow responders prefer the highest
take rate on average (0.483), whereas NoPartHigh responders show the low-
est mean (0.402). The average preferred group take rates of the other two
treatments are slightly higher (both average take rates are 0.414).
The median is 13 for all treatments; not surprisingly, then, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the median is the same in all four treatments
(Kruskal-Wallis test, p = .254). A pairwise comparison of average preferred
take rates in the four treatments shows no significant difference except for
PartLow versus NoPartHigh (two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p =
.082).
6.3.2 Destruction rates: Aggregate results
The mean destruction rate in response to the actual group take rates was
0.294. This is slightly higher than the value of 0.208 observed by Bosman et
al. (2006) and Hennig-Schmidt and Geng (2005). Of 116 responders, 81.9%
used the possibility of destroying part of the pie. The average destruction
rate is 0.289 over all choices. If the take rate is smaller than 1, destroying
part of the pie is costly; nevertheless, 71.6% of responders destroy even in
this case, with an average destruction rate of 0.234. This is in accordance
with the common observation that people are prepared to punish even if
punishment is costly to themselves.
However, 30.2% of the responders destroy part of the pie even if the take
rate is at its minimum of 13 , although the average destruction rate of 0.095 is
lowest in this case. This is in accordance with the observation that rejections
in restricted ultimatum games occur even when the proposer cannot make a
better offer (Falk et al., 2008). Even when the take rate is 23 , which implies
equal shares of the pie for all and is seen to be the fair take rate by an
overwhelming majority of 78.4% of all participants (t = 13 : 17.2%; t = 1:
4.3%), the average destruction rate is 0.216.
Nevertheless, cost considerations seem to be important for punishment.
The average destruction rate for take rates over 23 but below 1 is 0.384; at a
122 CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENT 3
take rate of 1, where punishment is costless, the destruction rate jumps to
0.662. Obviously, average destruction rates increase with increasing group
take rates.
Table 6.5 highlights proportions of responders classified by their destruc-
tion rate choice for any take rate. Average destruction rates for various take
rates are reported in the last column of table 6.6.
Let us now tackle the related question whether there is a correlation
between the levels of destruction and take rates. Hennig-Schmidt and Geng
(2005) found that the null hypothesis of independence can be rejected at p=
.05, indicating a positive correlation (Spearman’s ρ = .57). In our data, the
correlation is substantially smaller but more significant (Spearman’s ρ= .23,
p= .006).
Table 6.5: Destruction rate choices (in %) for different take rates
0< 0.1< 0.2< 0.3< 0.4< 0.5< 0.6< 0.7< 0.8< 0.9<
d= 0 d d d d d d d d d d d= 1
≤ 0.1 ≤ 0.2 ≤ 0.3 ≤ 0.4 ≤ 0.5 ≤ 0.6 ≤ 0.7 ≤ 0.8 ≤ 0.9 < 1
t= 39 69.8 6.9 6.9 4.3 1.7 6.0 0.9 3.4 0 0 0 03
9 < t <
6
9 44.8 14.7 10.3 7.8 11.2 6.9 3.4 0.9 0 0 0 0
t= 69 48.3 2.6 7.8 5.2 12.9 11.2 5.2 2.6 3.4 0 0 0.96
9 < t < 1 30.2 2.6 9.5 4.3 6.0 10.3 6.9 12.1 7.8 5.2 0 5.2
t= 1 25.0 1.7 0.9 0 1.7 8.6 0.9 0 3.4 0.9 1.7 55.2
3
9 ≤ t≤ 1 43.6 5.7 7.1 4.3 6.7 8.6 3.5 3.8 2.9 1.2 0.3 12.3
6.3.3 Destruction rates: Treatment effects
A first analysis of destruction rate data shows almost no evidence in favor of
our hypothesis that participation diminishes negative reciprocity.
Table 6.6 shows destruction rate choices for different take rates and for all
treatment groups. Possible take rates differ between the High and Low treat-
ments. In order to allow for a comparison, data are therefore grouped into
five categories: d(t= 39),d(
3
9 < t <
6
9),d(t=
6
9),d(
6
9 < t < 1),d(t= 1). We now
consider the effects of participation and strength of influence on destruction
rates. Since we hypothesized directional effects of participation and strength
of influence on destruction rates, we apply one-sided tests throughout.
A visual inspection suggests that the distribution of destruction rates in
each treatment group is similar in shape. We used the Kruskal-Wallis test
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Table 6.6: Destruction rates: Overview
treatment
PartLow PartHigh NoPartLow NoPartHigh overall
dt with t= 39 average 0.109 0.059 0.118 0.093 0.095
(sd) (0.186) (0.143) (0.204) (0.193) (0.182)
dt with 39 < t <
6
9 average 0.136 0.119 0.150 0.179 0.146
(sd) (0.186) (0.164) (0.200) (0.187) (0.184)
dt with t= 69 average 0.218 0.210 0.219 0.218 0.216
(sd) (0.235) (0.256) (0.275) (0.264) (0.255)
dt with 69 < t < 1 average 0.343 0.406 0.384 0.404 0.384
(sd) (0.295) (0.352) (0.355) (0.335) (0.333)
dt with t= 1 average 0.597 0.610 0.749 0.690 0.662
(sd) (0.433) (0.446) (0.411) (0.452) (0.435)
dt with 39 ≤ t≤ 1 average 0.269 0.273 0.308 0.305 0.289
dt with 39 ≤ t < 1 average 0.214 0.231 0.234 0.257 0.234
to compare the four groups of data, finding that, for each take rate category,
destruction rates do not differ significantly between the treatment groups.19
The picture does not change much when we look at pairwise comparisons
of the four groups. First, we test whether observations on d(t) in the PartLow
treatment are smaller than in the NoPartLow treatment. Comparing average
destruction rates of both treatments, we find that, for all take rates t ∈
T Low∪T High common to both treatments, d(t) is higher in NoPartLow than
in PartLow. However, according to the one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney,
these differences are not significant: all p-values are clearly higher than .05
except for d(t= 1), where p= 0.054.20
When we look at the differences between PartHigh and NoPartHigh, we
get similar results. Average destruction rates are higher in NoPartHigh than
in PartHigh for any feasible take rate t (with the exception of d(t= 34): mean
destruction is 0.361 for PartHigh and 0.277 for NoPartHigh). According
to the one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, none of the differences is
19The smallest significance level p= .181 is found for d(t= 1).
20The test uses ranks and assumes that the scores come from a continuous distribution,
where the probability of ties is zero. With discrete data, ties may occur, which happened
in our case. In such cases, each of the tied observations is given the ranks they would
have had if no ties had occurred. For our data, the proportion of ties is quite large and
occurred between observations involving both groups. We applied the correction for ties.
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significant.
There is also no significant effect of the strength of influence. When
comparing PartLow and PartHigh or, less interestingly, NoPartLow and
NoPartHigh, the smallest p-value is p= .78, associated with d(t= 13) in Part-
Low and PartHigh. There is even no evidence that strength of influence has
any directional effect: for some t, destruction rates are higher in the Low
treatments; for other t, destruction rates are lower in the Low treatments.
Since destruction rates from High and Low treatments do not differ in
medians (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) nor in the distribution of values
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), we have also pooled the data in two groups, Part
(PartLow and PartHigh) and NoPart (NoPartLow and NoPartHigh). Again,
we found mean destruction rates to be higher in NoPart than in Part, which
we expected. Whereas the difference is positive for any d(t), it ranges from
very small (0.0074 for d(t = 69)) to relative large (0.1167 for d(t = 1)), with
the other values in the range from 0.0189 to 0.0364. However, none of the
differences is significant according to the one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test: the smallest p-value is 0.55 for d(t = 1). There is also no significant
difference when we analyze destruction rates for any feasible group take rate
t instead of destruction rate categories.o
6.3.4 Destruction rates: Responder types
We found that average destruction rates increase with increasing group take
rates but do not differ significantly among the treatments. Thus, we find
negative reciprocity on average but no treatment effects. However, averages
may mask substantial heterogeneity in individual behavior. Non-reciprocal
responder types are not influenced by our treatments. If these types are
frequent enough, treatment effects on reciprocal types may not show up in
the aggregate.
In accordance with other experimental studies, we distinguish four types
of responders: the homo oeconomicus (type 0), the unconditional cooperator
(type 1), the homo reciprocans (type 2), and the erratic type (type 3). This
classification of responder behavior is not ad hoc. It is known from other
experiments that types 0 and 1 occur, although their behavior is untypical
for average human behavior in many situations. Type 2 behavior covers the
kind of negative reciprocity we observe, on average, in basic power-to-take
games.
Type 3 is the most problematic type. It is known from many experiments
that there are almost always participants who are confused or not motivated
to decide carefully. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the
group of type 3 responders contains participants who have understood the
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instructions and decided carefully but just had aims we failed to understand.
These types differ in terms of their responder behavior, which we describe,
as before, by an n-tupel of destruction rates (d1,d2, ...,dn) ∈ Dn, where dj is
the type’s response to take rate tj , t1 < t2 < .. . < tn, and where the number n
of possible take rates and their values depend on the treatment. Specifically,
we consider the following strategies:
• d0 := (0, ...0) (never destroy)
• d+ := (0,0, ...0,x) with x > 0, x ∈ D (destroy iff this is costless)
• d++ := (d1,d2, ...,dn) with d1 ≤ d2 ≤ . . .≤ dn and dn−1 > 0 (nondecreas-
ing, destroy in spite of costs)
• d− := (d1,d2, ...,dn) with dj+1 < dj for at least one j (nonmonotonic)
According to the type definitions, types play only certain strategies. Type
0 maximizes its experimental payoff, which implies d0 or d+. Type 1 is always
cooperative and therefore plays d0. Type 2 shows (negative) reciprocity, that
is, plays d+ or d++. Type 3 may play any strategy; however, if there is a
strong random influence on the behavior of type 3, it will most likely play
d−, because this is the largest class of strategies.
Hence, we can tentatively classify types on account of their behavior. We
classify users of d0 and d+ as type 0/1, users of d− as type 3, and users of d++
as type 2. We then validate this classification by looking at some relevant
statistics.
On the basis of this classification, table 6.7 lists the observed frequency
of the three responder types by treatments and over all treatments. Overall,
type 2 responders constitute the majority (slightly above 50%), while 25%
of the responders are of type 0/1 and the rest (not quite 25%) is of type 3.
The distribution of types over treatment groups does not differ significantly
from a uniform distribution (chi-square test, p < .001). Thus, types seem to
be exogenous, which supports our type classification.
Destruction decisions also differ substantially among these types. Median
destruction rates of type 0/1, type 2, and type 3 players are significantly
different for any possible group take rate smaller than 1 (p < .001, three-
sample Median test).21 Thus, types differ not only in their strategy choices
but also in their reactions to each group take rate below 1. This is not implied
by the type definition and suggests that our types are really different. A
pairwise comparison of destruction choices of type 0/1 with type 2 as well
21For t= 1, the Median test could not be performed because their were no cases above
the median.
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Table 6.7: Responder types
Treatment
PartLow PartHigh NoPartLow NoPartHigh Total
Type 0/1 8 7 7 7 29
(6.9%) (6.0%) (6.0%) (6.0%) (25.0%)
Type 2 15 18 13 14 60
(12.9%) (15.5%) (11.2%) (12.1%) (51.7%)
Type 3 6 4 9 8 27
(5.2%) (3.4%) (7.8%) (6.9%) (23.3%)
as with type 3 yields the expected results: for any take rate t < 1, type
0/1 responders destroy significantly less (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, one-
sided, p< .004). Even more interesting results provides a comparison between
type 2 and type 3 responders. Type 2 players destroy less than type 3
responders on average when confronted with t ≤ 59 and more as reaction to
t > 59 . For some small and some high take rates, destruction decisions are
significantly different, for others (especially medium take rates), they are
not (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, two-sided), but there seems to be no
meaningful pattern.
Moreover, types differ with regard to the correlation between take rate
and destruction rate. As already explained, we found a significantly positive
correlation in the aggregate. For type 0/1 responders, we find, trivially, a
positive and significant correlation (Spearman’s ρ= .312, p= .050 one-sided),
whereas for type 3 responders, we find a negative, non-significant correlation
(Spearman’s ρ = −.175, p = .384 two-sided). For type 2 responders, the
correlation between take and destruction rate is positive by definition of the
type, large, and highly significant (Spearman’s ρ= .697, p < .001 one-sided).
The hypothesis that participatory decision making reduces negative reci-
procity concerns only the reciprocal type 2; thus, we focus on type 2 re-
sponders, who also form a clear majority. Table 6.8 provides the following
data for type 2 responder behavior in Part and NoPart treatments: num-
ber of type 2 responders (n)22, mean destruction rate and standard devia-
tion (sd). For low and medium take rates (t < 912), we observe no clear-cut
effect concerning mean destruction rates between both treatments. How-
ever, for t ≥ 912 , mean destruction rates of responders in the NoPart treat-
22Number of responders differ within the Part and NoPart treatments because some
group take rates are only possible in either the High or Low treatments while others are
possible in both.
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ments clearly exceed destruction rates in the Part treatments. This is in line
with the hypothesis that responders allowed to participate in the decision-
making process destroy smaller shares of the pie than NoPart-responders.
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (one-sided) shows that mean destruction
rates of Part-responders are significantly lower than of NoPart-responders
for t = 89 (p = .026), t =
8
9 (p = .044), and t = 1 (p = .021). The last column
of table 6.8 provides the corresponding p-values (one-sided) for any possible
group take rate t.
Table 6.8: Destruction rates of type-2 responders
Treatment
Part NoPart
Take rate n mean sd n mean sd p23
t= 39 33 0.054 0.117 27 0.042 0.118 .151
t= 512 18 0.077 0.143 14 0.120 0.134 .155
t= 49 15 0.125 0.149 13 0.077 0.155 .152
t= 612 18 0.156 0.181 14 0.207 0.197 .241
t= 59 15 0.182 0.184 13 0.165 0.189 .379
t= 712 18 0.222 0.244 14 0.283 0.240 .261
t= 69 33 0.314 0.247 27 0.319 0.266 .485
t= 912 18 0.478 0.332 14 0.468 0.285 .500
t= 79 15 0.452 0.238 13 0.532 0.311 .266
t= 1012 18 0.534 0.311 14 0.567 0.315 .380
t= 89 15 0.626 0.212 13 0.784 0.184 .026
t= 1112 18 0.657 0.300 14 0.835 0.202 .044
t= 1 33 0.824 0.273 27 0.960 0.137 .021
Thus, we find that participation matters for type 2 responders. For low
and medium group takes rates (t ≤ 1012), the destruction rates do not differ
significantly between Part and NoPart treatments (p ≥ .151). However, for
high group take rates (t > 1012), destruction rates in Part are significantly lower
than destruction rates in NoPart (p≤ .044). Pooling data for t= 89 and t= 1112
(which both result from the same action profile (t1, t2, t3) = (1,1, 23) and differ
only in the weight of t3 due to treatment variation) yields a highly significant
difference (p= .0005).
We do not find, however, that there is a significant difference in type 2
responder behavior between PartLow and PartHigh. The smallest p-value is
p= .259, associated with d(t= 13) (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, one-sided).
Nevertheless, strength of influence seems to have a directional effect: for any
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t being feasible in both treatments (i.e. t ∈ {13 , 23 ,1}), destruction rates are
lower in PartHigh.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter reports data from a laboratory experiment on procedural as-
pects of decision making. The literature shows that an individual’s will-
ingness to accept unfavorable decisions, without resorting to negatively re-
ciprocal behavior like punishment or revenge, may depend on the perceived
fairness of the decision procedure. We have focused on a specific aspect of
procedural fairness, namely, participation. In our experiment, participation
does indeed increase acceptance of unfavorable decisions for the majority
of participants who show reciprocal behavior. Participatory decision making
had no effects in the case of moderately unfavorable decisions, but there were
significant effects in the case of highly unfavorable decisions.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
There is substantial empirical evidence and increasing recognition that not
only outcomes but also procedures leading to these outcomes affect people’s
utility from and their reactions to those decisions. However, as discussed in
chapter 2, economists only recently started to focus on procedures in contrast
to a huge number of studies provided by non-economists (e.g., psychologists,
sociologists, political scientists, and legal scholars). In this dissertation, I
have presented experimental evidence in favor of the existence of procedural
effects. In particular, the economic experiments which I have conducted (or
which I have taken part in conducting) were intended to answer four main
research questions as stated in chapter 1. To sum up, the experiments provide
the following evidence: first, individual procedural fairness judgements are
not of prime importance. In line with previous research from various fields,
individuals offer less resistance to unfavorable decisions if these decisions
resulted from a fair procedure rather than from a procedure judged to be
less fair. This is consistent with the fair process effect, describing the finding
that people are more likely to accept outcomes if they feel that they are made
via fair procedures. Although the effect is said to be exceedingly robust,
the observed behavioral differences according to people’s fairness evaluations
turned out not to be statistically significant in experiment 1 (chapter 4).
Second, experimental data from experiment 1 and 2 suggest that proce-
dural satisfaction is relevant for decision making. The studies introduced the
notion of procedural satisfaction to account for possible behavioral effects
resulting from the mere fact that people’s preferences concerning procedures
are either fulfilled or not. The experimental design is able to capture two
kinds of procedural satisfaction, i.e., by individuals and by the group. Analo-
gous to the fair process effect, we hypothesized that individuals rather accept
an outcome which results from a preferred than from a non-preferred proce-
dure. Indeed, experiment 2 (chapter 5) confirms the hypothesis for individual
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procedural satisfaction. Responders offered less resistance to any outcome if
their individual procedural preferences were satisfied. The effect is signifi-
cant for high tax claims. In contrast, experiment 1 (chapter 4) revealed the
opposite: responders whose individual procedural preferences were satisfied
offered significantly more resistance than those whose procedural preferences
were violated. As both experiments differ in a strategic feature, i.e., proposers
either know or do not know how they have been appointed, responders seem
to evaluate proposers’ claims differently depending on the information being
available to proposers.
With regard to group procedural satisfaction, data from both experi-
ments suggests a more unified picture. For any claim, responders offered
more resistance if their group procedural preferences are satisfied. However,
the differences are only significant in experiment 1. The direction of the ef-
fect is reversed from what we expected. Two possible reasons come to the
fore: the frustration effect and the expectation effect. The expectation effect
describes the fact that people form expectations about the contributions of
others and adjust their contribution decisions accordingly. Such an expec-
tation effect can go in either direction: it may raise contributions or lower
contributions, depending on whether one expects one’s own contribution to
be necessary or superfluous to make resistance successful. Further research
would be necessary to explain the findings.
Previous research has shown that fair procedures generally trigger posi-
tive responses, but the opposite may be true as well. Some studies found a
so-called frustration effect to occur under certain conditions: fair procedures
can result in less satisfaction with negative outcomes than unfair procedures.
It has been argued that the effect only occurs in settings where the character-
istics that give the procedure a procedural fairness advantage are relatively
weak. In chapter 2, I discuss the effect and its underlying reasons in greater
detail. I argue that these findings from the procedural fairness literature
can be transferred to the broader notion of procedural satisfaction. Again,
further research in this direction is encouraged.
Third, I investigated whether individuals claim a smaller share of a group
endowment if they have been appointed proposers based on a procedure
which was either accepted by the group or rejected. Experiment 2 reveals
that an I-want-You effect exists: proposers whose group procedural pref-
erences were satisfied claimed less than proposers whose group procedural
preferences were not satisfied. This finding is in line with previous findings
and thus underlines the robustness of the experimental design. Besides, it
shows that procedural judgements are of great importance for both respon-
ders and proposers.
Fourth, this dissertation was intended to answer the question whether
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individuals rather accept an outcome if they have the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the decision making process regarding the distribution of a group
endowment. Procedural fairness can be characterized by various fairness
criterions, amongst others participation in the decision making process. Ex-
periment 3 (chapter 6) shows that behavior depends on the possibility to
participate. Responders destroyed more if they had no opportunity to par-
ticipate in the decision making process and were confronted with highly un-
favorable outcomes. This participation effect is highly significant for those
responders (the majority) who show negative reciprocity (i.e. they destroyed
more when takers are greedier).
I believe that these results contribute to a deeper understanding of the be-
havioral foundations of procedural effects in decision-making. The findings
suggest that future research should account for people’s procedural judge-
ments in order to contribute to the inclusion of any behaviorally relevant
factor.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Figures: Responder types
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Figure A.1: Responder types in treatment PartHigh
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Figure A.2: Responder types in treatment PartLow
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Figure A.3: Responder types in treatment NoPartHigh
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Figure A.4: Responder types in treatment NoPartLow
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Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 4
B.1 Sign-up sheet
The original sign-up sheets were in German. Each participant filled in this
sheet before the experiment was conducted.
1. Participant number:
2. Gender:
2 male 2 female
3. Age:
4. Approximately how many hours per week do you volunteer?
2 less than 1 hour/week
2 about 1 hour/week
2 about 2 hours/week
2 about 3 hours/week
2 about 4 hours/week
2 about 5 hours/week
2 about 6 hours/week
2 about 7 hours/week
2 about 8 hours/week
2 more than 8 hours/week
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5. Do you participate in this experiment for the first time? [applied in
session 1 to 3 only]
2 yes 2 no
6. Have you participated in the experiment at the University’s Open Day
2005? [applied in session 4 and 5 only]
2 yes 2 no
7. Are you studying? [applied in session 4 and 5 only]
2 yes, field of study: 2 no
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B.2 Written instructions
The original instructions were in German. They will be sent on request. This
appendix reprints a translation of them.
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment!
The experiment lasts about 30 minutes and has four stages. During the
first three stages, you will be asked to make decisions. You will get sheets
with precise instructions. Your payment depends on your decisions
and the decisions of the other participants. In stage four, we will ask
you to fill in a questionnaire.
Please do not communicate with any other participant from
now on. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We
will assist and help you. You are allowed to ask questions at any time.
Please do not ask questions in public. Please ask only us, do not ask other
participants. Thank you!
Please read the explanations for any decision stage carefully. Then make
your decision and enter it in the appropriate sheet. A stage is completed
when all decisions are made. Please do not turn back the page.
You will be assigned to a group of 5 people (you and four other partic-
ipants). During the experiment, you will play in the same group. Each of
your teammates will be handed out exactly the same instructions. We will
keep group membership, decisions and payment in confidence.
In our experiment, you can earn chips. At the end of the experiment
your earnings in chips will be converted to Euros at the rate of 4
chips = 1 Euro. That is, each earned chip equals 0.25 Euro. The
more chips you earn, the higher your payment will be.
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Decision sheet (stage 1)
There are 4 chip owners in your group. Each chip owner has 25 chips.
The fifth member of your group has no chips at the beginning. The group
member without chips will be called participant X. No one in your group
knows, who participant X is. It might be that you are participant X. Your
first task is to imagine to be participant X. As participant X, you have no
chips, while each chip owner has 25 chips. It is now up to you to propose,
how many chips each chip owner is supposed to yield to you:
0 chips, 5 chips, 10 chips, 15 chips, 20 chips, or 25 chips.
Each participant in your group has been asked to make such a transfer pro-
posal; only one group member is participant X. Later in the course of the
experiment, it will be decided who participant X is. Besides, later during the
course of the experiment, it will be decided whether the transfer proposal of
participant X will be realized.
Example: You decide in favor of a transfer of 10 chips. If you are
participant X and your proposal has been realized, you will get 10 chips
from each chip owner. These are 40 chips in sum for you. As each chip
owner has 25 chips in the beginning and now has to give over 10 chips to
you, 15 chips remain for each chip owner. The result of your proposal would
be: 40 chips for you in the role of participant X, 15 chips for each chip owner.
Please decide now in favor of a transfer. Mark with a cross the
chosen transfer in the last column! Mark with only one tick. If you
want to cancel an entry, cross it clearly out and tick another box.
Transfer: Each chipowner keeps:
As participant
X, you get:
Mark one en-
try:
0 chips 25 chips 0 chips
5 chips 20 chips 20 chips
10 chips 15 chips 40 chips
15 chips 10 chips 60 chips
20 chips 5 chips 80 chips
25 chips 0 chips 100 chips
Stage 1 is completed when you made your decision.
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Decision sheet (stage 2)
In stage 1, each member of your group made a proposal in the role of
participant X, how many chips the other group members should transfer to
him/her. However, only one member of your group can really be participant
X. One of the following rules will decide who participant X will be.
Rule 1: The experimenter decides someone to be participant X without
being aware of your proposals.
Rule 2: Your group is asked to vote for one of two options in deciding
someone to be participant X: the oldest group member or the one who
volunteers his/her time most frequently. If more than one group
member comes into question (e.g. because two persons are of the
same age), participant X will be drawn.
It will not be announced at any time who participant X is.
A) Please indicate your opinion about both rules.
1. In your opinion, which rule should be used: rule 1 (the experimenter
decides) or rule 2 (vote of the group)?
2 rule 1 2 rule 2
2. Please give reasons for your decision:
3. How do you rate the importance of the appointment procedure on a
scale from very important to completely unimportant?
very important 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 completely unimportant
4. How do you rate rule 1 (the experimenter decides) on a scale from very
unfair to completely fair?
very unfair 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 completely fair
5. How do you rate rule 2 (vote of the group) on a scale from very unfair
to completely fair?
very unfair 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 completely fair
B) Please vote now: Who should be participant X, if rule 2 is used?
If you do not tick any box, you cast a ballot for the first possibility.
2 the oldest participant
2 the participant who volunteers his/her time most frequently.
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Stage 2 is completed when you have answered all questions.
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Comments on stage 3
In stage 2, you and any other group member have indicated whether rule
1 (the experimenter decides) or rule 2 (vote of the group over the criteria
age and engagement) should be used. The result of the vote is as follows:
group member(s) voted for rule 1 and
group member(s) voted for rule 2.
Thus, the majority voted for rule .
In your group, the majority / minority (to be deleted as appli-
cable) decides which rule will be used. Thus:
Participant X of your group will be assigned by rule .
Participant X is yet to be determined, but you do not know, who it is and
which transfer participant X claims. In case you are not participant X but a
chip owner, you have to make another decision: Do you pay voluntarily the
transfer to participant X or do you resist? Because you do not know, which
transfer participant X has claimed, you have to decide for each possible
proposal of participant X. In case you are participant X, your decision in
stage 3 is irrelevant.
As a chip owner, you are now endowed with 25 chips. Participant X
claims a transfer from you and from the other chip owners: either 0, 5, 10,
15, 20, or 25 chips. If you do not want to pay the transfer, you may
pay any number of chips out of your 25 chips into a common account.
Half chips can be payed, to. All chip owners are asked to do the same. In
case the chip owners pay at least 26 chips in sum into the common
account, the transfer to participant X need not to be paid.
Thus there are two alternatives:
1. There are paid 26 chips or more in sum into the common account:
Then nobody has to transfer anything to participant X. Thus participant X
receives 0 chips. The chip owners can keep all chips, which they have not
paid into the common account. The chips paid into the common account are
lost.
2. There are paid less than 26 chips in sum into the common ac-
count: The chips paid into the common account are lost. All chip owners
have to pay the transfer; if they have not enough chips left, they will pay as
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much as they can. Participant X receives the transfer he/she has asked for
or somewhat less, if a chip owner has not got enough chips left to pay the
whole transfer.
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Three examples: Participant X asks each chip owner for a transfer of
10 chips. You do not want to pay the transfer.
1. You pay 5.5 chips into the common account. The other three chip owners
pay 22.5 chips in sum. Thus, there are 28 chips in the common account.
Therefore, the transfer need not to be paid. You will receive 19.5 chips: 25
chips minus 5.5 chips (your transfer into the common account) equals 19.5
chips. Participant X receives 0 chips.
2. You pay 6 chips into the common account. The other three chip owners
pay 13.5 chips in sum. Thus, there are 19.5 chips in the common account.
Therefore, the transfer must be paid. You will receive 9 chips: 25 chips minus
6 chips (your transfer into the common account) minus 10 chips (transfer)
equals 9 chips. Participant X receives 40 chips in sum: 10 from each chip
owner.
3. You pay 20 chips into the common account. The other three chip owners
pay 3.5 chips in sum. Thus, there are 23.5 chips in the common account.
Therefore, the transfer must be paid. You will receive 0 chips: 25 chips
minus 20 Chips (your transfer into the common account) equals 5 chips; you
have to transfer these 5 chips to participant X. Participant X receives 35
chips in sum: only 5 chips from you, because you cannot pay more, and 10
chips from each other chip owner.
You will receive 0.25 Euro cash for each chip you have earned in stage 1
to 3.
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Decision sheet (stage 3)
For your group applies:
Participant X will be assigned by rule .
As a reminder: rule 1 says that the experimenter determines participant
X. Rule 2 says that the group votes.
In case you are a chip owner and not participant X please spec-
ify, how many chips you want to pay into the common account: 0
chips, 0.5 chips, 1 chip, 1.5 chips, 2 chips, 2.5 chips, 3 chips, ...24
chips, 24.5 chips, or all 25 chips. You are asked to make a decision
for each possible transfer proposal of participant X.
1. Assume that participant X claims a transfer of 25 chips. In this case,
how many of your 25 chips do you want to pay into the common ac-
count?
I would like to pay chips.
2. Assume that participant X claims a transfer of 20 chips. In this case,
how many of your 25 chips do you want to pay into the common ac-
count?
I would like to pay chips.
3. Assume that participant X claims a transfer of 15 chips. In this case,
how many of your 25 chips do you want to pay into the common ac-
count?
I would like to pay chips.
4. Assume that participant X claims a transfer of 10 chips. In this case,
how many of your 25 chips do you want to pay into the common ac-
count?
I would like to pay chips.
5. Assume that participant X claims a transfer of 5 chips. In this case, how
many of your 25 chips do you want to pay into the common account?
I would like to pay chips.
6. Assume that participant X claims a transfer of 0 chips. In this case, how
many of your 25 chips do you want to pay into the common account?
I would like to pay chips.
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Stage 3 is completed when you have made all six decisions.
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B.3 Post-experimental questionnaire
Questionnaire (stage 4)
Finally, we would like to ask you to fill in a short questionnaire.
1. The comments to stage 1 (decision as participant X) were clear and
comprehensible.
I agree 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 I do not agree
2. The comments to stage 2 (determination of participant X) were clear
and comprehensible.
I agree 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 I do not agree
3. The comments to stage 3 (decisions as chip owner) were clear and com-
prehensible.
I agree 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 I do not agree
4. I tried to earn as many chips and thus as many Euro as possible.
I agree 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 I do not agree
5. I thought twice about each decision.
I agree 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 I do not agree
6. Your group has been assigned one out of two possible rules for de-
termination of participant X. Subsequently, you have decided on your
individual resistance for each possible transfer proposal of participant
X. How do you rate the influence of the assigned rule on your individual
resistance decisions?
strong influence 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 no influence at all
7. Each group member has voted which rule to determine participant X
is right.The result of the vote has been communicated to you. How do
you rate the influence of the group opinion on your individual resis-
tance decisions?
strong influence 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 no influence at all
8. What is a fair transfer proposal of participant X?
A fair transfer proposal of participant X is chips.
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9. Remember your decision in the role of a chip owner in response to a
transfer proposal of 15 chips. In your opinion, should your group offer
resistance?
2 no 2 yes
10. Let us assume that you would know the other three chip owners have
paid exactly 19.5 chips into the common account in response to a trans-
fer proposal of 15 chips. What would you do?
In that case, I would pay chips into the common ac-
count.
Thank you very much for participating!
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B.4 Post-experimental questionnaire: Answers
1. The comments to stage 1 (decision as participant X) were clear and
comprehensible. (1: “I agree” to 7: “I do not agree”)
2. The comments to stage 2 (determination of participant X) were clear
and comprehensible. (1: “I agree” to 7: “I do not agree”)
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3. The comments to stage 3 (decisions as chip owner) were clear and com-
prehensible. (1: “I agree” to 7: “I do not agree”)
4. I tried to earn as many chips and thus as many Euro as possible. (1:
“I agree” to 7: “I do not agree”)
154 APPENDIX B. APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 4
5. I thought twice about each decision. (1: “I agree” to 7: “I do not
agree”)
6. Your group has been assigned one out of two possible rules for de-
termination of participant X. Subsequently, you have decided on your
individual resistance for each possible transfer proposal of participant
X. How do you rate the influence of the assigned rule on your individual
resistance decisions? (1: “strong influence” to 7:“no influence at all”)
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7. Each group member has voted which rule to determine participant X
is right.The result of the vote has been communicated to you. How do
you rate the influence of the group opinion on your individual resis-
tance decisions?(1: “strong influence” to 7: “no influence at all”)
8. What is a fair transfer proposal of participant X?
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9. Remember your decision in the role of a chip owner in response to a
transfer proposal of 15 chips. In your opinion, should your group offer
resistance?
10. Let us assume that you would know the other three chip owners have
paid exactly 19.5 chips into the common account in response to a trans-
fer proposal of 15 chips. What would you do?
Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 5
C.1 Written instructions
The original instructions are in Bulgarian. This appendix reprints a transla-
tion of majority treatment instructions for proposers. The original instruc-
tions in Bulgarian or a German version will be sent on request.
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! This experiment lasts about 45 minutes.
Please do not communicate with any other participant from
now on. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will answer
them. You can raise questions throughout the experiment. Please do not ask
questions in public. Ask only the experimenter, do not ask other participants.
Thank you!
The experiment has four stages. You can earn money depending on your
decisions and on the decisions of the other members in your group. In stage
four, we will ask you to fill in a short questionnaire. You have been randomly
assigned to a group of 5 people (you and four other participants). You are
paired with these persons throughout the experiment. Nobody, however, will
be informed about who is paired with whom or who earns how much. These
information we will keep in confidence.
In our experiment, you can earn chips. At the end of the experiment
your earnings in chips will be converted to Leva at the rate of 4 chips = 1
Lev, i.e. each earned chip equals 0.25 Lev.
Please read all sheets carefully. Then take your decisions and fill in the
sheets accordingly. A stage is completed if all decisions are filled in. Please
do not scroll back.
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Decision sheet (stage 1)
There are 4 chip owners in your group and 100 chips in total. Each chip
owner gets 25 chips. The fifth member of your group has 0 chips at the
beginning. This group member without chips is called participant X.
During the experiment participant X proposes how many chips each chip
owner is supposed to yield to him. Thereafter, chip owners have to decide
whether or not to offer resistance against the proposal of participant X. The
attempt to offer resistance costs chips. If no resistance is offered or resistance
was unsuccessful, participant X obtains the number of chips claimed (as
long as they have not been spent for resistance). If resistance is successful,
participant X receives nothing.
However, only one group member is actually participant X. One of the
following two rules determines who will be participant X.
Rule 1: The experimenter chooses someone to be participant X.
Rule 2: The group is asked to vote for one of two options in deciding
someone to be participant X: either the oldest group member or the one who
spends most time in student and volunteer activities. If more than one group
member has to be considered (for instance, two persons are of the same age)
participant X will be chosen by lot.
A) Please indicate your opinion about both rules.
1. How do you rate the importance of the rule for choosing participant X
on a scale from very important to very unimportant?
very important 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 very unimportant
2. How do you rate rule 1 (the experimenter decides) on a scale from very
unfair to extremely fair?
very unfair 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 very fair
3. How do you rate rule 2 (group voting) on a scale from very unfair to
extremely fair?
very unfair 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 very fair
B) Please vote now: If you do not tick any box, your vote counts for
the first one.
1. In your opinion, which rule should be used: rule 1 (the experimenter
decides) or rule 2 (vote of the group)?
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2 rule 1 2 rule 2
2. If rule 2 is applied, who should be participant X?
2 the oldest participant
2 the participant who spends most time for student and
volunteer activities
Stage 1 is completed when you have answered all questions.
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Decision sheet (stage 2)
In stage 1, each group member has voted for a rule to be applied for
choosing participant X. The voting result is as follows:
votes for rule 1.
votes for rule 2.
Thus, the majority voted for rule
The majority decides which rule will be used.
Thus: Rule applies.
Based on this rule you have been assigned the role of participant X.
No participant of the experiment will never know that you are participant
X. As participant X, you have 0 chips, while each chip owner has 25 chips.
It is now up to you to propose how many chips each chip owner is supposed
to yield to you:
0 chips, 5 chips, 10 chips, 15 chips, 20 chips or 25 chips.
In stage 3 of the experiment, chip owners can decide whether to offer
resistance against your proposal or not. The attempt to offer resistance
costs chips. If no resistance is offered or resistance was unsuccessful, you
as participant X receive the number of chips you had proposed (as long as
the chips have not been spent for resistance). If resistance is successful, you
receive nothing.
Example: You propose a transfer of 10 chips. If your proposal is imple-
mented, you will get 10 chips from each chip owner, that is, 40 chips in sum.
As each chip owner has 25 chips at the beginning and is then asked to yield
10 chips to you, 15 chips are left for the chip owner. The result would be:
40 chips for you as participant X and 15 chips for each chip owner.
Please decide now. Mark with a cross the chosen transfer in
the last column! Tick only one transfer. In case you tick more than one or
none transfer, the lowest transfer is counted. If you want to cancel an entry,
cross it clearly out and tick another entry.
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Transfer: Each chipowner keeps: You will get:
Your pro-
posal
0 chips 25 chips 0 chips
5 chips 20 chips 20 chips
10 chips 15 chips 40 chips
15 chips 10 chips 60 chips
20 chips 5 chips 80 chips
25 chips 0 chips 100 chips
Stage 2 is completed when you have chosen a transfer.
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Comments on stage 3
You as participant X have decided in stage 2 how many chips you claim
from each participant. Now the four other participants take their decisions.
However, we would like to ask you to imagine that you are in the situation
of a chip owner. Now we would like to ask you how you would decide in such
a situation. Your decision now has no consequences for you payoff.
The chip owners have to decide either to pay the chips which you have
demanded as player X or to show resistance. Since the chip owners do not
know how much you have demanded they have to decide for each possible
claim.
Please imagine now that you are in the role of a chips owner. As a chip
owner, you are endowed with 25 chips. Participant X asks for a transfer from
you and from the other chip owners: either 0, 5, 10, 15, 20 or 25 chips. If
you do not want to pay the transfer, you may pay any number of chips out of
your 25 chips into the common account. All chip owners are asked to do the
same. In case the chip owners pay at least 26 chips in sum into the common
account, the transfer to participant X need not to be paid.
Thus there are two alternatives:
1. There are paid 26 chips or more in sum into the common account:
Then noboby has to transfer anything to participant X. Thus participant X
receives 0 chips. The chip owners can keep all chips, which they have not
paid into the common account. The chips paid into the common account are
lost.
2. There are paid less than 26 chips in sum into the common ac-
count: The chips paid into the common account are lost. All chip owners
have to pay the transfer; if they have not enough chips left, they will pay
as much as they can. Participant X receives the transfer he has asked for or
somewhat less, if a chip owner has not got enough chips left to pay the whole
transfer.
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Three examples:
1. Participant X asks each chip owner for a transfer of 10 chips. You do not
want to pay the transfer. You pay 5.5 chips into the common account. The
other three chip owners pay 22.5 chips in sum. Thus, there are 28 chips in
the common account. Therefore, the transfer need not to be paid. You will
receive 19.5 chips: 25 chips minus 5.5 chips (your transfer into the common
account) equals 19.5 chips. Participant X receives 0 chips.
2. Participant X asks each chip owner for a transfer of 10 chips. You do not
want to pay the transfer. You pay 6 chips into the common account. The
other three chip owners pay 13.5 chips in sum. Thus, there are 19.5 chips in
the common account. Therefore, the transfer must be paid. You will receive
9 chips: 25 chips minus 6 chips (your transfer into the common account)
minus 10 chips (transfer to participant X) equals 9 chips. Participant X
receives 40 chips in sum: 10 from each chip owner.
3. Participant X asks each chip owner for a transfer of 10 chips. You do not
want to pay the transfer. You pay 20 chips into the common account. The
other three chip owners pay 3.5 chips in sum. Thus, there are 23.5 chips in
the common account. Therefore, the transfer must be paid. You will receive
0 chips: 25 chips minus 20 Chips (your transfer into the common account)
equals 5 chips; you have to transfer these 5 chips to participant X. Participant
X receives 35 chips in sum: only 5 chips from you, because you cannot pay
more, and 10 from each other chip owner.
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Decision sheet (stage 3)
As a reminder: In stage 1 each group member has decided for a rule in
order to determine participant X. The rule which received the majority
of votes was applied to select participant X. Please indicate how many
chips you would like to transfer to the common account. You can pay any
sum between 0 and 25 chips and you can also pay half chips. You are asked
to make a decision for each possible transfer proposal of participant X.
1. Assume that participant X asks for a transfer of 25 chips. In this case,
how many chips of your endowment of 25 chips do you want to pay
into the common account?
I would like to pay chips.
2. Assume that participant X asks for a transfer of 20 chips. In this case,
how many chips of your endowment of 25 chips do you want to pay
into the common account?
I would like to pay chips.
3. Assume that participant X asks for a transfer of 15 chips. In this case,
how many chips of your endowment of 25 chips do you want to pay
into the common account?
I would like to pay chips.
4. Assume that participant X asks for a transfer of 10 chips. In this case,
how many chips of your endowment of 25 chips do you want to pay
into the common account?
I would like to pay chips.
5. Assume that participant X asks for a transfer of 5 chips. In this case,
how many chips of your endowment of 25 chips do you want to pay
into the common account?
I would like to pay chips.
6. Assume that participant X asks for a transfer of 0 chips. In this case,
how many chips of your endowment of 25 chips do you want to pay
into the common account?
I would like to pay chips.
Stage 3 is completed when you have reached all six decisions.
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C.2 Post-experimental questionnaire
Questionnaire (stage 4)
Code No.:
At the end of the experiment, we would like to ask you to fill in a short
questionnaire.
1. The comments to stage 1 (determination of participant X) were clear
and comprehensible.
I agree 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 I do not agree
2. The comments to stage 2 (decision in the role of participant X) were
clear and comprehensible.
I agree 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 I do not agree
3. The comments to stage 3 (decisions in the role of a chip owner) were
clear and comprehensible.
I agree 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 I do not agree
4. I tried to earn as many chips and thus as many Lewa as possible.
I agree 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 I do not agree
5. I thought twice about each decision.
I agree 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 I do not agree
6. According to rule 1, the experimenter decides who becomes participant
X. Do you prefer the experimenter to be a professor from your depart-
ment or an unknown third person or don’t you care?
2 preferably a professor
2 preferably an unknown third person
2 I don’t care
7. To which study group (German, English, French) do you belong to?
Your group:
8. Imagine, you take part in the experiment twice. You know in the first
round that the other 4 group members belong to the same study group
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(Englisch, French, German) as you do (homogeneous group composi-
tion). In the second round the study groups are mixed up (heteroge-
neous group composition). Would you make exactly the same decisions
in both rounds or would you make different decisions?
As participant X:
2 I make the same decisions
2 I claim a larger part in a homogeneous group
2 I claim a smaller part in a homogeneous group
As a chip owner:
2 I make the same decisions
2 I claim a larger part in a homogeneous group
2 I claim a smaller part in a homogeneous group
9. In your opinion, how strong is the influence of participant X’s legiti-
macy on the resistance level.
very weak 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 very strong
10. How do you rate your religiousness on a six-point scale.
not religious 2 2 2 2 2 2 very religious
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C.3 Post-experimental questionnaire: Answers
1. The comments to stage 1 (determination of participant X) were clear
and comprehensible. (1: “I agree” to 7: “I do not agree”)
2. The comments to stage 2 (decision in the role of participant X) were
clear and comprehensible. (1: “I agree” to 7: “I do not agree”)
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3. The comments to stage 3 (decisions in the role of a chip owner) were
clear and comprehensible. (1: “I agree” to 7: “I do not agree”)
4. I tried to earn as many chips and thus as many Lewa as possible. (1:
“I agree” to 7: “I do not agree”)
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5. I thought twice about each decision. (1: “I agree” to 7: “I do not
agree”)
6. According to rule 1, the experimenter decides who becomes participant
X. Do you prefer the experimenter to be a professor from your depart-
ment or an unknown third person or don’t you care? (1: “professor”;
2: “unknown third person”; 3: “I don’t care”)
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8. Imagine, you take part in the experiment twice. You know in the first
round that the other 4 group members belong to the same study group
(Englisch, French, German) as you do (homogeneous group composi-
tion). In the second round the study groups are mixed up (heteroge-
neous group composition). Would you make exactly the same decisions
in both rounds or would you make different decisions? (1: “I make the
same decisions”; 2: “I claim a larger part in a homogeneous group”; 3:
“I claim a smaller part in a homogeneous group”)
As participant X:
As a chip owner:
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9. In your opinion, how strong is the influence of participant X’s legiti-
macy on the resistance level? (1: “very weak” to 7: “very strong”)
10. How do you rate your religiousness on a six-point scale? (1: “not
religious” to 6: “very religious”)
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Appendix D
Appendices to Chapter 6
D.1 Written instructions
These are the written instructions, translated from the German original, for
the PartLow treatment. The instructions for the other three treatments were
very similar and are available upon request. Formatting (e.g., use of bold
face) follows the original, with the exception of spacing. Screenshots of the
computerized experiment, z-tree files and raw data are also available from the
authors upon request.
Instructions
Welcome! This experiment lasts about 20 minutes and consists of three
stages. In stage 1 and 2, you will be asked to make decisions. For this, you
will receive precise instructions. In stage 3, you are asked to fill in a short
questionnaire. All answers are treated as confidential. Your chances to win
the prize of 500 Euro depends only on your decisions and the decisions of
your group members in the first two stages. Your chances do not depend
on your questionnaire answers. Please do not communicate with any
other participant from now on. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. An experimenter will come to you and answer your questions
individually. At every moment in the experiment, you can ask the
experimenters questions. Do not ask anyone else and make sure
you ask quietly. Thank you!
Please read the instructions carefully. The experiment does not start until
each participant has completely read and understood these instructions. You
have to type your decisions into the corresponding field on the screen. Once
you have entered and confirmed your decisions, a stage is completed. Note
that all decisions are final and cannot be changed at a later date.
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In this experiment, you have been randomly assigned to a group of three
players. No participant will find out, who his/her teammates are and which
decisions they made. We will treat group membership and decisions as con-
fidential. Each group consists of two A participants and one B par-
ticipant. By drawing a number at the reception desk, you were assigned
either role A or role B. You will keep this role throughout the experiment.
At a later date, you will be informed about your role.
In our experiment, you can earn chips by making decisions. Your chances
to win the prize of 500 Euro depends on your decisions and the
decisions of your teammates. Every whole earned chips will be
converted into a lottery ticket. Example: You earn 3.7 chips and thus
receive 3 lottery tickets. At the drawing, taking place during lecture time
next week, the number of lottery tickets will be fixed at 1044. Thus, the
probability of winning the prize of 500 Euro is 1/1044 for each earned chip.
This probability does not depend on the number of lottery tickets other
participants earn. Remember: The more chips you earn, the higher
your chance to win the prize of 500 Euro. In addition, remaining lottery
tickets are distributed among all participants by a fair random mechanism.
In addition to and independent of individual decisions, each participant who
participates in the experiment according to the rules, receives 5 credit points
for the written examination in Introductory Microeconomics.
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Stage one (group claim)
There are 2 participants A and 1 participant B in your group. At the be-
ginning, the B participant has an endowment of 9 chips and each
A participant has 0 chips. In stage 1, the group chooses a percentage.
This percentage determines how many of the 9 chips participant
B has to transfer after stage two to both participants A (one half
each).
Example: Suppose that the group decides that 33.33% of the endow-
ment of 9 chips of participant B (that is 3 chips) will be transferred to both
participants A. Each A receives 1.5 chips and B keeps 6 chips.
The voting procedure is as follows:
Both participants A and participant B propose a percentage. This
percentage determines how much of B’s endowment of 9 chips after
stage two will be transferred to the participants A. The following
percentages are available: 33.33%, 66.66% and 100%. Each group
member makes a proposal by ticking the appropriate number.
The decision rule is a compromise of all three proposals: All pro-
posals are added and divided by three. Thus, the average take rate
is the group decision. To conclude, the voting rule is:
[(A’s proposal) + (A’s proposal) + (B’s proposal)]: 3
Note that participant B is involved in bringing about a decision on
how many chips to transfer from participant B to both participants
A.
Example: One participant A chooses 100%, the other participant A
chooses 33.33%. B chooses 100%. The average proposal is (100%+33.33%+
100%) : 3 = 77.77% and this is the group decision on their take rate.
Stage two (destruction of endowment)
In stage one, the group has decided on participant’s B transfer to both par-
ticipants A. This decision has been made by participants A and participant
B.
In stage two, only participant B makes a decision.
Now, participant B can react to the group’s decision in stage one
by deciding which percentage of his/her endowment will be de-
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stroyed. The percentage chosen must be an integer in the interval
[0,100].
The transfer from participant B to each participant A will be based
on the residual endowment of participant B that is left after stage
two.
At that time, participant B does not know yet which percentage has been
chosen by the group in stage one. Participant B is only informed of the per-
centage he/she has proposed, but not of the percentages each participant A
has chosen. Thus, in stage two, B has to decide on the destruction of his/her
endowment for any feasible resulting percentage.
After stage two, the experiment is completed. In stage three, you will be
asked several questions. Your answers on this questions do not influence
your chances to win the prize.
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Payoffs
After stage two, all participants will be informed of the number of lottery
tickets they have earned during the experiment. They will also be informed
of the number of lottery tickets earned by their teammates. Additionally,
each participant may receive further lottery tickets by a random procedure.
No participant is able to influence the allocation of additional lottery tickets.
Example of how to calculate your number of lottery tickets:
Remember that participant B has an endowment of 9 chips. Each A partici-
pant has 0 chips. Suppose that in stage one a percentage of 66.66% has
been chosen by the group. This means that participant B keeps 3 chips
and transfers 6 chips (66.66% of 9 chips) to the A participants. Thus, the
payoff of each participant A equals 3 chips (6 : 2 = 3).
Remember that in stage two, participant B can destroy any percentage of
his/her initial endowment of 9 chips. Destroyed chips are not available for
allocation within the group any more.
Suppose that participant B decides to destroy 0% of his/her endowment.
In this case, the whole endowment of 9 chips remains. Participant B’s trans-
fer to both participants A is 6 chips (66.66% of 9 chips). Each participant
A receives 3 chips and participant B keeps also 3 chips (participant B’s en-
dowment of 9 chips minus the transfer of 6 chips). Thus, each participant of
this group receives 3 lottery tickets.
Now suppose that, in this example, participant B decides to destroy 50%
of his/her endowment as reaction to a group claim of 66.66%. Thus, only
4.5 chips would remain as the half of 9 chips have been destroyed. In this
case, participant B’s transfer to both participants A is again 66.66%, but
66.66% of 4.5 chips, thus 3 chips. Each participant A receives 1.5 chips and
participant B keeps 1.5 chips. As the exchange rate between chips and lot-
tery tickets is 1:1 and only whole numbers of chips are converted to lottery
tickets, each group member receives 1 lottery ticket.
If you have any questions now, please raise your hand and we will come to
you. If you do not have questions any more, please wait until an experimenter
announces the start of the experiment and click then on “start experiment”.
Thank you for participating!
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D.2 Post-experimental questionnaire
1. Participant number:
2. Month of birth:
3. Year of birth:
4. Gender:
2 male 2 female
5. Field of study:
6. Number of semesters:
7. Where did you receive your high school diploma?
2 Germany 2 any other country
8. If you received your high school diploma in Germany, please indicate
the federal state; if you received your high school diploma in any other
country, please indicate the country:
9. How many months did you spend abroad?
10. Have you ever taken part in an economic or psychological experiment
before?
2 yes 2 no
11. Do you know any fundamental differences between economic and psy-
chological experiments?
12. Did you enjoy the experiment?
2 yes 2 no
13. Would you take part in an economic experiment again?
2 yes 2 no
14. How do you rate the voting procedure?
very fair 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 very unfair
15. How do you rate a transfer of 33.33% (stage 1)?
very fair 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 very unfair
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16. How do you rate a transfer of 66.66% (stage 1)?
very fair 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 very unfair
17. How do you rate a transfer of 100% (stage 1)?
very fair 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 very unfair
18. Decision in stage 1 (fraction of B’s endowment to be handed out to
both A’s): which claim is the fairest?
2 33.33% 2 66.66% 2 100%
19. Decision in stage 2 (fraction of B’s endowment that B destroys): do
you consider the possibility of participants B to destroy part of their
own endowment reasonable?
2 yes 2 no
20. What might be the motivation of participants B to destroy part of their
own endowment?
21. What do you think: which fraction of their endowment do participants
B destroy on average in reaction to a claim of 66.66%?
22. Do you think that participants B destroy a different fraction depending
on whether they proposed a transfer or not?
2 yes 2 no
23. Do you think that participants B who proposed a transfer destroy a
larger, a smaller or the same fraction in reaction to a low transfer in
comparison to participants B who did not propose a transfer?
2 larger fraction 2 smaller fraction 2 same
fraction
24. Do you think that participants B who proposed a transfer destroy a
larger, a smaller or the same fraction in reaction to a medium transfer
in comparison to participants B who did not propose a transfer?
2 larger fraction 2 smaller fraction 2 same
fraction
25. Do you think that participants B who proposed a transfer destroy a
larger, a smaller or the same fraction in reaction to a high transfer in
comparison to participants B who did not propose a transfer?
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2 larger fraction 2 smaller fraction 2 same
fraction
Thank you very much for taking part in the experiment. You can leave
now.
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D.3 Post-experimental questionnaire: Answers
14. How do you rate the voting procedure? (1: “very fair” to 7: “very
unfair”)
15. How do you rate a transfer of 33.33% (stage 1)? (1: “very fair” to 7:
“very unfair”)
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16. How do you rate a transfer of 66.66% (stage 1)? (1: “very fair” to 7:
“very unfair”)
17. How do you rate a transfer of 100% (stage 1)? (1: “very fair” to 7:
“very unfair”)
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18. Decision in stage 1 (fraction of B’s endowment to be handed out to
both A’s): which claim is the fairest one?
19. Decision in stage 2 (fraction of B’s endowment that B destroys): do
you consider the possibility of participants B to destroy part of their
own endowment reasonable?
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21. What do you think: which fraction of their endowment do participants
B destroy on average in reaction to a claim of 66.66%?
22. Do you think that participants B destroy a different fraction depending
on whether they proposed a transfer or not?
D.3. POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE: ANSWERS 185
23. Do you think that participants B who proposed a transfer destroy a
larger, a smaller or the same fraction in reaction to a low transfer in
comparison to participants B who did not propose a transfer?
24. Do you think that participants B who proposed a transfer destroy a
larger, a smaller or the same fraction in reaction to a medium transfer
in comparison to participants B who did not propose a transfer?
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25. Do you think that participants B who proposed a transfer destroy a
larger, a smaller or the same fraction in reaction to a high transfer in
comparison to participants B who did not propose a transfer?
Appendix E
Eidesstattliche Erklärung
Ich erkläre an Eides statt:
Ich habe die vorgelegte Dissertation selbständig, nur mit den Hilfen angefer-
tigt, die ich in der Dissertation angegeben habe und ohne unerlaubte fremde
Hilfe. Alle Textstellen, die wörtlich oder sinngemäss aus veröffentlichten
oder nicht veröffentlichten Schriften entnommen sind, und alle Angaben,
die auf mündlichen Auskünften beruhen, sind als solche kenntlich gemacht.
Bei den von mir durchgeführten und in der Dissertation erwähnten Unter-
suchungen habe ich die Grundsätze guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis, wie sie
in der Satzung der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen zur Sicherung guter wis-
senschaftlicher Praxis niedergelegt sind, eingehalten.
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